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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITOR	DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY *Barnard College* *Columbia University*
MANAGING EDITOR	BONNIE B. HARTMAN
MANUSCRIPT EDITOR	JEAN HIGHLAND

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CONTENTS

PSQ • Volume 112 • Number 3 • Fall 1997

"Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti
MORRIS MORLEY
CHRIS MCGILLION 363

Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy
JONATHAN MERMIN 385

Teenage Childbearing and Personal Responsibility: An Alternative View
ARLINE T. GERONIMUS 405

Unfolding Promises: Trust Funds and the Politics of Precommitment
ERIC M. PATASHNIK 431

Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru
WENDY HUNTER 453

Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War
BETH A. FISCHER 477

Book Reviews 497

Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received 539

Correspondence 540

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BOOK REVIEWS

Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, **Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals** JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD 497

Dan T. Carter, **From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994** RICHARD M. VALELLY 498

W. Avon Drake and Robert D. Holsworth, **Affirmative Action and the Stalled Quest for Black Progress** WILBUR C. RICH 500

Louis DeSipio, **Counting the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate** JUAN CARLOS HUERTA 501

William G. Mayer, **The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections** FRANCIS E. ROURKE 502

Clyde Wilcox, **Onward Christian Soldiers: The Religious Right in American Politics** ALLEN D. HERTZKE 503

Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn and Susan Dunn, eds., **Diversity and Citizenship: Rediscovering American Nationhood** PHILIP GLEASON 504

Martha Lee, **The Nation of Islam: An American Millenarian Movement** ADAM B. SELIGMAN 505

Seymour Martin Lipset, **American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword** JAMES A. MORONE 506

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, **Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe** SCOTT MAINWARING 507

Michael Yahuda, **The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995** AKIRA IRIYE 509

William K. Tabb, **The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation** DAVID ARASE 510

Robert M. Uriu, **Troubled Industries: Confronting Economic Change in Japan** ULRIKE SCHAEDE 511

David M. Potter, **Japan's Foreign Aid to Thailand and the Philippines** MIRANDA A. SCHREURS 513

Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, **Thailand: Economy and Politics** JIM LOGERFO 514

Tse-Kang Leng, **The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits** THOMAS B. GOLD 515

John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, **Islam and Democracy**; and Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, **Muslim Politics** STEPHEN PELLETIERE 516

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Aguibou Y. Yansane, ed., **Development Strategies in Africa: Current Economic, Socio-Political, and Institutional Trends and Issues** GORAN HYDEN 517

Michael N. Barnett, ed., **Israel in Comparative Perspective** JEROME SLATER 518

Jay Winik, **On the Brink: The Dramatic Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War** ROBERT A. DIVINE 519

Shirley Anne Warshaw, **The Domestic Presidency: Policy Making in the White House** MATTHEW J. DICKINSON 520

Nicholas Laham, **A Lost Cause: Bill Clinton's Campaign for National Health Insurance** ANNE LENHARD REISINGER 522

Jessica Korn, **The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto** LOUIS FISHER 523

Mark Rozell, **In Contempt of Congress: Postwar Press Coverage on Capitol Hill** JOHN J. SMEE 524

Jean Edward Smith, **John Marshall: Definer of a Nation** HERBERT SLOAN 526

Samuel J. Eldersveld, **Party Conflict and Community Development: Postwar Development in Ann Arbor** CYNTHIA Y. JACKSON 527

Alberta M. Sbragia, **Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development** TODD SWANSTROM 528

David Vogel, **Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and Business in America** WILLIAM B. FRIEDRICKS 529

Jonathan J. Bean, **Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies Toward Small Business 1936–1961** DAVID VOGEL 530

Suzanne Uttaro Samuels, **Fetal Rights, Women's Rights: Gender Equality in the Workplace** JOYCE GELB 531

Maria Braden, **Women Politicians and the Media** DORIS A. GRABER 533

Michael Newman, **Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union** MICHAEL J. BAUN 534

Harold James, **International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods**; and Alberto Giovannini, **The Debate on Money in Europe** KATHLEEN R. MCNAMARA 535

Nigel Harris, **The New Untouchables: Immigration and the New World Worker** PETER RACHLEFF 537

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

MORRIS MORLEY and CHRIS McGILLION review American policy toward Haiti from the September 1991 military coup that toppled democratically-elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide to the September 1994 U.S. intervention that ousted the ruling generals. They argue that Bush and Clinton policy makers' commitment to redemocratization in Haiti was subordinated to efforts to promote a regime change that would ensure the continuity of key state institutions supportive of long-term American interests in that country.

JONATHAN MERMIN challenges the idea that individual journalistic initiative put Somalia in the news in 1992 and was the driving force behind American action. He shows that Somalia had emerged as an issue in Washington before it appeared on the evening news and concludes that American politicians, not television journalists, put Somalia on the foreign policy agenda.

ARLINE T. GERONIMUS examines widely-shared assumptions about teen childbearing that informed the welfare reform debate. She argues that the scientific basis for these assumptions is equivocal and questions the belief that teen childbearing always represents irrationality and the abdication of personal responsibility.

ERIC M. PATASHNIK explores the limits and possibilities of precommitment in democratic politics by examining federal trust funds, a device for earmarking future tax revenues for government activities such as Social Security, Medicare, and highway building. He argues that precommitment is an historical process that shapes the environment in which policy making takes place.

WENDY HUNTER analyzes military influence in postauthoritarian Argentina, Chile, and Peru. She contends that electoral politics unleashes a competitive dynamic that induces politicians to attend to civilian interests and rein in the military.

BETH A. FISCHER describes the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union between 1981 and 1985. She argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Reagan began seeking a rapprochement with Moscow before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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"Disobedient" Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti

MORRIS MORLEY
CHRIS McGILLION

U.S. policy toward political transitions in postwar Latin America has centered around the goal of securing regime changes that ensure the continuity of the state. This is true of Republican and Democratic administrations under both conservative and liberal presidents. While issues of democracy and dictatorship have remained secondary, the task of preserving the institutions of the state (civil bureaucracies, judiciaries, military and police, etc.) have taken priority. The level of Washington's concern over challenges to the state has been incomparably greater than over changes in regime because the state, especially its coercive institutions, is perceived as the ultimate arbiter of power and guarantor of basic U.S. interests in these societies.

Consequently, Washington's policy toward the state in Latin America has remained constant; toward the regime it has been variable. Whether we are discussing Eisenhower policy toward Cuba, the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward the Dominican Republic and Brazil, Richard Nixon's hostility toward Allende's Chile, Jimmy Carter's policy toward Nicaragua and El Salvador, or Ronald Reagan's support for redemocratization in Guatemala, the thread that linked them all was a singular determination to preserve key state institutions

MORRIS MORLEY is an associate professor of politics at Macquarie University (Sydney, Australia) and a senior research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, DC. He is the author of *Imperial State and Revolution: The United States and Cuba, 1952–1986* and *Washington, Somoza and the Sandinistas: State and Regime in the U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua, 1969–1981*. CHRIS McGILLION is the opinion page editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia). He has written extensively on U.S.–Latin American relations and hemispheric politics for newspapers and journals in Australia, England, and the United States.

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(not least, the armed forces) in the event of a political transition, together with a flexible approach regarding support for elected regimes or dictatorial rulers.

Moreover, given the willingness of U.S. governments to support such autocratic regimes as Fulgencio Batista in Cuba or Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua over extended time periods in the absence of challenges to the regime or state, an abrupt policy change cannot be adequately explained by reference to a White House commitment to promoting or imposing democratic values. Rather, U.S. policy makers have interpreted a change from dictatorship to democratic regime, first and foremost, as a mechanism for preserving the state, not as a mode of promoting democratization and the values that accompany it.

Where state structures are threatened by broad-based social and political movements, Washington has sought to hive off those sectors compatible with the state and U.S. interests and promote a political settlement in which electoral processes are incorporated within the "old" state; where such movements achieve power and signal their intention to change state structures, Washington has traditionally moved to apply pressure on these nationalist or populist regimes to modify their policies and appoint moderate/conservative individuals to key decision-making positions.

However, as in the case of Haiti, once a decision is made to dump recalcitrant clients in order to "save" the state, it is never a question of the United States automatically achieving what it wills. One particularly difficult task in brokering a desired political transition has been in those circumstances where the target regime is tightly connected with the state, all the more so where the authoritarian client or ruling generals have built up strong political loyalties in the armed forces that resist pressure from the outside. Such circumstances can and do determine Washington's preferred policy options more than any pressing need to protect human rights or pursue the goal of redemocratization.

Bush Policy toward Haiti

It was almost five years after the toppling of the Duvalier family rule before Haiti tasted democracy for the first time in its history. In December 1990, following an interregnum of military-dominated governments, a populist priest, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was elected president with an overwhelming 67 percent of the total vote. Aristide campaigned on a platform of politically, socially, and economically empowering the country's largely peasant population and reforming key state institutions, including the armed forces. On assuming office, however, he confronted two active centers of resistance: a local economic elite that branded him a "Bolshevik" and "the devil" and a military leadership that opposed his efforts to reform the institution and implement existing constitutional provisions affirming civilian authority over the armed forces. During his short-lived presidency, Aristide not only antagonized the Haitian business community but also U.S. investors with his proposals to double the minimum wage, initiate new public works projects, make the wealthy pay their fair share

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of taxes, impose export levies on assembly plant operators, and support the growth of trade unions.

Aristide's presidency lasted a mere nine months; in September 1991 it was terminated by a military coup. Initially, Washington joined with other regional governments in denouncing the junta and calling for the reinstatement of the ousted Haitian leader. Secretary of State James Baker said the junta would "be treated as a pariah, without friends, without support, without a future. . . ."[1] Days later, though, the Bush administration began to back away from unqualified support for the deposed president's return with all his former powers intact. Demands that Aristide disavow an imagined mobocracy "and work toward sharing power with the Parliament"[2] indicated a new vision of what administration officials had in mind when they spoke of the restoration of Haitian democracy: it must not antagonize the military or the traditional political class which had largely accommodated itself to the coup.

This policy shift was linked to a concern over Aristide's populist orientation. The White House was ambivalent about supporting an elected leader who was committed to empowering the poor through changes in the economy, the regime, and the state. And as the policy unfolded, it soon became clear that support for Aristide's return was predicated on the latter's willingness to accept specific limitations on his presidential powers, not least because his efforts to democratize the Haitian state were perceived as a potential threat to longer-term U.S. objectives: the restoration of political stability; the survival of an, albeit reformed, military institution with its external linkages to the Pentagon intact; and the promotion of an open economy and a development strategy that accorded foreign investors a central role.

Within the foreign policy bureaucracy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) emerged as the locus of hostility to a U.S. policy approach based on Aristide's return. Soon after his election in 1990, the agency began waging a systematic campaign to discredit the Haitian leader, in the process forging close links with Aristide's domestic opponents. Among them was Emmanuel Constant, the head of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), a violent paramilitary organization with close links to the armed forces. After the September 1991 coup, Constant was placed on the agency payroll, in return for which he provided continuing information about the nature and activities of Aristide's local protagonists.[3]

For all its professed aversion to the *golpistas* (ruling generals), the United States dragged its feet on endorsing an Organization of American States (OAS)

[1] Quoted in Kim Ives, "The Unmaking of a President," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 27 (January/February 1994): 16.

[2] Clifford Krauss, "In a Policy Shift, U.S. Pressures Haitian On Rights Abuses," *New York Times*, 7 October 1991; also see Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Won't Link Aristide Return and Democracy," *New York Times*, 8 October 1991.

[3] See R. Jeffrey Smith, "Haitian Paramilitary Chief Spied for CIA, Sources Say," *Washington Post*, 7 October 1994.

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trade embargo, which weakened the regional body's effectiveness in denying the military its oil or the wealthy their smuggled-in luxury goods paid for in hoarded dollars. In early February 1992, the Bush administration dealt another powerful blow to the economic sanctions strategy when it lifted those restrictions affecting American-owned assembly plants, which comprised most U.S. investments in Haiti.[4] This was the clearest indication to date that Washington was reluctant to commit itself to a formula based on substituting Aristide for the Duvalierist armed forces.

Later that same month, the State Department sought to broker an "acceptable" political comprise that included a role for the military. Under intense pressure from his American hosts, Aristide agreed to sign an accord with Haitian parliamentarians appointing an interim prime minister, Conservative party leader Rene Theodore, and establishing a timetable for his return in effect as little more than a figurehead president at some future, unspecified date. But after the parliament, bowing to military opposition, failed to approve the agreement, Washington quickly revealed a disposition to tolerate the existing political arrangements.

Meanwhile the generals' brutal rule had precipitated a refugee problem for the Bush administration, which it attempted to solve in a fashion guaranteed to reaffirm the junta's belief that it had little to fear from Washington. Following the September 1991 coup, temporary restraining orders by U.S. courts prevented the forced repatriation of Haitian boat people. This ban was lifted by the U.S. Supreme Court on 31 January 1992, but Naturalization and Immigration authorities continued to prescreen interdicted Haitians at the U.S. naval facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, allowing just under one third to enter the United States to seek asylum. By the end of May, however, concern over the domestic political consequences of thousands of Haitians fleeing military terror produced a major policy shift. Bush reinstituted a 1981 agreement between Washington and the Duvalier regime permitting the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept refugee boats on the high seas and return all undocumented passengers to Haiti. Washington's line was now based on the assumption that boat people were fleeing economic deprivation, not political repression. In future, Haitians could only apply for refugee status at the American embassy in Port-au-Prince. This decision subsequently affected more then 30,000 refugees.

By mid-1992, while still going through the motions of calling for the restoration of Aristide's government, the United States was simultaneously encouraging the exiled leader to negotiate with the new military-imposed Prime Minister Marc Bazin, a former World Bank official and the favored Bush candidate in the 1990 elections in which he received only 14 percent of the total vote. In the process, State Department officials "dropped the none-too-subtle hint that if he passed up this 'important window of opportunity,' the United States may

[4] See Al Kamen and John M. Goshko, "U.S. Eased Haiti Embargo Under Business Pressure," *Washington Post*, 7 February 1992.

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drop or ease the embargo."[5] A July CIA memorandum, which lavished praise on Bazin and described General Raoul Cedras "as a conscientious military leader who genuinely wished to minimize his role in politics, professionalize the armed services, and develop a separate and competent civilian police force," mirroring as it did the attitudes of many Defense and State officials, provided more evidence of the conditional nature of administration support for Aristide's return: it had to be acceptable to Haiti's military and economic elite.[6]

Clinton Policy: January 1993 to April 1994

The transition from George Bush to Bill Clinton did not signal any major policy shift on Haiti. While the newly appointed Secretary of State Warren Christopher acknowledged that Aristide "ha[d] to be part of the solution to this [crisis]," both he and President Clinton balked at setting a firm deadline for the exiled Haitian leader's return. Senior administration officials spoke of his "eventual" return "when conditions permit."[7] During their first meeting, Clinton sought to assuage Aristide's concern about the strength of Washington's commitment to his speedy return, but he stressed that this could only take place "under conditions of national reconciliation and mutual respect for human rights."[8]

The initial uneasiness and ambiguity in Clinton's approach to the "Aristide problem" was partly a function of domestic political factors, specifically the refugee issue. In the course of the 1992 presidential election campaign, Clinton vigorously denounced the Bush policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees as "appalling" and promised to overturn it.[9] Within days of his inauguration, however, Clinton backtracked on this pledge following warnings that the United States might soon be confronted by a new wave of at least 200,000 Haitians fleeing the brutality of military rule. Sensitive to the electoral damage suffered by the Carter administration in the wake of the 1980 Mariel boatlift of over 125,000 Cuban refugees to Florida, Clinton tumbled from the high moral ground of the election campaign and announced that the existing policy would remain in place.

[5] Lee Hockstader and Douglas Farah, "U.S. Presses Haiti's Civilian Leaders to Find Accord," *Washington Post,* 5 July 1992.

[6] Quoted from memorandum dated 21 July 1992, prepared by Brian Latell, the CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin America, in Christopher Marquis, "CIA Memo Discounts 'Oppressive Rule' in Haiti," *Washington Post*, 19 December 1993.

[7] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Warren M. Christopher to be Secretary of State*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 13 and 14 January 1993 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1993), 75.

[8] See Gwen Ifill, "Haitian Is Offered Clinton's Support on an End to Exile," *New York Times*, 17 March 1993.

[9] Quoted in Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Debate Over Risks Split Administration," *Washington Post*, 25 September 1994.

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The absence of a sharp break in policy was further reinforced by Clinton's decision to temporarily retain until May the architect of Bush's Haiti strategy, Bernard Aronson, as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, and Clinton's reluctance at the White House meeting with Aristide to take a strong stand on the question of justice for victims of the military terror. To Aristide's demand that the coup leaders must be brought to account for the killing of some 3,000 of his supporters and other human rights abuses since September 1991, Clinton offered little but the vaguest of promises.

Having reversed his position on refugee policy Clinton moved quickly to limit its impact by committing the new administration to "step up dramatically" diplomatic efforts to restore the ousted Haitian leader to office.[10] To facilitate this goal, the former U.S. ambassador to Nicaragua, Lawrence Pezzullo, was appointed a special envoy to secretary of State on Haiti policy.

Over the next fifteen months, the Clinton White House searched for an internal political solution to the Haitian conflict that could accommodate the military, the local economic elite, and Aristide. This attempt to produce an acceptable coalition government that would effectively circumscribe Aristide's power had as one of its by-products a sustained pressure on the exiled leader to capitulate on army demands for immunity from prosecution for its brutal rule since September 1991. U.S. policy was distinguished by its effort to bludgeon Aristide to agree to give amnesty to those who had engaged in a "systematic and ruthless" program of murder, torture, and indiscriminate repression throughout Haitian civil society—targeting not just pro-Aristide slum dwellers but also the political, peasant, trade union, and other leaders of the opposition movement.[11]

To lure and prod the military leaders to relinquish power, Clinton resorted to a carrot and stick strategy. The carrot was the White House offer of a seat at the negotiating table for the ruling troika—Army Chief Lt. General Raoul Cedras, his deputy and Chief of Staff General Philippe Biamby, and the Port-au-Prince Police Chief Michel Francois. The stick consisted largely of a gradual tightening of the global, regional, and bilateral trade embargos. In June, Clinton announced new sanctions, preventing all civilian and military coup supporters from entering the United States and freezing the latter's American assets; later that month, the United Nations imposed a global oil and arms embargo on Haiti. In tandem with the resignation of the military-appointed Prime Minister Marc Bazin, the conditions were deemed propitious for a resumption of talks involving Aristide and the military *golpistas*.

On 3 July 1993, under considerable pressure from United Nations Special Envoy Dante Caputo and the Clinton administration's Lawrence Pezzullo, Aristide and Cedras signed the so-called Governor's Island Agreement, which outlined a redemocratization scenario for Haiti. The steps included Aristide's

[10] Quoted in ibid.

[11] Americas Watch, *Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti* (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1993), 1.

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nomination of a prime minister to assume office after being confirmed by a reconstituted parliament; the suspension of global economic sanctions; the provision of international aid to facilitate reforms of the civil bureaucracy, the judiciary, the armed forces, and the establishment of a new police force; a political amnesty for the perpetrators of the September 1991 coup; and Army Chief Cedras's retention of his position until Aristide's resumption of the presidency on 30 October 1993. In light of the accord's concessions to the military and its lack of any enforcement mechanisms for ousting the ruling junta from power, it is not surprising that Aristide's signature required much greater effort on the part of the international negotiators than Cedras's.

The Governor's Island Agreement signaled an escalation of the campaign to shrink Aristide's authority while ostensibly working for his return to Haiti. In the course of negotiations, Pezzullo seemed no less preoccupied with the fate of the armed forces and the local economic elite than with Aristide's restoration to office. The accord asked much of the exiled civilian president, little of the military leaders, and relied on a groundless belief in the junta's commitment to "good faith" negotiations.

Although Pezzullo, Caputo, and the other international negotiators had been only too willing to accept Cedras's commitments at face value, the "recalcitrant" Aristide displayed the greater willingness to abide by the terms of the agreement. After his nominee for prime minister, Robert Malval, was approved by the reformed parliament in late August, all regional, global and U.S. sanctions were suspended. Almost immediately, the tempo of military-authored violence accelerated. The army and police unleashed their thuggish paramilitary "attaches," who threatened Malval and a number of his cabinet ministers, and assassinated or attempted to murder prominent Aristide civilian and political supporters. The audacious nature of this offensive, reflecting the military's intransigence and belief that it could and would hold onto power, elicited a relatively muted response from Washington. Ultimately, the accord unravelled: while Aristide exhibited flexibility to excess and honored his commitments, Cedras did not.

Throughout this period, U.S. policy makers seemed less committed to restoring democracy than to creating political stability in Haiti. The State Department's Pezzullo strategy was based on the assumption that the military was a stabilizing factor, and that it should and had to be part of any political solution. Hence, there was relentless pressure on Aristide to negotiate some kind of power-sharing arrangements with the generals, to give priority to national reconciliation at the expense of justice, and to be willing to modify or forego long-held policy positions. But it was becoming increasingly clear that on these issues Aristide was not the problem. He accepted the reversal in Clinton refugee policy, agreed to a political amnesty for the military, and appointed a business figure acceptable to the Haitian elite and Washington to be his prime minister. By contrast, Cedras and his colleagues persistently refused to accommodate U.S. demands. Instead, they revealed themselves to be disobedient clients—

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obdurate, intransigent, and implacably opposed to relinquishing their hold on political power.

In early October, the military reaffirmed their opposition to Aristide's return and simultaneously dealt a telling blow to the Pezzullo approach. In preparation for Aristide's return on 30 October and as part of a larger United Nations observer and training force destined for Haiti under the Governor's Island Agreement, the U.S.S. *Harlan County*, with 200 lightly armed U.S. soldiers and twenty-five Canadian military trainers aboard, arrived within sight of Port-au-Prince on 11 October, only to find that the military leadership had reneged on its promise to allow the ship to dock. While Haitian soldiers stood by doing nothing, armed civilian thugs, organized by the FRAPH, whose leader Emmanuel Constant was still on the CIA payroll,[12] bluffed the *Harlan County* into turning around and heading for home. This was the clearest possible sign that the ruling clique would not cede power without a struggle.

The Pentagon, determined to avoid any repetition of the debacle in Somalia less than two weeks earlier, which led to the deaths of eighteen American soldiers, played a leading role in the bureaucratic debate that produced the decision to recall the *Harlan County*. If this humiliating episode triggered the image of "America turns tail"[13] and a loss of "credibility," as well as dealing an almost fatal blow to the accord, the Defense Department was far from displeased. Having constantly opposed sending any American troops to Haiti, it felt vindicated. Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Walter Slocombe expressed the agency's view of Aristide in no uncertain terms: it was opposed to risking soldiers' lives to put "that psychopath" back in power.[14] At the same time, other administration officials, so angered over what had occurred, requested that serious consideration be given to the interventionist option. National Security Council (NSC) Adviser Tony Lake, signaling this possible future course of action, directed his subordinates to construct the first of the Haiti invasion scenarios. For the moment, however, according to another involved official, "cooler heads . . . prevailed."[15]

While support for Aristide's return raised hackles in the Pentagon, the exiled leader was still the target of malicious CIA allegations and leaks that largely questioned his sanity. In October, the agency's national intelligence officer for Latin America, Brian Latell, prepared a psychological profile on Aristide that concluded he was mentally unstable. Such studies provided ammunition for anti-Aristide legislators on Capital Hill and other foreign policy influentials such as former Bush NSC adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who described

[12] See Stephen Engleberg, "A Haitian Leader of Paramilitaries Was Paid by C.I.A.," *New York Times*, 8 October 1994.

[13] U.S. official, quoted in Devroy and Smith, "Debate Over Risks Split Administration."

[14] Quoted in Elaine Sciolino et al., "Haiti Standoff: The U.S. Will Try Again," *New York Times*, 29 April 1994.

[15] This unnamed administration official is quoted in Devroy and Smith, "Debate Over Risks Split Administration."

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the Haitian leader as "erratic" and concurred with Senator Jesse Helms that he was "probably a certifiable psychopath."[16]

If the *Harlan County* fiasco indicated the military leadership's resolve, further provocative actions testing the outer limits of Washington's tolerance followed. Emboldened by Clinton's shambolic foreign policy performance, and despite White House warnings that the generals were responsible for the safety of the new civilian government, gunmen assassinated the newly appointed Justice Minister Guy Malary on 14 October. Malary was then preparing legislation to bring the police force under civilian control.[17] The United Nations immediately reimposed its oil and arms embargo—this time enforced with the support of six U.S. Navy warships. Washington also reinstituted its bilateral sanctions. Just as significant, though, was Clinton's footdragging on proposals to implement more draconian trade penalties against the military, notably a December 1993 French-Canadian plan to impose a comprehensive ban that only excluded food and medicines. The explanation was not hard to find: the administration still clung to a belief in the possibility of a solution to the conflict based on a power-sharing formula, or what special envoy Lawrence Pezzullo described as "a political coalition in the center."[18] Not even the Haitian military troika's recent provocations were able to completely disabuse the Clinton administration of this illusion.

The refusal to jettison the belief that the military could still be part of the solution to the conflict also explained the White House reluctance to exploit the generals' cocaine-generated personal wealth. Ignoring Drug Enforcement Administration evidence implicating the Haitian military commanders in drug trafficking extending back to the early 1980s,[19] Clinton avoided virtually any mention of the subject in his public pronouncements, precisely because to have made an issue of these activities would have rendered the existing power-sharing approach politically untenable.

However, by December the frustration among key administration officials over the behavior of the military leadership was palpable. The junta was increasingly perceived not just as an obstacle to political stability, solving the refugee problem, and getting Haiti off the domestic political agenda; but it was also seen as an impediment to Washington's longer-term third force goal—identifying and promoting a civilian alternative to Aristide. According to a *New York Times* report, an exasperated Warren Christopher told his newly appointed deputy, Strobe Talbott, "that the administration's policy was at a dead

[16] Quoted in Mark Danner, "The Fall of the Prophet," *New York Review of Books*, 2 December 1993, 44.

[17] See Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, *Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and Congressional Concerns in 1994*, 22 September 1994, 9.

[18] Quoted in Daniel Williams and Julia Preston, "U.S. Policy on Haiti Includes Search for Moderates," *Washington Post*, 8 December 1993.

[19] See Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, *Haiti: Prospects for Democracy and U.S. Policy Concerns*, 16 October 1992, 10.

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end because no viable alternative to Aristide would be found while the nation remained under a military dictatorship."[20]

By the 15 January 1994 deadline, the military had failed to meet any of the conditions set down in the Governor's Island Agreement. Although Washington had previously threatened to request expanded United Nations sanctions if this situation arose, it now declined to do so. Instead, it once again sought to apply pressure on Aristide to be more flexible, which translated into additional concessions to ensure a political solution. This new attempt to lean on the exiled Haitian president, largely orchestrated by Pezzullo, took the form of a plan proposed by a delegation of Haitian parliamentarians during a visit to Washington in late February 1994. Pezzullo's objective was to present the image of a politically balanced proposal drafted by a representative group of centrist legislators that could provide the basis for a negotiated resolution of the conflict.

The so-called Monde Plan, named after one of the delegation, a founding member of the paramilitary FRAPH whom the U.S. special envoy preferred to describe as "a right wing politician,"[21] was basically an American production. The visit was sponsored by a private conservative organization, the AID-funded Center for Democracy, and it was composed of figures vetted by U.S. officials. As Pezzullo conceded during congressional testimony: "Well, we selected people who we thought would be a representative group to come up here."[22] More than half of the delegation belonged to the Alliance, a pro-coup coalition that had consistently sided with the military leadership since September 1991.

The proposed plan represented a visible retreat from the Governor's Island Agreement: only one military leader would be required to step down (the others receiving amnesties); the national police, a major perpetrator of violence against Aristide supporters, would remain in place; the exiled president would appoint a new prime minister responsible for establishing a broad-based government that included allies of the current regime; and no date would be set for the military's transfer of power to Aristide and the latter's return to Haiti. In contrast to the earlier accord, there was no provision for an international mission to train and create a more professionalized armed forces. Aristide was bluntly told that this plan was the quid pro quo for a tightening of economic sanctions against the country's ruling generals.

Not surprisingly, Aristide balked at these demands, accusing its supporters of "acting in 'complicity' with the military regime in delaying his return,"[23] and

[20] Devroy and Smith, "Debate Over Risks Split Administration."

[21] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, *U.S. Policy Toward Haiti*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 8 March 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 112.

[22] Ibid., 113.

[23] Congressional Research Service, *Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and Congressional Concerns in 1994*, 5.

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insisting that the generals would treat this proposal with the same contempt they had lavished on the Governor's Island Agreement. Irritated State Department officials interpreted Aristide's dismissal of the plan as another instance of his inflexibility and refusal to compromise. That, not the military's intransigence, constituted the main obstacle to a political solution and his return to Haiti.[24]

But the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Christopher Dodd, provided the most trenchant and damning critique of the plan and its policy implications. Following sustained questioning of special envoy Lawrence Pezzullo, he concluded on the following note:

> Larry, you understand my point here. We handpick a group of people. We finance their trip to Washington. We put together a proposal. You have some people who hardly could be called centrists craft this thing and put it together. Label them as sort of the moderate group, then put the pressure on the fellow who got 70 percent of the vote, and if he does not go along with these conditions, which do not even include the entire structure of the hierarchy of the military, that we are not going to impose the sanctions any longer. Why are we putting so much pressure on him?[25]

The State Department-Pezzullo strategy was premised partly on the notion of a reformed coercive apparatus of the "old" state maintaining its power and prerogatives in any transition from Cedras to Aristide—illustrative of the historic U.S. perception of the Latin American armed forces as the ultimate guarantor of Washington's vital interests within its traditional sphere of influence. This concern was echoed by Pentagon officials. While conceding that "there would have to be a change at the very top," Deputy Under Secretary Walter Slocombe told a congressional subcommittee in early March that "there are significant forces within the Haitian military who would support and participate actively in the program of modernizing it and professionalizing [it]. . . ."[26] The achievement of this goal was also linked to a desire to circumscribe and limit Aristide's power in the event of his return to Haiti. Perceived in exile as a transitional figure by many U.S. officials, the Pezzullo-led pressure on Aristide to negotiate a political solution that embraced the military, the local economic elite, and his civilian political opponents was intended to erode the powers of the presidency, and make it more of a ceremonial position without substantive decision-making authority. This desire to encumber a revived Aristide presidency within a powerful set of constraints explained, for instance, the considerable emphasis Washington attached to the naming of a new prime minister as soon as possible; this would facilitate the undermining strategy through the appointment of Aristide political and military foes to cabinet posts.

[24] See Steven Greenhouse, "Which Way Forward on Haiti?," *New York Times*, 9 March 1994.
[25] U.S. Congress, Senate, *U.S. Policy Toward Haiti*, 113–114.
[26] Ibid., 126.

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At the end of March, U.S. policy still seemed wedded to the Pezzullo approach. The announcement by President Clinton that Washington would intensify its pressure on the generals, especially Cedras, to relinquish power was essentially motivated by twin concerns: saving the military and implementing the political preconditions for Aristide's return. Only with the junta's commitment to leave could Aristide name a new prime minister, thus establishing the basis for the eventual passage of an amnesty law through the Haitian parliament. The exiled leader's failure to appreciate the significance of this policy shift did not sit well with administration officials, provoking one to declare in a mood of barely controlled anger: "These adjustments are a way of trying to meet some of his concerns and get him to join in the process of finding a practical approach to solving this crisis. . . ."[27]

Ultimately, Aristide's stubborn refusal to accommodate each and every U.S. demand for flexibility, compounded by the military leadership's obduracy and disobedience, forced Washington's hand. In late April, the Clinton administration abandoned its attempts to extract more compromises from Aristide and its military-as-part-of-the-solution approach. The ruling junta's defiance and provocations had finally exhausted White House patience. The policy shift took the form of a request for United Nations Security Council support for imposing a global trade embargo on the country, together with financial sanctions (the freezing of overseas assets) and travel bans against 600 military officers who supported the autocratic regime or participated in the September 1991 coup that toppled Aristide from power.[28] One State Department official described these measures to tighten the economic embargo as incorporating "the basic components of the . . . approach" contained in a bill introduced into the House of Representatives in March by the Congressional Black Caucus, a leading domestic critic of Clinton's Haiti policy.[29]

Another clear indicator that the generals were about to be dumped was the almost simultaneous resignation of special envoy Lawrence Pezzullo, the official most closely identified with the power-sharing strategy, and his replacement by the former head of the Congressional Black Caucus, William Gray. But, despite Clinton's decision to get tough with Haiti's military rulers, the resort to stepped up sanctions was not accompanied by any plan of action in the event the sanctions failed to achieve their strategic objective.

Clinton Policy: May 1994 to September 1994

On 2 May, Clinton signaled a dramatic shift in U.S. policy toward Haiti. Referring to the leaders of Haiti's military junta, the president said that "it was time

[27] Quoted in Steven Greenhouse, "Aristide Cool to U.S. Shift in Haiti Policy," *New York Times*, 31 March 1994.

[28] See Julia Preston, "U.S. Shifts on Haiti, Gets Tougher on Army," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1994.

[29] Quoted in Steven A. Holmes, "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy," *New York Times*, 14 July 1994.

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for them to go," and for the first time he refused to rule out the use of U.S. force to get them going.[30] But these statements reflected the level of frustration with the Haitian military in the Clinton administration much more than they did a new resolve in the White House to see the crisis ended quickly. Cedras, Biamby, and Francois had dealt themselves out of any U.S.–brokered negotiated settlement by their obstinacy and, to a lesser extent, their continued brutality (OAS and UN human rights monitors in Haiti reported fifty politically-motivated killings for the month of April alone). Administration policy makers, however, remained deeply divided over how the United States should respond to the deadlock created by the junta's refusal to step down. One faction, led by Anthony Lake and Strobe Talbott, favored the invasion option and were preparing plans for it; another faction, led by William Perry and senior military and intelligence officers, cautioned strongly against the use of force. A consensus approach did emerge for the next four months, and even then it was tenuous enough to allow the final twist in the saga—Jimmy Carter's deal with the junta allowing for U.S. military intervention into Haiti and the phased exit of Cedras and his cohorts from power.

Between April and August, Clinton himself remained aloof from the debate within his own camp. In electoral terms, there was little to be gained by getting the approach right on Haiti; and especially after the debacle in Somalia the previous October, there was much to lose by putting another foot badly wrong. Moreover, the president was preoccupied with domestic policy issues, especially the troubled passage of his health and crime bills through the House of Representatives and the Senate. Those White House officials with day-to-day responsibility for Haiti had to consider limitations on their options. According to opinion polls, Americans disapproved of Clinton's handling of foreign policy generally and strongly opposed his sending U.S. troops into Haiti. Congress was hostile to an invasion and, apart from the Black Caucus which was pushing for tougher measures to hasten Aristide's return, deeply suspicious still of the exiled Haitian president and his democratic credentials. Aristide himself remained opposed to any invasion. Finally, it was clear that if Washington were to get the UN's imprimatur for interventionist action, it would have to disabuse UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of the notion that Haiti represented a case of sphere-of-influence peacekeeping in which the U.S. military should play only a minor role.

Clinton elaborated on the change of policy tack at an 8 May White House press briefing, when he announced the appointment of William Gray to replace Lawrence Pezzullo as the administration's special adviser on Haiti. After declaring that Gray "will be the point man in our diplomacy and a central figure in our future policy deliberations," Clinton outlined a set of tougher economic sanctions on Haiti in line with the previous day's UN Security Council Resolu-

[30] Quoted in Barton Gellman and Ruth Marcus, "U.S. Boosts Pressure on Haitians," *Washington Post*, 4 May 1992.

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tion 917. These included a freeze on assets in the United States belonging to the Haitian military leaders and their civilian allies, a ban on nonscheduled flights in and out of Haiti, and a tightening of the economic embargo on everything but humanitarian supplies. As well, the president announced changes in migration policy toward Haiti: the U.S. would continue to interdict all Haitian boat people, but instead of automatic repatriation, it would process applications for political refugee status aboard ship or in other countries. "I am committed," Clinton declared, "to making these new international sanctions work." But once again he refused to rule out other options if these failed to convince Haiti's military leaders to step down.[31]

The following day, Secretary of State Christopher, speaking in Mexico City, sought to drive home the message: "If Haiti's military leaders refuse to resign or leave Haiti," he said, "they will find that the international community has both the will and the means to make them pay the price for their illegitimate actions, and to restore the legitimate elected authorities."[32]

This new White House posture looked and sounded much harsher than it was. The circumstances of Gray's appointment, for instance, suggested that it would be much easier for the junta in Port-au-Prince to ignore him than had been the case with his predecessor. Unlike Pezzullo, Gray's brief was to advise rather than represent the administration; moreover, he insisted on performing these duties while retaining his status as a private citizen, not on the payroll of the U.S. government.

In announcing the sanctions, Clinton said that the United States was "working with" the Dominican Republic to improve enforcement procedures along its border with Haiti. But Washington balked at pressing the corrupt Balaguer regime to seal the border against smuggling with threats to reconsider the Dominican Republic's U.S. sugar quota or other economic benefits the country received under the Caribbean Basin Initiative. As for the new arrangements for processing applications for refugee status by fleeing Haitians, these were no more generous than the Bush administration had allowed during the months immediately following the 1991 coup,[33] despite the accumulated evidence since then of the new regime's brutality. In fact, publicly at least, the White House was doing little more than ratcheting up its sanctions policy in line with UN initiatives and adopting minimum changes in its refugee policy to avoid condemnation from its domestic critics. Privately, the Clinton administration had adopted a two-track policy of forcing the Haitian military junta from power while "preparing" Aristide for his return.

If the ruling generals had become expendable, the fate of the coercive institution was another matter altogether. Paramount importance was attached to

[31] "Clinton Takes New Steps to Oust Haitian Military Leaders," *USIA Wireless File*, 9 May 1994.

[32] Quoted in Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "Pursuing the Restoration of Democracy in Haiti," U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, 23 May 1994, 332.

[33] Congressional Research Service, Report to Congress, *Cuban and Haitian Asylum Seekers: Recent Trends*, 1 September 1994.

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the survival of the armed forces in the event of Aristide's return. But in recent weeks the weight of opinion among senior policy makers had shifted away from the idea of major personnel cuts and organizational changes as being too fraught with unintended consequences. The new emerging consensus was based on a hitting from the top strategy (getting rid of Cedras et al.) and working with those elements willing to accommodate Aristide's return. Secretary of Defense William Perry put it succinctly, if rather clumsily: "We would want to use as much of the military and military police as is capable. . . ."[34]

Resistance to an invasion was fuelled by continuing CIA advice that Aristide was unreliable and that dispatching U.S. troops to restore him to power would have little impact on Haiti's corrupt and thuggish political system.[35] Within the Defense Department, there was the added concern that the use of force lacked a clear objective and cut-off point. "The problem is not getting in," said a Pentagon-based general. "It is getting out."[36] Exploring options short of direct U.S. intervention seemed preferable. One scenario involved buying off Haiti's military leaders and sending the bill to the country's economic elite.[37] Amid increasing skepticism about whether or not the sanctions would achieve their intended goal in the time period allotted by the White House, a State Department official commented in late May: "It's by a process of subtraction that we're getting to the military option."[38] However, sending in the marines to enforce a political transition based on a restored Aristide presidency was unlikely as long as the exiled leader remained wedded to a program of radical social and economic reform.

During his 8 May briefing, Clinton emphasized that one of the administration's fundamental policy objectives was to promote a "broad-based, functioning representative government that can relate to the business community as well as to the ordinary citizens of Haiti."[39] Given that Aristide was now perceived as an integral part of Washington's equation, it therefore became imperative to reconfigure his populist socioeconomic outlook. This meant jettisoning his commitment to redistribute wealth, end exploitative labor relations, and pursue a growth strategy based on rural, not export-driven development in favor of a more economically "responsible" capitalist development strategy; and appointing the kind of moderate, technocratic officials who would faithfully oversee the implementation of this program.

As part of their efforts to remake Aristide, officials from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), World Bank, and the International

[34] Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "Exile in Style Being Offered to Haitian Chiefs," *New York Times*, 20 June 1994.

[35] Devroy and Smith, "Debate Over Risks Split Administration."

[36] Quoted in Michael R. Gordon, "Weighing Options, U.S. Aides Assess Invasion of Haiti," *New York Times*, 30 May 1994.

[37] See Sciolino, "Exile in Style Being Offered to Haitian Chiefs."

[38] Quoted in Gordon, "Weighing Options, U.S. Aides Assess Invasion of Haiti."

[39] "Transcript of May 8 White House News Conference," *USIA Wireless File*, 9 May 1994.

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Monetary Fund (IMF) began examining every aspect of his plans for rebuilding Haiti; in the process they instructed him in the kinds of economic programs and public administration rebuilding they deemed suitable for the country's revival.[40] The United States was not only in a position to pressure Aristide directly but also to control his public profile. Aristide's radio broadcasts to Haiti were monitored, the National Security Agency admitted to bugging his telephone calls, and he was not even consulted about U.S. plans for his return—especially the deal Jimmy Carter stitched together with Haiti's military leaders in September.

Washington's goal of getting Aristide "to see eye to eye" with a "critical mass" of the Haitian elite—to appreciate what William Gray called "the political realities"—proved effective as the exiled leader began to tone down his radical theology and class struggle rhetoric.[41] In mid-July he outlined a ten-point reconstruction plan for Haiti that included a commitment to "promote goals in the private sector."[42] With few, if any, alternatives, his acceptance of IMF-World Bank-AID development blueprints calling for large-scale privatization, major tariff cuts, the elimination of import quotas, and a halving of personnel in the civil bureaucracy had become, in effect, one of the preconditions for his return. U.S. officials also managed to procure from Aristide a written pledge to uphold the Haitian Constitution and to hand over power to a successor when his term expired in February 1996. As AID Administrator J. Brian Atwood later recalled: "When we first met he was running for president, he [had] a real attitude about the United States and the West. But I think he really has grown. He knows all the practical issues now."[43]

As these efforts continued, events in Haiti were reeling out of anyone's control. Clinton's decision to modify the refugee processing arrangements produced a dramatic increase in the number of Haitians fleeing their country by boat. During the whole of 1993, around 2,000 Haitians put to sea in search of asylum in the United States; in June 1994 alone, the number jumped to 5,603; and then the floodgates really opened as close to 6,000 decamped in the first four days of July.[44] Attempting to strike an optimistic note, Defense Secretary William Perry told reporters that an invasion was still not on the cards: "I think we should . . . give some time to see that sanctions work itself out, and I think we may see some very substantial results from that. The conventional wisdom is that sanctions cannot be effective, that they cannot force governments to change their actions. This may be a counter-example." The following day (1

[40] See Elaine Sciolino, "Aristide Adopts a New Role: From Robespierre to Gandhi," *New York Times*, 18 September 1994.

[41] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy Toward Haiti*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 8 June 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 11.

[42] Quoted in Daniel Williams, "U.S. Looks for Moderation in Aristide's Mixed Signals," *Washington Post*, 18 July 1994.

[43] Quoted in Sciolino, "Aristide Adopts A New Role: From Robespierre to Gandhi."

[44] See Congressional Research Service, *Cuban and Haitian Asylum Seekers: Recent Trends*.

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July), Secretary of State Christopher, when asked if the administration favored an invasion to overthrow the Haitian military, replied: "The option we're pursuing now is . . . sanctions."[45]

These comments only served to undercut Washington's efforts to spook the ruling generals into stepping down. Such efforts included an announcement by U.S. officials that a naval task force with 2,000 marines was steaming toward the Haitian coast. Complementing this show of gunboat diplomacy were a Pentagon news leak that more than 1,000 commandos had just returned from Florida after secretly rehearsing a plan to seize Haiti's airfields and ports, and William Gray's warning that any threat to the lives of the 3,000 Americans still in Haiti would trigger immediate and forceful White House action. Frustrated over the seeming inability of any measure to stem the refugee tide, the White House unsuccessfully tried to pressure Aristide into making radio broadcasts to Haiti to discourage people leaving.[46]

The US. response to the continuing exodus of Haitians was complicated by the unwillingness of regional allies to absorb large numbers of the boat people. Panama's President Guillermo Endara abruptly reneged on his country's agreement to temporarily house 10,000 Haitians; other Caribbean countries were slow to offer assistance. Meanwhile, Haiti's military rulers were clearly losing their grip on the situation. On 13 July they expelled all international human rights monitors amid a marked escalation in the junta's reign of terror. Clinton responded by saying the expulsion validated his decision to consider possible military action. But no definitive decision was taken.

By the end of July, the United States had secured UN Security Council approval for military intervention in Haiti. Within the foreign policy bureaucracy, however, disagreements persisted over the efficacy of such action. The Pentagon, unlike the State Department, remained steadfastly opposed to an invasion; nor did it believe that the options for inducing the junta leaders to relinquish power for a comfortable exile had been fully exhausted.[47] At the same time, these interagency conflicts could not mask the fact that Washington's patience and imagination were running out. "We're seized by the refugee surge," one senior administration official explained, "and this has accelerated the discussion of other options."[48] But the quickened drift toward a more activist response was temporarily halted by a simultaneous outflux of boat people from Cuba.

Beginning in August, the number of people seeking to leave Cuba by boat or raft rose precipitously. For the whole of 1993, only 3,656 Cubans were inter-

[45] Quoted in Ann Devroy and Barton Gelman, "Exodus From Haiti Strains U.S. Policy," *Washington Post*, 7 July 1994.

[46] See Pilita Clark, "Haiti Risks Invasion After Expulsions," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 July 1994, 10; Elaine Sciolino "Haiti Invasion Imminent, Envoy Says," *New York Times*, 4 July 1994.

[47] See Elaine Sciolino, "Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti," *New York Times*, 4 August 1994.

[48] Quoted in Devroy and Gellman, "Exodus From Haiti Strains U.S. Policy."

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cepted by the U.S. Coast Guard en route to Florida; between the beginning of August and early September the number surged to 30,000. The Cuban exodus made a final settlement in Haiti all the more imperative. But it also distracted attention from Haiti. Although UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright informed the Security Council at the end of July that the United States was prepared to lead a multinational force into Haiti, it was not until 26 August, after this latest Cuban refugee problem had been contained, that Clinton authorized "the final version of an invasion plan that the military had been drafting for months."[49]

While Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott quickly headed to a meeting of Caribbean foreign and defense ministers in Jamaica to secure unequivocal regional backing for the move, the White House authorized one last-ditch effort to promote an internal solution to the crisis: a $12 million CIA covert operation to topple the junta leaders by offering funds, communications equipment, and weapons to "friendly elements" in the military. As one involved U.S. official put it: "We are using every means at our disposal to get rid of this regime in the hopes of avoiding the necessity of an invasion. . . . Every means."[50] But the agency's failure to crack the loyalty of the armed forces to Cedras made direct U.S. intervention inevitable; all other options had finally been exhausted. It was now time to prepare the U.S. public for the invasion.

Apart from perfunctory remarks labeling Haiti's coup leaders criminal and brutal rulers, Washington was forced to wage a low-key rhetorical campaign during the three years of Aristide's exile. After all, Bush and Clinton officials could hardly rail against repression in Haiti, identify the junta as the culprits, and still deny asylum to the great majority of Haitians fleeing tyranny. But that consideration no longer applied. On 13 September, the State Department released its third interim report on Haiti's human rights situation, which said, in part: "The present situation reflects a degree of terror comparable to that of the Duvalier regimes. . . . The [Cedras] regime's human rights record demonstrates its intention not only to eliminate its opponents, but to subjugate the general populace and suppress and intimidate any potential opposition as well."[51] Clinton drew on this report in a televised address to the nation in which he recounted a litany of politically motivated killings, torture, and rape in Haiti and declared that "General Cedras and his accomplices alone are responsible for this suffering and terrible human tragedy."[52] This demonization of the Haitian military leadership made all the more puzzling Clinton's decision to dispatch a negotiating team headed by Jimmy Carter to Port-au-Prince.

[49] John H. Cushman, Jr. et al., "On the Brink of War, a Tense Battle of Wills," *New York Times*, 20 September 1994. On the Cuban refugee figures, see Congressional Research Service, *Cuban and Haitian Asylum Seekers: Recent Trends*; Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, *Cuba: Issues for Congress*, 6 September 1994, 14.

[50] Quoted in Doyle McManus and Robin Wright, "U.S. Tried Covert Action to Rid Haiti of Rulers," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1994.

[51] "Haitian Regime as Bad as Duvalier, U.S. Says," *USIA Wireless File*, 15 September 1994.

[52] "The Crisis in Haiti," reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Dispatch*, 19 September 1994, 605.

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Officially, Carter was to discuss the "modalities" of the departure of Cedras and the others from power. More likely, the mission was meant to prepare the way for an invasion. It's composition suggests as much. Carter, who opposed Clinton policy on Haiti and had been ignored when he offered to lead a similar diplomatic effort earlier in the year, had resurrected something of a public persona as a conflict resolution ambassador-at-large. If the former president could not talk the Haitian junta around to a peaceful exit, nobody could. To address any lingering congressional misgivings about the use of force, the powerful Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn accompanied Carter to Haiti. So too did Colin Powell, former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and hero of the Persian Gulf War, ensuring that any invasion decision would pass the Defense Department's muster.

The deal Carter unexpectedly concluded with Cedras caught the Clinton administration by surprise and forced a rethink of the invasion plans literally in midflight. The agreement stated only that "certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to consent to an early and honorable retirement," that their successors "will be named according to the Haitian constitution and existing military law," that the Haitian military and police forces "will work in close cooperation with the U.S. Military Mission" then on its way to Haiti, and that "the military activities of the U.S. Military Mission will be coordinated with the Haitian military high command."[53] The agreement allowed the ruling clique to stay in power up to a month before Aristide's return. It granted a general amnesty for all human rights abuses committed by military officials against civilian noncombatants since the 1991 coup (which Aristide had consistently opposed since the Governor's Island Agreement); and left Cedras, Biamby, and Francois in possession of millions of dollars they made breaking the oil embargo through an alliance with military officials in the Dominican Republic.[54]

These arrangements satisfied the Pentagon. The Somali debacle had demonstrated the risk of trying to fill a law-and-order vacuum in a strife-torn country. Moreover, it guaranteed that the coercive institution of the military-dominated Haitian state would survive intact (but refurbished) in the transition back to an Aristide presidency. The diplomatic agreement also appealed to Clinton and those White House officials concerned about whether a military gambit would pay off in the polls. They were enthusiastic about what Strobe Talbott called "a permissive invasion" resulting in virtually no casualties.[55]

For Aristide, of course, the deal was far less attractive. First, it indicated just how marginal he was to the evolving policy debate. While the NSC's An-

[53] "Agreement Sets Conditions for Haitian Leaders to Retire," Text, *USIA Wireless File*, 19 September 1994.

[54] See Douglas Farah, "U.S. Assists Dictators' Luxury Exile," *Washington Post*, 14 October 1994.

[55] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy Toward, And Presence in Haiti*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess., 13, 27, and 28 September 1994 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 25.

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thony Lake and special White House adviser William Gray kept Aristide informed about the Carter mission, the exiled leader's aides later complained that he had no input into the decision-making process.[56] During these briefing sessions, U.S. officials seemed more concerned with drilling Aristide on the importance of free market policies and adhering to the Haitian constitution, which mandated wider political powers to the parliament than to the presidency.[57] Second, it turned the generals who had ousted him from office and conducted a three-year reign of terror on his supporters into "honorable men," to use Carter's term, and elevated them into allies of the U.S. forces in their mission to restore "democracy" in Haiti. Lastly, Carter's brokered outcome further constrained Aristide's room for maneuver: it delayed his return to Haiti, guaranteed the survival of an institutionally cohesive armed forces, provided generous amnesty terms for Cedras and the other junta leaders, and gave the military-backed network of thugs and "attaches" both time and opportunity to mount one last assault on Aristide supporters under the very noses of U.S. peacekeeping troops.

Conclusion

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations shared the same overriding objective in Haiti, which was to restore political stability and stop the country being seen as a "problem" for Washington. Each worked through the same preferred policy options to secure this end, with Clinton only returning to the tough choices he advocated on the 1992 presidential campaign trail as his options narrowed and the situation in Haiti threatened to get out of control.

From the beginning of his presidency, Clinton pressured and cajoled the ousted, democratically-elected president of Haiti to adopt a more flexible approach toward dealing with the ruling junta. As long as the junta was perceived as "part of the solution," the White House was content to talk tough about the generals but apply its real muscle to extracting concessions from Aristide. Washington's objectives in seeking to broker a power-sharing solution to the Haitian conflict were primarily twofold: to ensure the survival of the coercive apparatus of the old state, albeit restructured and reformed; and to shrink Aristide's political authority in the event of his resumption of the presidency. American officials were particularly insistent that the army "must be preserved as an institution," convinced that it was "an essential part of the 'iconography' of nationhood."[58]

[56] Cushman et al., "On the Brink of War, a Tense Battle of Wills."

[57] Norman Kempster and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Cautions Aristide Over Divisive Action," *Los Angeles Times*, 17 September 1994.

[58] Quoted in Anthony Boadle, "U.S. to Keep Haiti Army Intact Despite Black Record," *Reuters Wire*, 10 October 1994; Larry Rohter, "Some Aristide Supporters Seek Abolition of Military," *New York Times*, 22 November 1994.

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Ultimately, the obdurate behavior of the junta leadership proved incompatible with the broader U.S. policy approach. The belief increasingly took hold among Clinton and his senior advisers that these disobedient clients had passed their use-by date and had to go, by force if necessary. The challenge was to replace them with a government that could lay some claim to legitimacy, that enjoyed some degree of popular support, and that would thus put an end to the refugee flow and get Haiti off Washington's political agenda. Given the U.S. commitment to "stability" and the correlation of political forces in Haiti, Aristide effectively became the sole realistic option. But the White House only wanted his legitimacy, not his populist policies. Hence, the need for his political and economic reeducation—a precondition for the invasion.

In mid-1995, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott reassured members of a Senate Committee: "even after our exit in February 1996, *we will remain in charge* by means of USAID and the private sector."[59] The Clinton political objective in restoring Aristide to power reflected less a universal commitment to democracy than an effort to create a permeable democracy in which restructured state institutions (especially the military and police) and an economic development model (free markets) would serve long-term U.S. interests in Haiti, as well as those of the country's international creditors, and, to a lesser extent, the privileged local elites. Washington wanted a government of civilians who could lay claim to an electoral mandate but who, more importantly, would know their place and have little power or opportunity to move beyond it.

Not surprisingly, this objective has contributed to instability and uncertainty in Haiti. By overriding Aristide's initial desire to abolish the military, prosecute officers for human rights abuses, and disarm the paramilitaries, the White House left Haitian democracy vulnerable to its old adversaries. Despite a purge of the security forces in September 1996, political assassinations and plots by armed right-wing groups have forced President Rene Preval to request the continued presence of foreign peacekeeping troops. Meanwhile, as fear of indiscriminate violence spreads, it slowly undermines confidence in the democratic process.

Another source of tension between the Preval government and the popular classes has been the economic reconstruction program imposed on Haiti by Washington and the international financial community. Large-scale aid has been conditioned on the sell-off of state-run enterprises and the shedding of thousands of public sector jobs. This strategy to date has failed to attract significant new foreign investment or produced visible signs of economic recovery. Rather, it has contributed to an erosion of the government's political support.

Disenchanted voters, however, are not turning to Haiti's right-wing parties, which is one reason why these elements remain attracted to an authoritarian

[59] Quoted in Worth Cooley-Post, "Haiti Shows It's Ready for Democracy," *National Catholic Reporter*, 28 July 1995, 9. (Emphasis added.)

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political solution. Instead, they are looking to a person who many believe should still be leading Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide. In 1995, he agreed at U.S. insistence not to stand for reelection. Today, Aristide has become the focus of a new opposition movement potentially more radical than the one that catapulted him to political power in September 1991. If he regains the presidency with a strong nationalist mandate, it will once again test Washington's commitment to the defense of Haitian democracy.

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Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy

JONATHAN MERMIN

Television, it is often argued, caused the United States to intervene in Somalia in 1992. Bernard C. Cohen argues that in the 1990s television "has demonstrated its power to move governments. By focusing daily on the starving children in Somalia, a pictorial story tailor-made for television, TV mobilized the conscience of the nation's public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons."[1]

In the view of Michael Mandelbaum, "televised pictures of starving people" in Somalia "created a political clamor to feed them, which propelled the U.S. military" into action.[2] Adam Roberts characterizes U.S. intervention in Somalia as "responding to the immediate pressure of media."[3] George F. Kennan describes American policy as "controlled by popular emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial television industry."[4]

Next to Vietnam, Somalia may be the most often cited case of media influence on American foreign policy, and it is one in which an effect of high order—inspiring a military intervention—is claimed. The argument that television contributed to U.S. intervention is supported by the chronology of events and news stories presented in this study; there is no reason to doubt that the appearance of Somalia on American television just before major changes in U.S. policy in

[1] Bernard C. Cohen, "A View from the Academy" in W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, eds., *Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 9–10.

[2] Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," *Foreign Policy* 95 (Summer 1994): 16.

[3] Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights," *International Affairs* 69 (July 1993): 446.

[4] George F. Kennan, "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly," *New York Times*, 30 September, 1993.

JONATHAN MERMIN is a lecturer in political science at Yale University.

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August and November of 1992 influenced the decision of the Bush administration to act. What is not clear, however, is why Somalia appeared on television in the first place, a question of central importance in understanding the scope and character of television's influence on foreign policy formulation.

One possibility is that independent journalistic initiative put Somalia in the news. An example of this is television coverage of the Ethiopia famine in 1984. Immediately after a series of NBC stories on Ethiopia in October 1984, American aid to Ethiopia skyrocketed, from $23 million for all of fiscal 1984 to nearly $100 million for October and November 1984.[5] Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer find that an enterprising NBC correspondent in London is responsible for getting a story on Ethiopia, originally broadcast on the BBC, onto the air in the United States.[6] The origin of the Ethiopia story appears to have been the effort of a journalist to publicize distant events that had for the most part been ignored in the West. The origin of Somalia as a news story could turn out to be similar.

A second possible explanation for the appearance of Somalia on American television is that it had not been ignored but made the news only after it had generated interest among foreign policy makers in the United States. In this view, television coverage of Somalia in the summer and fall of 1992 did not originate in the independent actions of journalists but in the interaction of journalists engaged in routine newsgathering practices and sources in Washington who made efforts to get Somalia onto the foreign policy agenda.

Although the Ethiopia model often appears to be implicit in the argument that television got America into Somalia and in claims that television has emerged as a major independent player in the foreign policy arena, the evidence indicates that only when Washington turned its attention to Somalia did ABC, CBS, and NBC deem events there worthy of coverage. In other words, if television inspired American intervention in Somalia, it did so under the influence of governmental actors—a number of senators, a House committee, a presidential candidate, and figures within the Bush administration—who made considerable efforts to publicize events in Somalia, interpret them as constituting a crisis, and encourage a U.S. response.

Journalists and Politicians

The governmental agenda, as defined by John W. Kingdon, is "the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious atten-

[5] Christopher J. Bosso, "Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and the Discovery of Famine in Ethiopia" in Michael Margolis and Gary A. Mauser, eds., *Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989), 168–69. (Emphasis in original.)

[6] Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, *News Out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid* (London: Hilary Shipman, 1986), 123–24.

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tion at any given time."[7] If television affects what the government is paying attention to, it is in a position to affect government policy. "By publicizing foreign events," Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf observe, the media may "provoke decision making about issues which, had they not attracted attention, would probably have been met with apathy and indifference."[8]

Journalists necessarily engage in agenda setting, in deciding out of the vast universe of events what to report and what to ignore. But in setting the news agenda, what rules do journalists follow? On this question, most studies have found that American journalists turn to politicians and government officials for guidance in deciding what constitutes news.[9]

Although news happens everywhere, practical considerations limit where reporters are able to look for it. To offer a package of news consistently, "on deadline with a limited budget and staff, editors have to assign reporters to places where newsworthy information is made public every day. Reporters need sources who can provide information on a regular and timely basis; they are not free to roam or probe at will."[10]

In the area of foreign policy, a concentration of "places where newsworthy information is made public every day" is found in Washington. The White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and Congress generate a consistent flow of statements, briefings, speeches, hearings, resolutions, and other forms of information on the events of the day. In Daniel C. Hallin's formulation, "The government is organized to provide a timely flow of information, geared to the demands of daily journalism; it is extremely efficient for news organizations to locate their personnel at the channels provided by the government."[11] W. Lance Bennett concludes that the virtue of using official sources is "the sheer simplicity that it introduces into the otherwise complex business of representing political reality.[12] Considerations of the need to establish the legitimacy of information reported and the need for protection against liability for inaccurate reports also encourage the use of official sources.[13]

[7] John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 3.

[8] Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 327.

[9] See Herbert J. Gans, *Deciding What's News* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Gaye Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity," *American Journal of Sociology* 77 (November 1972); and Mark Fishman, *Manufacturing the News* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).

[10] Leon V. Sigal, "Sources Make the News" in Robert Karl Manoff and Michael Schudson, eds., *Reading the News* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 16.

[11] Daniel C. Hallin, *The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 71.

[12] W. Lance Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States," *Journal of Communication* 40 (Spring 1990): 122.

[13] See Michael Schudson, *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers* (New York: Basic Books, 1978); and Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual."

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None of this is necessarily inconsistent with the view of some that the media are "out of order" and antagonistic toward government.[14] If governmental actors are engaged in political conflict, as they often are, journalists may produce coverage that is critical of government all around, even as they defer to official sources in setting the news agenda.

Sources of news are clearly in a position to influence its content.[15] Yet even if journalists turn to Washington for guidance in deciding what constitutes news, governmental actors offer far more possibilities than journalists are able to accommodate.[16] The three branches of government issue mountains of statements, hold innumerable press conferences, conduct hearings, make speeches, enact laws, and otherwise indicate newsworthy topics. Yet only a few of these offerings are reported. Journalists, in other words, may turn to Washington for story ideas, but far more stories are pitched to reporters than end up making the news.

The news agenda in this view is a joint production of sources and journalists. It is this formulation that most accurately describes the contribution of television to American intervention in Somalia. Somalia appeared on American television before the decision for U.S. intervention, because it had sparked interest among figures in Washington who made efforts to draw attention to it and because journalists decided to respond to those efforts with coverage. In making that decision, journalists may have been guided to some degree by economic imperatives (the need to win and entertain an audience),[17] ideological factors (the conviction that certain stories demand public attention),[18] or other considerations that figure in editorial decisions. Yet the evidence indicates that before television made the decision to cover the crisis in Somalia, influential politicians had spoken out on it, indicating to journalists who routinely look to Washington for possible stories that Somalia constituted a significant concern of American foreign policy and that it warranted consideration for space in the news (CNN is an interesting exception on this point).

The framing of the Somalia story also appears to have been a joint production of sources and journalists. As story tellers, journalists inevitably frame the events they report, and much of the coverage examined in this study framed events in Somalia as a crisis the United States could do something about. The

[14] Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

[15] Hallin, *The 'Uncensored War'*, 8.

[16] On this point, see Timothy E. Cook, *Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989); and Gans, *Deciding What's News.*

[17] On the impact of economic considerations on news decisions, see Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992); and Gans, *Deciding What's News.* On news as entertainment, see Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).

[18] For evidence that American journalists tend to hold liberal political views, which could encourage them to publicize events such as African famines, see Robert S. Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, *The Media Elite: America's New Powerbrokers* (Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler, 1986).

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origins of this frame, however, are of interest in understanding the impact of television on American policy. The evidence indicates that the major networks focused on the possibility of American intervention only after it had first been advocated in Washington.

Finally, journalists appear to have set the volume of coverage on the evening news through de facto collaboration with politicians. The claim that Somalia appeared "daily" on American television in the period before U.S. intervention turns out to be greatly exaggerated. Instead, the coverage is in proportion to the interest Somalia had sparked in Washington. A case could even be made that journalists allocated less coverage to Somalia than might have been expected from its place on the governmental agenda.

In sum, journalists worked closely with governmental sources in deciding when to cover Somalia, how to frame the story, and how much coverage it deserved. The lesson of Somalia is not just about the influence of television on Washington; it is equally about the influence of Washington on television.

Background and Overview

At the beginning of 1992, civil war and starvation gripped Somalia in the wake of the overthrow of Mohammed Siad Barre, who had ruled the country for two decades. In January, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and a political settlement of the conflict.[19] In March this ceasefire went into effect; but with no national government and continued factional conflict over food, by August "as many as 1.5 million of an estimated Somali population of 6 million were threatened with starvation, with approximately 300,000 Somalis already having died, including roughly 25 percent of all children under the age of five."[20]

As of March, the United States resisted a peacekeeping role for the UN in Somalia, supporting a Security Council resolution "only after language calling for a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission had been removed."[21] In April, the Security Council authorized a modest military operation, but negotiations with Somali factions delayed its implementation. On 27 July, the Security Council voted to airlift food to Somalia, and on 12 August the UN announced plans to send 500 troops to protect the international relief effort. On 14 August, the White House announced that the United States would take charge of the airlift.[22]

[19] Samuel M. Makinda, *Seeking Peace From Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 61.

[20] Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 177.

[21] Ibid., 170.

[22] Makinda, *Seeking Peace from Chaos*, 62–63; Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa*, 175.

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TABLE 1

Monthly Coverage of Somalia on ABC, CBS, and NBC in 1992

	Time in Minutes	*Stories Over 30 Seconds*
January	1.5	1
February	2.0	1
March	2.5	1
April	0.0	0
May	0.3	0
June	0.2	0
July	5.7	2
August	48.3	18
September	13.0	6
October	3.8	1
November	16.3	4

Source: *Television News Index and Abstracts*. For entries with multiple subjects (not just Somalia), I divided the time listed by the number of subjects. November figures are for 1–25 November.

The 500 troops did not arrive until September—"with the support of four U.S. warships carrying 2,100 Marines"—and proved unable to do much to protect the relief effort.[23] In November, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali informed the Security Council that the relief effort was not working. On 26 November, the Bush administration announced that the United States would send troops to Somalia if the Security Council passed an authorizing resolution, which it did on 3 December. The first contingent of Operation Restore Hope hit the shores of Somalia on 9 December.

This study focuses on coverage of Somalia on *ABC World News Tonight, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News*, and CNN from 1 January through 25 November of 1992, the day before the White House announced plans for U.S. intervention. The focus of the analysis is on ABC, CBS and NBC, then on CNN, for two reasons. First, the three major networks have an audience over ten times the size of CNN's, and are therefore more likely to influence official expectations of public opinion. Second, as I explain below, the coverage on CNN differs from the major networks in one quite interesting way.

If the major networks influenced the U.S. decision to intervene, when could this influence have been exerted? Table 1 displays the time and the number of stories on Somalia on ABC, CBS and NBC from January to November 1992. The table shows an extraordinarily low level of coverage from January through June, averaging about one minute per month on the three networks put together; an increase in July; extensive coverage in August and September; a sharp drop-off in October; and a recovery in November. The distribution of

[23] Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa*, 175.

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TABLE 2

Five Phases of Somalia Coverage on ABC, CBS, and NBC in 1992

Phase	Dates	Total Time (minutes)	Time per Week (minutes)
I	January 1–July 21	6.5	0.2
II	July 22–August 13	15.4	4.7
III	August 14–September 18	55.3	10.8
IV	September 19–November 8	4.2	0.6
V	November 9–November 25	16.3	6.7

Source: *Television News Index and Abstracts*.

coverage is more clearly illustrated when it is divided into five phases, corresponding to clusters in the data. This is done in Table 2.

In Phase I—1 January to 21 July—Somalia is close to invisible on the major networks, averaging only twelve seconds of coverage per week. In Phase II—22 July to 13 August—the coverage increased to over four minutes per week. In Phase III—14 August to 18 September—Somalia received extensive coverage, over ten minutes per week, focusing on the American airlift. In Phase IV—19 September to 8 November—Somalia disappeared from view, the coverage falling to under a minute per week. In Phase V—9 November to 25 November—Somalia returned from the eclipse of Phase IV (although not to the level of Phase III), to over six minutes per week.

Phase II ends with the announcement of the U.S. airlift to Somalia on 14 August. Phase V ends with the announcement of military intervention on 26 November. As Phases I and IV contain almost no coverage of Somalia, it is primarily in Phases II and V that the search for television's influence on U.S. intervention will be conducted.

The August Airlift Decision

From 1 January to 21 July, six stories on Somalia appeared on the three major networks. Three were studio reports that averaged under twenty seconds in length. The other three, full stories of 70 to 150 seconds, appeared on 5 January, 27 February, and 2 March (a full story is one reported by a correspondent, as opposed to a studio report read by the anchor).[24] CBS reported on 27 February that "half of Somalia's eight million people may die of starvation,"[25] and NBC on 2 March described "a terrible, closed world of violence and destruction."[26] As this series of stories ends over five months before August, however, it is

[24] The full stories in this study average from two to three minutes in length. No studio report exceeds thirty seconds.

[25] *CBS Evening News*, 27 February, 1992.

[26] *NBC Nightly News*, 2 March 1992.

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TABLE 3

Chronology of Events and Stories in July and August 1992

July 19	Senator Simon calls for action on Somalia
July 22	Senator Kassebaum calls for action on Somalia
July 22	House Select Committee on Hunger conducts hearings on Somalia
July 22	**ABC Story**
July 23	Senator Kennedy suggests action on Somalia
July 27	White House calls for "urgent attention" to Somalia
July 31	**CBS Story**
August 3	Senate Resolution on Somalia
August 6	Senator McConnell compares Somalia to Bosnia
August 7	Senator Jeffords compares Somalia to Bosnia
August 8	President Bush mentions Somalia at news conference
August 9	Senator Rockefeller criticizes Bush on Somalia
August 10	House Resolution on Somalia
August 12	UN announces plan to send 500 troops to Somalia
August 13	Bill Clinton cites Somalia as foreign policy issue
August 13	**ABC Stories**
August 14	White House announces airlift

unlikely that it made a significant contribution to the events of the summer, although the possibility of some minor influence on the evolution of American policy is not entirely ruled out.

Not until July does the next full story on Somalia appear on the major networks. From 22 July to 13 August there are nine stories on Somalia. Five of the nine, studio reports that do not exceed twenty seconds in length, are not serious candidates for influence on American policy. The four full stories, however, require further investigation. All contained video of starving Somalis. Table 3 superimposes events in Washington in the month before the U.S. decision to conduct an airlift, over the timing of the four full stories on Somalia.

The first full story in this period—and the first since 2 March—appeared on ABC on 22 July. It described and showed pictures of the grim situation in Somalia, a country of "six million people waiting for relief, starving for attention."[27] Before credit for putting Somalia on the foreign policy agenda is allocated to television, however, it is necessary to consider the context of official activities in which the story appeared. On 22 July, the day the story aired, the House Select Committee on Hunger had held hearings on Somalia. At the hearings, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), chair of the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when the Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 to 1986, and just returned from an official visit to Somalia, testified that the situation there was desperate. She declared, "I strongly support sending a United Nations security force to Somalia."[28] This declaration, reported in the ABC story, clashed with the position of the Bush administration that a UN force should not be deployed until a cease-fire had

[27] *ABC World News Tonight*, 22 July 1992.

[28] Ibid.

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been achieved among the Somali factions. On the Democratic side, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL), chair of the Subcommittee on Africa since 1987, had commended Kassebaum for visiting Somalia and urged the White House to act: "I don't want to wait to have a Democratic administration before we respond more adequately. I want to do it now."[29]

The events of 22 July do not represent the first notice of Somalia in Washington in 1992, but they do mark the movement of the story into a new phase, one of direct calls for forceful action.[30] Although Congress had expressed concern over Somalia in the spring, it had not challenged the Bush administration's policy of working through the UN to achieve a diplomatic solution. A resolution introduced in the House in April commended the administration "for its significant efforts to provide food and humanitarian relief to Somalia."[31] A resolution in the Senate in May expressed "the sense of the Senate regarding needed action to address the continuing state of war and chaos and the emergency humanitarian situation in Somalia," but suggested no change in policy.[32] In other words, Congress in the spring simply instructed the White House and the UN to go forward with existing policy, hardly a newsworthy event in the framework of American journalism, which most often finds news where there is conflict, or something that moves a story forward.[33] Conflict and movement only appeared in July, when Kassebaum and Simon declared the response of the Bush administration inadequate and urged a change in policy.

ABC's 22 July story is best understood as a joint production of politicians, who made efforts to publicize events in Somalia and the possibility of some form of U.S. intervention, and journalists, who decided to respond to those efforts with coverage. ABC's contribution is obviously indispensable and may have been influenced by the judgment that the visually stunning Somalia story made "good television" and could hold an audience, or by the conviction that television—which had inspired efforts to aid Ethiopia eight years earlier—had a responsibility to publicize massive human suffering. It is economic factors that are invoked when reference is made to "the commercial television industry"[34] as the source of U.S. interest in Somalia; ideological ones are suggested in the assertion that journalists "mobilized the conscience of the nation's public institutions,"[35] presumably acting out of conscience themselves.

Economic and ideological factors may indeed have contributed to ABC's decision to send cameras to Somalia. Yet the timing of the story points to the influence of Senators Kassebaum and Simon and the House Committee on

[29] Marilyn Greene, "Senator Reaches Out to Somalia," *USA Today*, 20 July 1992.

[30] On the use of "phase structures" to determine what constitutes news, see Mark Fishman, *Manufacturing the News* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 63–76.

[31] *Congressional Record*, 7 April 1992, E978.

[32] *Congressional Record*, 19 May 1992, S6933.

[33] Fishman, *Manufacturing the News.*

[34] Kennan, "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly."

[35] Cohen, "A View from the Academy," 10.

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Hunger in getting Somalia considered as a possible story in the first place. Contrary to the impression created by those who attribute to television "the power to move governments,"[36] ABC appears to have observed a rule of deference to government officials, in this case the top Senate experts on Africa in terms of institutional position, in deciding that events in Somalia constituted news in the United States. The efforts of Kassebaum and Simon to publicize the crisis in Somalia were not sufficient to get the story on television; ABC had to cooperate, a decision economic, ideological and other factors may have contributed to. But the evidence clearly suggests that those efforts were necessary. As I show below, exactly the same pattern is found in November; Somalia turned up on television after a period of near invisibility on the very day that a congressional delegation reported on a visit to Somalia and urged U.S. action.

As of 22 July, Somalia had not attained a very conspicuous position on the foreign policy agenda; two senators and one House committee constitute only one corner of the Washington foreign policy establishment. If ABC had made Somalia the top story or offered a series of stories on it in July, a case could be made that it had been magnified out of proportion to its place on the Washington agenda. As Harrison and Palmer observe of British coverage of Ethiopia in 1984, "by leading on two consecutive days with items of eight and seven minutes in length . . . the BBC was quite clearly saying: 'Here is an event of major importance.'"[37] Yet the ABC story appeared in isolation at the end of *World News Tonight*. Somalia may not have been at the top of the foreign policy agenda in July, but neither did it appear at the top of the news.

"Somalia," CBS reported on 31 July, "is in danger of becoming a vast graveyard."[38] In Washington, this turn of events had not gone unnoticed. On 27 July, the *Washington Post* reported: "Congressional pressure is mounting to send U.N. peacekeeping troops to guard relief shipments to Somalia."[39] Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), for example, wondered "why we're not moving in Somalia as we are in Yugoslavia."[40] White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater indicated on 27 July that Somalia was on the president's agenda: "The tragedy in Somalia . . . requires the urgent attention of the international community."[41] In other words, CBS covered Somalia on 31 July—the first story on CBS since 27 February—after actors in Washington had defined it as a significant concern of American foreign policy. Instead of being out ahead of Washington, television appears to have acted in concert with Congress and the White House in illuminating events in Somalia.

[36] Ibid., 9.

[37] Harrison and Palmer, *News Out of Africa*, 129.

[38] *CBS Evening News*, 31 July 1992.

[39] Shari Rudavsky, "Bush, UN Face Pressure to Aid War-Torn Somalia," *Washington Post*, 27 July 1992.

[40] "Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: U.S. Refugee Programs for FY 1993," *Federal News Service*, 23 July 1992.

[41] "Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Situation in Somalia," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, 27 July 1992.

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This is the only story on Somalia over twenty seconds in length on the major networks in the twenty-one days from 23 July to 12 August. If television contributed to the evolution of American interest in Somalia in this period, its contribution must be described as measured and proportionate. Far from magnifying the crisis, ABC, CBS, and NBC responded to the White House declaration on 27 July that Somalia warranted "urgent attention" with one story on one network on 31 July, near the end of the broadcast, and no further stories until 13 August.

As one moves into August, it appears that Washington is getting out ahead of television on Somalia. On 3 August the Senate passed a resolution urging the deployment of a UN force to Somalia. A similar resolution passed the House on 10 August.[42] From 6 August to 13 August, four more senators and a presidential candidate addressed Somalia. Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) listed Somalia as one of four examples of the failure of Bush's foreign policy and criticized the president for inaction: "What's he doing about Somalia? . . . [T]here's no planning. There's no sense of a course."[43] Somalia also appeared in the debate over Bosnia, which heated up in early August. On 5 August, six senators urged further UN action on Bosnia, and on 13 August the Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to deliver aid to Sarajevo and other areas. Somalia was introduced into this debate by opponents of intervention in Bosnia. Senator James Jeffords (R-VT) wondered, "How do you make distinctions between going into the former Yugoslavia, . . . and Somalia?"[44] Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) also argued that intervention in Bosnia could be a slippery slope to intervention in Somalia.[45] In responding to this argument, supporters of intervention in Bosnia, like Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), noted the gravity of the crisis in Somalia, and indicated that further action might be required there too.[46] In other words, the juxtaposition of Bosnia and Somalia in foreign policy debate emerged in part from the tactics of opponents of intervention in Bosnia in the Senate. Finally, on 13 August, Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton cited Somalia—along with Bosnia and Cambodia—as a "torn" area in which "multilateral action holds promise as never before."[47]

Only after all this do the first stories on Somalia in August appear on ABC on 13 August. One story described Somalia as "on the verge of committing suicide," a country in a state of "utter and complete and hopeless misery," where one finds "Graves in athletic fields. Graves in farm fields. Graves along city

[42] Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa*, 177. Unlike the spring resolutions, which did not criticize existing policy, the August resolutions urged a change in policy.

[43] *Newsmaker Sunday*, CNN, 9 August 1992.

[44] *Morning Edition*, NPR, 7 August 1992.

[45] *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*, 6 August 1992.

[46] *Crossfire*, CNN, 3 August 1992.

[47] "Excerpts from Clinton's Speech on Foreign Policy Leadership," *New York Times*, 14 August 1992.

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streets." A second story explored why the West appeared more interested in Bosnia than Somalia. An official from Transafrica, for example, argued "it's as if the U.S. government is saying that the lives of black babies are not as important and that suffering Bosnians are worth more . . . than the starving Somalians."[48]

On 14 August, the White House announced plans to airlift emergency aid to Somalia. It is at this point that the case for the influence of television appears strongest. On 12 August, the United Nations had announced that the warring Somali factions had consented to the deployment of 500 UN troops to guard relief supplies, indicating an increase in international efforts to aid Somalia. This could have inspired ABC to frame a story around the emerging international response to the crisis. Instead, ABC focused on why the West had not responded.

ABC's decision must be viewed in the context of the international response to the crisis in Bosnia. The Security Council had just passed a resolution authorizing the use of force to deliver humanitarian aid in Bosnia. Although doubts existed as to the likelihood of its implementation, reports indicated that NATO had been engaged in "operational planning" and that over 100,000 troops could be used.[49] Next to this effort to show international resolve on Bosnia, a plan to send just 500 troops to Somalia to guard relief supplies, not even authorized to use force to deliver them to those in need, must have appeared unimpressive. International efforts on Somalia paled at this point next to the far greater efforts apparently in the works on Bosnia, a contrast American politicians, as noted, had been working to illuminate. Somalia had figured in Washington debate as the crisis the world had ignored, and the announcement of a major international initiative on Bosnia just twenty-four hours after reports of a minor one on Somalia simply reinforced this interpretation.

It is not hard to explain why the United States finally acted on Somalia. In addition to principled concern for the Somali people and the "new world order," the president may have had, an administration official cited, "a desire by the White House to initiate a dramatic relief effort on the eve of the Republican national convention."[50] According to this official, "The White House figured they couldn't gain votes by acting in Somalia but their image could be tarnished if they didn't do anything." Of course, political costs from inaction only come into play if the inaction is publicized; and in framing events in Somalia in a way that supported the case for intervention, ABC most likely influenced the White House decision. Yet if ABC influenced American policy in crystallizing and amplifying the political stakes in Somalia, it is American politics—and the situation in Bosnia—that created those stakes in the first place

[48] *ABC World News Tonight*, 13 August 1992.

[49] Trevor Rowe, "UN Approves Use of Military Force for Bosnia Aid," *Washington Post,* 14 August 1992.

[50] Jane Perlez, "U.S. Encounters Snags in Airlift to Aid Somalia," *New York Times*, 22 August 1992.

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and that is the frame through which ABC interpreted events in Somalia and the U.S. response.

In sum, an assessment of the scope and character of television's influence on American policy in the summer of 1992 must weigh the evidence that as of 13 August ABC had received numerous signals from actors in Washington—seven senators, a House Committee, the full House and Senate, the Democratic candidate for president, and the White House—that Somalia had emerged as a subject of foreign policy debate. This debate, like the ABC stories on 13 August, focused on the proposition that U.S. policy toward Somalia stood in contrast to U.S. policy toward Bosnia, an assessment the Bush administration made no great effort to dispute. ABC could have found another way to frame its coverage of Somalia, but only if it had rejected the frame that had evolved in Washington.

When George Kennan describes American policy as "controlled by popular emotional impulses, . . . provoked by the commercial television industry,"[51] the implication is that television framed Somalia in a way that inspired an emotional reaction. Indeed, the coverage does at times appear designed to pull at the heartstrings and create a sense of American responsibility, as in ABC's 13 August presentation of "a bewildered little girl" whose entire family is dead, "waiting like so many others for help that may never come" from a world that has "turned its back on this country."[52] This is an angle the Bush administration, gearing up for the fall campaign, must have found disturbing.

Although explicit commentary on the failure of the West to act is not necessary for a story to push American policy in that direction—pictures of dying children may speak for themselves—it is noteworthy that the framing of the crisis in Somalia as a humanitarian disaster that the United States could do something about does not appear on television until it had appeared in Washington first. Stories in February and March, before senators had criticized the White House for inaction, characterized Somalia as "a terrible, closed world of violence and destruction."[53] But they offered no hint of possible Western action, a frame that evokes, in contrast to the one found in July, a sense of inevitability and hopelessness about the events described.

In July, when Kassebaum openly urged the United States and the international community to do more for Somalia and criticized White House inaction, this angle appeared on television. The framing of Somalia as desperate for Western intervention that could happen turns out to be a joint production of television and actors in Washington, who signalled in July and August that the crisis in Somalia was not just an unfortunate disaster in a distant land but one the United States could do something to end.

[51] Kennan, "Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly."
[52] *ABC World News Tonight*, 13 August 1992.
[53] *NBC Nightly News*, 2 March 1992.

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A CNN Effect?

For the most part, the coverage on CNN follows the pattern found on ABC, CBS, and NBC. From 1 June to 13 August, only three stories on Somalia appeared on CNN: on 27 July, 4 August, and 6 August, or after Somalia had emerged as a contested issue in Washington. From 1 January to 30 April, CNN aired no stories on Somalia. Where CNN departs from the pattern observed on the major networks is in May. Without any apparent cues from Washington, CNN sent a reporter to Somalia and aired eight stories on the crisis there from 1 May to 15 May.

In this series of reports we find the stuff of which the image of television's power over U.S. foreign policy is made. Pictures of starving Somalis illustrate the following narrative:

> The weak were pushed aside, trampled in the rush on one rice pot. The cooks desperately tried to save it as the starving crowd clawed in vain. Hundred of faces eyed the cooking pot, burning to eat the contents.[54]

> These are the faces of famine. Countless thousands of children now look like this. Hanging on to life by a thread, hoping that something soon will change. They want the world to see, to witness their skeletal forms, to share and understand their agony, and to forcefully act in a way that will end or at least ease this suffering.[55]

The detail here is more vivid, more disturbing than in the CBS and NBC stories in February and March. Moreover, in contrast to the CBS and NBC stories, CNN explicitly frames Somalia as a tragedy the United States has turned its back on, ignoring those children who "want the world to see . . . and to forcefully act." In the blunt assessment of CNN's Brent Sadler, Somalia "needs bombarding with food by a massive, coordinated rescue mission."[56] The West "will be neither forgiven nor forgotten"[57] if this does not happen. Finally, eight reports in two weeks made Somalia a major story on CNN, over two months before the Kassebaum visit and three months before the U.S. airlift.

In the first half of May, CNN presented the crisis in Somalia in extraordinarily dire terms and explicitly criticized the West for declining to act. Yet the CNN stories had no discernible impact on American policy. Plans to increase the UN presence in Somalia continued to stall. Calls for intervention did not sound in Washington. Nor could they be heard around the United States, if letters to the editor are an indication: a LEXIS/NEXIS search of letters to nine major American newspapers turned up one letter on Somalia in May, one in

[54] "Somalians Fight Over Meager Rations," CNN, 11 May 1992.
[55] "Somalian Famine Reaches Crisis Proportions," CNN, 15 May 1992.
[56] "Somalia Starvation Worsens Due to Civil War," CNN, 3 May 1992.
[57] "Somalia Problems Mounting Without Signs of Respite," CNN, 5 May 1992.

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June, and one in July.[58] Not until August did the number of letters to the editor in the nine newspapers increase (to 25). Although editors have the power to decide what subjects to publish letters on, if the CNN stories in May had generated a significant public outcry one might expect the letters appearing in some of the papers examined to reflect this. In sum, the series of stories on CNN in May offers something of a test: What happens when television does independently investigate a foreign crisis that has not sparked much interest in Washington and frames it in terms that cry out for action? In this case, no impact on American policy is apparent.

It could be that the CNN stories had some behind-the-scenes influence on Senator Kassebaum and others in Washington, encouraging them to consider the possibility that interest in Somalia could be mobilized in the United States. Yet what influence CNN may have had in the spring is far more subtle and indirect than declarations on "the immediate pressure of media"[59] and claims that television "propelled the U.S. military"[60] into action appear to indicate. CNN may have contributed something to the evolution of American interest in Somalia, but the episode is evidence that even a concerted effort on the part of CNN to put a foreign crisis on the Washington agenda may have no direct impact on American policy, if the "pressure of media" is not joined with a political dynamic that encourages action. Of course, if ABC, CBS, or NBC, each with an audience over ten times the size of CNN's, had aired eight stories on Somalia in May, the impact on the public—and on politicians who anticipate the evolution of public opinion—might have been much greater.

The November Ground Troop Decision

Somalia received substantial coverage on television for over a month after 13 August. From 14 August to 18 September, the three major networks devoted over 55 minutes to Somalia, or 18 minutes per network. The stories reported preparations for the airlift of food to Somalia, the operation itself, and the pitfalls it encountered. Most of the stories contained video from Somalia. As the United States was conducting a military operation in that country, however, it is hard to argue that this coverage magnified Somalia out of proportion to its place on the foreign policy agenda. Moreover, despite U.S. military activity in Somalia and an ample supply of video footage of starving children, Somalia never appeared as the top story on ABC, CBS, or NBC in the 1 January to 25 November period.

[58] The papers were selected arbitrarily: they are the nine papers that list their letters in LEXIS/NEXIS under the heading "letters to the editor." The papers are the *Columbus Dispatch*, the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, the *San Diego Union-Tribune*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Orlando Sentinel Tribune*, the *St. Petersburg Times*, and the *Washington Post*. The search terms were "letters to the editor" and "Somalia."

[59] Roberts, "Humanitarian War," 446.

[60] Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," 16.

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TABLE 4

Chronology of Events and Stories in November

November 9	Senators Simon, Kassebaum, and Wofford call for further action on Somalia
November 18	Bush-Clinton meeting addresses Somalia; Bush aides consider further action; congressional delegation holds press conference in Nairobi
November 18	**ABC Story**
November 21	Congressional delegation holds press conference in Washington
November 21	**CBS Story, NBC Story**
November 24	**NBC Story**
November 26	White House announces plan to send troops to Somalia

On 18 September, the United States temporarily suspended flights to one area of Somalia after an aircraft came under fire. Although the airlift continued, at this point Somalia all but disappeared from the news. From 19 September to 8 November, only 250 seconds of coverage appeared on the major networks. The primary explanation for the eclipse of Somalia on American television is the presidential election in the United States, in which foreign policy played a marginal role. With a campaign focused on domestic issues, politicians for the most part ignored Somalia, offering journalists few words or deeds upon which stories might have been based. It is also likely that the story simply grew old, as the airlift went on with no change of phase to generate "news" deemed worthy of coverage.[61]

From 9 November to 25 November (the day before the White House announced plans to send troops), over sixteen minutes of Somalia coverage appeared on ABC, CBS, and NBC. From 9 November to 17 November, this took the form of six studio reports of ten to thirty seconds in length. The coverage then increased, as four full stories appeared from 18 November to 24 November. Table 4 displays the four full stories in November, superimposed over activities in Congress and the White House.

The first reference to Somalia in November, in an ABC story on Clinton's military policy, appeared the day Senators Simon, Kassebaum, and Harris Wofford (D-PA) held a press conference urging further U.S. action on Somalia. "The United Nations has to move from being peacekeeper to being a peacemaker," Simon declared. "This is a situation that cannot wait" for the Clinton administration. Senator Kassebaum argued that "We simply must send security guards in."[62] In mentioning Somalia on 9 November, ABC clearly had not gotten out ahead of Washington.

On 18 November, President-Elect Clinton met with President Bush at the White House for a briefing that focused on foreign affairs. After the meeting, Clinton cited four areas of the world that had been discussed: the former Soviet

[61] Fishman, *Manufacturing the News*, 63–76.

[62] Marilyn Greene, "Senators Call for Protection for Somalian Aid Shipments," *USA Today*, 10 November 1992.

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republics, Bosnia, the North American Free Trade Area, and Somalia.[63] The Clinton camp was apparently struck by the depth of Bush's concern over Somalia.[64] The *New York Times* reported in a story filed on that day that "Key Bush aides will . . . urge [the president] to energize the UN now to provide more food, more transport and most importantly more troops with more powerful weapons and a mandate to be aggressive."[65] Also on 18 November, a six-member congressional delegation that had just visited Somalia held a press conference in Nairobi, where they described the situation in Somalia as "an affront to humanity," and urged further action.[66]

Only after the White House had put Somalia at the top of its agenda and Congress had dispatched a delegation to investigate the crisis does a full story on Somalia appear on a major network in November. Neither White House nor congressional activities are reported in ABC's 18 November story, which focuses on the futility of UN efforts in Somalia, but as in July, the timing clearly suggests a connection. In November as in July, the evening news first contained a full story on Somalia the very day a congressional delegation reported on a visit to that country and urged U.S. intervention. In each case, television coverage and the actions of politicians are closely correlated, official actions falling just before Somalia makes the news.

Three more stories appeared on the major networks before the announcement of the decision to send U.S. troops. Half of the 21 November story on NBC is an interview with Representative John Lewis (D-GA), head of the congressional delegation, who argues, "We must get the United States to go before the UN and intervene" in Somalia.[67] The CBS story on 21 November also focuses on the findings of the congressional delegation.[68] The 21 November stories may have accelerated the movement in Washington toward intervention, but they are also clearly a product of that movement.

Only after all of this did what is probably the most powerful and evocative story on Somalia found on the major networks appear. On 24 November, NBC presented a series of still photographs of starvation in Somalia, over the grim narration of anchor Tom Brokaw: "In Somalia, children under the age of five have all but disappeared. Hundreds die each week. It's a place where a thousand die today, and a thousand will die tomorrow, and the day after that, and the day after that. We have seen all this before, and we will see it again. The images will fade, but the memory cannot."[69]

[63] Gwen Ifill, "Bush and Clinton Proclaim End to the Election's Rancor," *New York Times*, 19 November 1992.

[64] Russell Watson, "Troops to Somalia," *Newsweek*, 7 December 1992.

[65] Leslie H. Gelb, "Shoot to Feed Somalia," *New York Times*, 19 November 1992.

[66] Buchizya Mseteka, "Members of Congress Call for Firmer UN Role in Somalia," *Reuters*, 18 November 1992.

[67] *NBC Nightly News*, 21 November 1992.

[68] *CBS Evening News*, 21 November 1992.

[69] *NBC Nightly News*, 24 November 1992.

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It is likely that video and commentary like this on the evening news increased the sense of the White House that something had to be done about Somalia, or the legacy of the Bush administration and its "new world order" could be tarnished.[70] In assessing television's influence, however, it is important to note that the tone of this report is no more dire than the judgment of Representative Lewis, who the House had sent to Somalia, that what he had found there "[could not] be compared to anything else in modern history."[71] NBC's grim framing of Somalia, it turns out, matches that of the institutionally authorized representative of the House.

CNN's coverage in November parallels the major networks. The first CNN story in November appeared on the 12th. The Somali fashion model Iman is interviewed and urges further action. Yet it does not appear that CNN decided on its own to consult Iman, as only three days before Senators Kassebaum and Simon had held a press conference with her. This presumably is what established Iman—not otherwise likely to have been viewed as a credible source of opinion on American foreign policy—as worthy of consultation. Stories on Somalia also appeared on CNN on 15, 22, and 24 November, in a pattern similar to the one found on the major networks.

In view of the position Somalia had achieved on the American foreign policy agenda, it is hard to argue that television overplayed the story in November. ABC and CBS each found space from 1 November to 25 November for a single story on Somalia over thirty seconds in length, neither in the top half of the broadcast. NBC offered two full stories on Somalia, neither in the top third of the news. Setting aside brief studio reports that could not possibly be argued to have inspired the Bush administration to act, one is left with four stories on ABC, CBS, and NBC over twenty-five days. This is hardly a record of overplaying what the head of a congressional delegation had described as without precedent in modern history and what President-Elect Clinton, following a meeting with President Bush, identified as one of four major issues on the foreign policy agenda of the United States.

Conclusion

It is likely that television news contributed to the decision of the Bush administration to act in Somalia. Events in Somalia could not have threatened to damage Bush politically in August or tarnish his legacy in November had they not been publicized in the United States. The 13 August stories on ABC may have signaled to the White House the political dangers that lurked if it failed to act on an issue that Democrats (and some Republicans) had begun to use against it.[72] News stories in November may have crystallized the damage the

[70] On this danger, see Jim Mann, "Somalia Closing Out Bush's 'New World Order,'" *Los Angeles Times*, 29 November 1992.

[71] "Rep. John Lewis," *Reuter Transcript Report*, 21 November 1992.

[72] Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy toward Africa*, 177–78.

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president's place in history could suffer if the "new world order" proved meaningless in Somalia.

Yet if television contributed to the emergence of Somalia as a political liability for the president in August and a threat to his legacy in November, it had powerful, outspoken allies in Washington, whose efforts to get Somalia onto the news in the first place appear to have been indispensable. The evidence in this study shows that stories on Somalia appeared just after the articulation of demands for intervention in Washington in the summer and fall of 1992. Journalists ultimately made the decision to cover Somalia, but the stage for this decision had been set in Washington.

The lesson of Somalia is often thought to be that television has the "power to move governments."[73] This study has found that governments also have the power to move television. Television is clearly a player in the foreign policy arena, but the evidence from Somalia is that journalists set the news agenda and frame the stories they report in close collaboration with actors in Washington. In the case of Somalia, television turns out not to be the independent, driving force that much of the commentary on its influence would lead one to believe.*

[73] Cohen, "A View from the Academy," 10.

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

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Teenage Childbearing and Personal Responsibility: An Alternative View

ARLINE T. GERONIMUS

The nature and scope of the welfare reform debate resulting in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)[1] reflect a growing convergence toward the position that poverty is the result of poor people's values and behaviors.[2] Among examples of this convergence is a perspective on teenage childbearing that informed some provisions of PRWORA.[3] "Teenage childbearing" operates as a uniquely effective symbol of the failure to act responsibly. At first glance, everyone can agree that teenage childbearing is a "bad thing," unambiguously harmful to all involved—the young parents, the innocent children, and the larger society. Because of its perceived social costs and the fact that children are involved, the

[1] P.L. 104–193, Public Law found in *U.S. Statutes at Large,* vol. 110, 2105–2355.

[2] Herbert J. Gans, *The War Against the Poor* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

[3] Politicians and the public often fail to distinguish between teen childbearing, teen pregnancy, and illegitimacy. I use the term "teenage childbearing," because only those teen pregnancies that are carried to term can have the consequences most often cited as costing welfare dollars. In addition, the universe of nonmarital births includes more nonteenage than teenage mothers, while many teenage mothers are married. It should be noted, however, that these terms are used interchangeably in quotations from others. Elected representatives are also inconsistent about what ages constitute teen mothers. Sometimes they refer to mothers <18, sometimes <21, and sometimes <23, years old. In Table 1, I define teenage mothers as those <20 years old. In the text, my use of the concept is not tied to very specific ages, but to the generally earlier fertility-timing distributions characteristic of poor or minority communities relative to more advantaged communities or to the national average. In socioeconomically disadvantaged communities, first births tend to be concentrated in the mid to late teens through the very early twenties. In more advantaged populations, first births are concentrated in the mid to late twenties.

ARLINE T. GERONIMUS is associate professor, Department of Health Behavior and Health Education, School of Public Health, and faculty research associate, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan. This work was undertaken while the author was a visiting scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation.

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invocation of incentives and punishments to alter this behavior is now considered to be within the legitimate purview of public policy. This particular form of social engineering garners enthusiastic support from representatives of different political persuasions. To the extent that it represents concern for the well-being of vulnerable children, it appeals to those with the desire to help the needy. And because to many it represents extramarital sexuality, it ignites the interests of those who seek to reaffirm social order. But if this apparent consensus siphons energy and resources away from searching debate about the nature of poverty, it presents a definite social danger.

In this article, I reopen discussion of widely shared assumptions about teenage childbearing. I begin with a brief discussion of its place in recent welfare reform proposals and legislation. I then argue that the scientific evidence of causal relationships between teenage childbearing and welfare dependence, or between teenage childbearing and the health and development of the children of teen mothers, is more modest and equivocal than conventional wisdom allows. I argue further that the current evaluation of teen mothers is crafted through the prism of middle-class nuclear-family experience. This prism may ill reflect the traditions or, more importantly, the environmental contingencies and life expectancy faced by members of poor families who hope to provide for children's well-being.

Based on these arguments, I question the merit of placing the reduction of teenage childbearing as an important goal of welfare reform. Teenage mothers and their children suffer from many disadvantages that public policy might address, as do all poor families. But current efforts to reduce teenage childbearing in the poor population may be ineffective at best or even harmful. Meanwhile energetic focus on reducing teen childbearing may distract from the development of more effective antipoverty policies.

Teenage Childbearing and Welfare Reform

In the recent national welfare reform debate, both Democrats and Republicans explicitly endorsed the view that successful welfare reform requires reducing teenage childbearing.[4] Furthermore, they both came to generally interpret teenage childbearing as "a bedrock issue of character and personal responsibility."[5] In June 1994, the Clinton administration offered the 103rd Congress a

[4] For example, see comments of Representative Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA), *Congressional Record*, 21 April 1993, E 995; Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), *Congressional Record,* 14 June 1994, 6810; Representative Linda Smith (R-WA), *Congressional Record*, 23 March 1995, 3718; Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), *Congressional Record,* 25 May 1994, 6345, and 27 July 1995, 10771; Representative Joel Hefley (R-CO), *Congressional Record*, 21 March 1995, 3341; or Representative Eva M. Clayton (D-NC), *Congressional Record*, 27 February 1996, 1297. Clayton observed: "One objective of welfare reform, shared by both political parties, is to reduce teenage childbearing."

[5] This quote is from the 1994 Clinton administration proposal for welfare reform. For additional evidence that Republicans and Democrats now construe teenage childbearing as a question of personal responsibility, see GOP "Contract with America," specifically "The Personal Responsibility Act," which among other provisions seeks to "discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting

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proposal for welfare reform that highlighted teenage pregnancy prevention. The proposal included provisions for a national campaign—sometimes referred to as a national mobilization[6] or crusade[7]—against teenage pregnancy. The 1994 proposal was unsuccessful, but the 104th Congress took up welfare reform with greater zeal and severity, including continued focus on teen childbearing.

As welfare reform was debated, some proposals highlighted the direct use of welfare regulations to discourage teenage childbearing, either by placing extra requirements on teen mothers who receive welfare benefits or by eliminating eligibility for welfare altogether among specified segments of the population of teenage mothers. For example, the 1994 Clinton administration proposal included provisions to require every school-age parent or pregnant teenager who received or applied for welfare to finish high school or enroll in a JOBS program; to live with a responsible adult, preferably a parent; and to cooperate in the effort to establish paternity. Any welfare recipient under age 23 would be required to search for a job during her first twelve weeks on the welfare rolls or undergo job training. Tougher proposals were suggested by moderate Democrats and by Republicans. A group of Democrats modified Clinton's plan to include a provision to deny all Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and food stamp benefits to unwed mothers under age 21 and their children. The Welfare and Teenage Pregnancy Reduction Act introduced by Representative Jan Meyers (R-KS) proposed that no AFDC benefits be permitted unless both the mother and the father were at least 18 years old and unless paternity was established. The provisions of the Republican Personal Responsibility Act proposed that states be compelled to deny cash assistance to a child born out-of-wedlock to a teen parent, to reduce family assistance when paternity was not established, and to deny family assistance when a parent did not cooperate in establishing paternity. A compromise advanced by a bipartisan coalition of governors in February 1996 proposed empowering states to deny benefits to children born to unwed women under the age of 18. Massachusetts requested a waiver to enable it to deny cash assistance to mothers under age 20 who did not live with a parent or other caretaker relative. At the most extreme, conservative legislators floated the idea of enforced fosterage of children with financially needy teenage mothers.[8]

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welfare to minor mothers." See remarks of such Republican representatives as Representative Jan Meyers, *Congressional Record*, 10 March 1993, 1083, on her introduction of the "Welfare and Teenage Pregnancy Reduction Act"; see also remarks of such Democratic representatives as, Representative Lee H. Hamilton, *Congressional Record*, 26 January 1995, E 181; and Representative Lewis F. Payne, *Congressional Record*, 22 March 1995, 3542.

[6] Clinton administration 1994 welfare reform proposal.

[7] Senator Joseph Lieberman on welfare reform, *Congressional Record,* 14 June 1994, 6811.

[8] GOP House leader Newt Gingrich touted orphanages and adoption as solutions for the young and disadvantaged. See Michael Tanner, "Ending Welfare As We Know It," *USA Today Magazine,* March 1995, 16; or Fred Bayles and Sharon Cohen, "Nobody's Children: A Child Welfare System in Chaos," Associated Press, 1 May 1995.

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The welfare bill signed into law by President Clinton in August 1996 avoided codifying the harshest proposals into law but does single out teen parents who hope to be welfare beneficiaries for extra requirements.[9] Except in special cases, states are prohibited from providing assistance to teen parents or their children if the parents fail to meet these requirements. Individual states may choose to add to these prohibitions. The law also calls for the secretary of Health and Human Services and the attorney general to implement programs aimed at teenage pregnancy prevention and for the former to implement a strategy by 1997 to assure that at least 25 percent of U.S. communities have teen pregnancy prevention programs in place.

In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Clinton gave voice to the logic underpinning the link between teen childbearing and welfare reform. He argued that the "welfare system has undermined the values of family and work" and that "to strengthen the family we must do everything we can to keep the teen pregnancy rates going down." He announced that a group of prominent Americans had been convened to launch such a bipartisan national campaign. Its mission is "to reduce teenage pregnancy by supporting values and stimulating actions that are consistent with a pregnancy-free adolescence" and to do so by one-third by the year 2005.

Past arguments connecting teenage childbearing to welfare did not focus prominently on questions of values. Instead, they alleged a sizeable link between teenage childbearing and welfare costs as the rationale. In Congress, these arguments were more often made by family planning advocates than by advocates of welfare reform.[10] Family planners who sought to place teenage pregnancy on the national agenda advocated the view that teen pregnancy was often caused by (or was a symptom of) poverty (more than vice versa) and was an educational or medical problem to be solved by increased access to contraception, abortion, and sex education.[11] Now, reducing teenage childbearing is also seen as a measure of moral renaissance. Members of a moderate Democrat

[9] The prohibitions and requirements for Block Grant assistance include that no assistance can be given to an unmarried minor with children over 12 weeks old who is not a high school graduate and is not participating in activities leading to a high school diploma or equivalent or an alternative educational program approved by the state; nor can assistance be given to such individuals (whatever their children's age), if they do not reside in a residence maintained by a parent, legal guardian, or other adult relative, or some other form of adult supervised living arrangement. A teen head of household who maintains satisfactory high school attendance is deemed to be meeting workfare requirements. While not limited to teens, teens will be disproportionately affected by requirements that individuals cooperate with paternity establishment, with the minimum penalty for noncooperation a 25 percent reduction in the family's grant.

[10] Constance A. Nathanson, *Dangerous Passage: The Social Control of Women's Adolescence* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).

[11] Catherine K. Riessman and Constance A. Nathanson, "The Management of Reproduction: Social Construction of Risk and Responsibility" in Linda H. Aiken and David Mechanic, eds., *Applications of Social Science to Clinical Medicine and Health Policy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986).

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think tank argue that the campaign against teen childbearing must stand firm, that such behavior is "morally wrong," and "cast single motherhood as a selfish act."[12] Remedies include measures that can be seen as punitive—such as denial of welfare benefits and reinvigoration of statutory rape laws—and national discussion of religion, culture, and public values.[13] The legislation earmarks $400 million for abstinence-only education programs for teens, but eliminates the mandate making family planning available to welfare beneficiaries.

In terms of scientific evidence, either perspective is at best incomplete and oversimplified. Family planning advocates blur the distinction between teenagers at risk of pregnancy who avoid childbearing when given adequate information and technology and those who would bear children even provided the same. Meanwhile, welfare reformers focus narrowly on teenage childbearing and leave unexamined other important causes of persistent poverty. There is no doubt that teenage childbearing is associated with many social and public health problems. And high rates of teen childbearing in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities likely result from the severe limits placed on the options available to the young for pursuing important goals. But none of these observations leads necessarily to the conclusion that reducing teenage childbearing itself, in the absence of other social changes, is either an attainable goal or one that would result in other social improvements. In targeting teen childbearing as a major activity for welfare reform, the basic question of cause and effect is consistently glossed over by policy makers and advocates.[14]

The Consequences of Teenage Childbearing

The question policy makers and social scientists need to answer is the following: Would social problems be alleviated *if the same women who become teen mothers postponed childbearing to older ages*? This question poses a serious challenge to scientific investigation, since the same women cannot have their first births twice. Nor can we do a controlled experiment and randomly assign women to their childbearing age. Instead, analysts must try to approximate an experimental approach by comparing teen mothers to older mothers who otherwise resemble them in every possible respect. But we know that those who will become teen mothers differ from the larger population in countless and consequential ways. For example, teen mothers are far more likely to have grown up in extremely impoverished circumstances and to have experienced prior school failure.[15] These disadvantages lead both to early motherhood and

[12] Jonathan Alter, "The Name of the Game Is Shame," *Newsweek*, 12 December 1994.

[13] See "Personal Responsibility and Reconciliation Act of 1996," and the charge of "The National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy," 2100 M Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20037.

[14] Arline T. Geronimus, "On Teenage Childbearing and Neonatal Mortality in the United States," *Population and Development Review* 13 (June 1987): 245–279; Kristin Luker, "Dubious Conceptions: The Controversy Over Teen Pregnancy," *The American Prospect* (Spring 1991): 73–83.

[15] Allan F. Abrahamse, Peter A. Morrison, and Linda Waite, "Beyond Stereotypes: Who Becomes A Single Teenage Mother?" (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988).

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to the subsequent problems we now attribute to teen childbearing. To assess the effects of teen motherhood per se, we need to consider whether an already disadvantaged group is further disadvantaged by early motherhood. Without such reasoning, any conclusions about teenage motherhood are apt to be misleadingly dire.

Welfare Dependence

When proposing the Welfare and Teenage Pregnancy Reduction Act, Representative Jan Meyers (R-KS) stated, "My bill ensures that the responsibility of having a child belongs to the mother and father, rather than to the mother and U.S. taxpayers."[16] Similarly, Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) when debating family planning and discussing welfare reform observed, "welfare payments are enormous when we talk about teenage pregnancy, which may be the greatest domestic social problem America faces today."[17] Statements such as these describe the simple statistical association between teen childbearing and poverty or welfare receipt and refer to public spending on women who had their first births in their teen years. However, this spending is incorrectly implied to represent the amount the government would save if teen mothers delayed their first births. That causal inference does not jibe with evidence from those studies on the relationship of teen childbearing to poverty or welfare dependence that most adequately control for the selection into teen childbearing of already disadvantaged teenagers. Simple associations may be easier to accept, because they reinforce peoples' intuition that early childbearing is detrimental; yet the extent of measurable background differences between the teens most likely to become mothers and more typical teens nationwide suggests the importance of proceeding cautiously before relying on intuitions developed from experience with typical teens.

Many studies employ standard multivariate statistical techniques to control for specified, measurable background characteristics. These studies improve over simple statistical associations, but are likely to overestimate the negative consequences of teen childbearing, since there are many unmeasured factors that jointly determine a girl's likelihood of becoming a teen mother and of being poor in adulthood.[18] A subset of recent studies compares mothers of different ages who are similar on a fuller range of potentially important antecedents of teen childbearing than can be measured directly. For example, investigators have compared outcomes among national samples of sisters who had their first births at different ages.[19]

[16] *Congressional Record*, 10 March 1993, 1084–85.

[17] *Congressional Record,* 27 July 1995, 10771.

[18] Arline T. Geronimus and Sanders Korenman, "The Socio-Economic Consequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107 (November 1992): 1187–1214.

[19] Ibid.; Saul Hoffman, Michael Foster, and Frank Furstenberg, "Reevaluating the Costs of Teenage Childbearing," *Demography* 30 (February 1993): 1–13; Mary E. Corcoran and James P. Kunz, "Do Out-of-Wedlock Births Among African American Teenagers Lead to Adult Poverty and Dependency?" *Social Service Review*, forthcoming.

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Unlike more typical studies, comparing sisters in effect controls for such factors as general access to resources throughout childhood, (not simply income at a specific point in time), cultural environment, neighborhood, or school system. Sisters comparisons do not control for personal antecedents of early childbearing that can affect long-term economic success (such as low academic ability), but vary among teens in the same neighborhood, school, or even family.[20] Sisters comparisons can be seen as producing estimates of the effects of teen childbearing on subsequent economic success that remain upwardly biased, but illuminate the extent to which unobserved factors associated with family background account for the poor economic fortunes of teen mothers.

Another approach taken to account for unmeasured differences between teen and older mothers is to compare outcomes between teenage mothers and teenagers who became pregnant but miscarried.[21] Comparing teen mothers to those who would have become teen mothers, but for the accident of miscarriage, approximates random assignment to teen motherhood and thus yields estimates that approximate true effects.[22] This approach provides a more complete assessment of the full magnitude of upward bias in estimates produced by cross-sectional studies than do sisters comparisons, but does not offer evidence on what factors other than age-at-first-birth may be responsible for the economic difficulties associated with being a teen mother.

For key economic outcomes bearing directly on the question of long-term economic self-sufficiency, findings from studies using these methods challenge well entrenched beliefs. As a group, they suggest substantially smaller effects of teen childbearing on economic outcomes than more typical studies, often reducing effects estimated by more traditional methods by at least one-half. Some findings suggest no independent effect of teen childbearing on important economic outcomes. For example, Sanders, Korenman and I reported no relationship between teen childbearing and high school graduation or subsequent

[20] There is evidence that such factors matter, although the magnitude of this bias is an empirical question. See Geronimus and Korenman, "The Socioeconomic Costs of Teenage Childbearing: Evidence and Interpretation"; and Christine A. Bachrach and Karen Carver, *Outcomes of Early Childbearing: An Appraisal of Recent Evidence* (summary of a conference convened by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, Bethesda, MD, 1993).

[21] Joseph V. Hotz, Susan W. McElroy, and Seth G. Sanders, "The Costs and Consequences of Teenage Childbearing for Mothers," *Chicago Policy Review* 1 (Fall 1996): 55–94.

[22] To the extent that miscarriages are random, comparing teen mothers to teens who miscarried eliminates heterogeneity more completely than sisters comparisons. In practice, there will be some misreporting of miscarriages in survey data that may be systematic. For example, if elective abortions are sometimes reported as miscarriages, then some proportion of the women classified as having had miscarriages are teens who chose not to become mothers. Because miscarriages among teenagers are rarely related to chronic health problems, however, there is little reason to believe that the groups who miscarried would suffer from health problems that would impede their chances for economic success. Hotz, Mullin, and Sanders perform tests of the validity of their method and conclude that it provides a valid approximation to their ideal conditions ("Bounding Causal Effects Using Contaminated Instrumental Variables: Analyzing the Effects of Teenage Childbearing Using a Natural Experiment," unpublished manuscript, 1996).

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family income in our analysis of sister pairs in the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women.[23] Using more recent data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Mary Corcoran and James Kunz found teen mothers to be no more likely to be welfare recipients after age 25 then their sisters who became mothers at older ages.[24] So too, Hotz et al., comparing teens who gave birth to those who miscarried in recent data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, concluded that a teen mother is no more likely to participate in welfare programs, to have her labor market earnings reduced, or to experience significant losses in spousal earnings than the same woman would have experienced if she had delayed childbearing.[25]

Not all investigators using state-of-the-art methods conclude that teen childbearing has no independent effect on economic outcomes, although that possibility cannot be ruled out. There is general agreement that the alarmist view is unsubstantiated.[26] Yet those debating welfare reform accepted it uncritically. Even if one prefers a conservative interpretation of recent findings that teen mothers do pay some penalty in their future income—although lower than previously thought—this alone would not justify targeting teen childbearing prevention ahead of addressing other contributors to poverty as an important focus of welfare reform. And it is possible to imagine a scenario, as I will suggest later, where forgoing some income is a reasonable trade-off, if early childbearing were positive in other important respects.

Child Health and Development

Teenage childbearing is believed to result in other negative outcomes for the children of teen mothers, in addition to long-term poverty or welfare dependence. These outcomes include child abuse or neglect by teen mothers, the propensity of children born to teen mothers to engage in antisocial acts such as crime in adolescence or young adulthood, infant poor health (indexed in terms, say, of low birthweight or infant mortality), and the lower development or academic achievement of children born to teen mothers. As the following quotes indicate, concern about such outcomes is evident in the reasoning of elected officials:

[23] Geronimus and Korenman, "The Socio-Economic Consequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered."

[24] Corcoran and Kunz, "Do Out-of-Wedlock Births Among African American Teenagers Lead to Adult Poverty and Dependency?"

[25] Hotz, et al., "The Costs and Consequences."

[26] For example, Hotz et al. review studies that use various approaches to account for unobserved background factors that may confound the relationship between teenage childbearing and long-term economic outcomes. They conclude that selection bias "vastly" overstates the negative consequences of teenage childbearing estimated in cross-sectional studies. They find that the reviewed studies "provide no support that there are large, negative consequences." They further conclude that the range of uncertainty is over whether the effects of teenage childbearing are "slightly negative," "negligible," or "positive." See also Geronimus and Korenman, "The Socioeconomic Costs"; and Bachrach and Carver, "Outcomes of Early Childbearing."

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> We need to make teens better understand that their actions have very serious consequences for which they are ultimately responsible. . . . Becoming a parent is a bad deal for children. *Representative Lee H. Hamilton, D-Indiana.*[27]

> Tragically, high pregnancy rates among adolescents take a toll not only on young parents but also on their children. Children born to teens are at greater risk of early death and are more likely to perform poorly in school and suffer abuse and neglect. *President Clinton*[28]

But does the research literature support these beliefs?

Abuse or neglect of children by teen mothers is overrepresented in the population of maltreating parents in some samples, but not in others. Associations between teenage motherhood and maltreatment often persist after adjustment for simple demographic characteristics, such as race. However, several studies that employ more detailed multivariate analyses—for example, including control for poverty—fail to show teen mothers to be at increased risk of abusing or neglecting their children.[29] No researcher of this topic has applied a research design to account for unmeasured factors. But even based on her cross-sectional research findings, Carol Rippey Massat concluded that the prevailing wisdom "that adolescent parents are more likely to maltreat their children than are older parents appears to be a myth entrenched in the popular culture. . . resources might better be used to cope with harms that research has shown to occur."[30]

There is very little evidence on the effect of teen motherhood on adolescent or young adult antisocial behavior. Kristen Moore, Donna Morrison and Angela Greene use standard cross-sectional techniques to analyze a national sample of 18–22 year olds and find no association between one's probability of having a teen mother and having committed delinquent acts (such as assault, theft, arson, or prostitution) or used illegal drugs in the past year.[31] They estimate an increased risk of running away from home in the previous year for 18–22 year olds whose mothers were 18 or 19 at their birth, but not for sample

[27] *Congressional Record,* 26 January 1995, E 181.

[28] President Clinton announcing National Teen Pregnancy Prevention Month, May 1996.

[29] See, for example, reviews including Olle Sahler, "Adolescent Parenting: Potential for Child Abuse and Neglect?" *Pediatric Annals* 9 (March 1980): 120–125; E. Milling Kinard and Lorraine Klerman, "Teenage Patenting and Child Abuse: Are They Related?" *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 50 (July 1980): 481–488; H. Dubowitz, "Child Maltreatment in the United States: Etiology, Impact, and Prevention" (Washington DC: Health Program, Office of Technology Assessment, 1987); and Ester Buchholz and Carol Korn-Bursztyn, "Children of Adolescent Mothers: Are They at Risk for Abuse?" *Adolescence* 28 (Summer 1993): 361–382; or studies including Shelby Miller, "The Relationship Between Adolescent Childbearing and Child Maltreatment," *Child Welfare* 58 (November-December 1984): 553–557; and Carol Rippey Massat, "Is Older Better? Adolescent Parenthood and Maltreatment," *Child Welfare* 74 (March-April 1995): 325–336.

[30] Massat, "Is Older Better?" 333–334.

[31] Kristin A. Moore, Donna Ruane Morrison, and Angela Dungee Greene, "Effects on the Children Born to Adolescent Mothers" in Rebecca Maynard, *Kids Having Kids* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1997), chap. 5.

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members whose mothers were 17 years old or younger. On the specific outcome of incarceration, Jeff Grogger tries to control for unmeasured background factors.[32] His findings are difficult to interpret. Although he is speaking to the question of whether incarceration rates would be reduced if teen mothers delayed their first births, as Grogger acknowledges, he actually estimates the effect of maternal age, not the effect of maternal age-at-first-birth.[33] Grogger concludes that, "even large changes in young teen mothers' age at first birth would have a relatively modest effect on their sons' incarceration risk."[34] In the absence of strong causal evidence linking teen childbearing to child abuse, neglect, delinquency, or crime, one is left to assume that the firm belief that teen childbearing contributes to these problems is largely stereotypical.

On the relationship of teenage childbearing to infant health or outcomes in early childhood, there is stronger evidence that refutes the idea that the association between teenage childbearing and poor infant or child outcomes is due to maternal age per se.[35] The most robust evidence comes from studies on the health of African American infants. In contrast to President Clinton's comments, among African Americans, rates of low birthweight and infant mortality are lowest for babies whose mothers are in their mid to late teens. Such risk among the first born tends to increase with advancing maternal age from the teens through the twenties and early thirties.[36] There is some evidence that the

[32] Jeff Grogger, "Crime: The Influence of Early Childbearing on the Cost of Incarceration" in Maynard, ed., *Kids Having Kids,* chap. 8.

[33] Grogger's method for controlling for heterogeneity is likely to be inadequate. He tries to control for maternal background characteristics by controlling for whether or not each sample mother's first birth occurred during her early teens, and then estimating the effect on incarceration of her age at subsequent births. By using a dichotomous variable to control for maternal age-at-first-birth when estimating the effect of maternal age, he fails to control adequately for heterogeneity or as well as he might have if he had instead used a continuous variable.

[34] The statistical significance of Grogger's estimates varies depending on the specification he uses (See Table 8.3). The modest results he emphasizes are his strongest results.

[35] Kristin A. Moore and Nancy O. Snyder, "Cognitive Attainment Among Firstborn Children of Adolescent Mothers," *American Sociological Review* 56 (October 1991): 612–624; Arline T. Geronimus, Sanders Korenman, and Marianne M. Hillemeier, "Does Young Maternal Age Adversely Affect Child Development? Evidence From Cousin Comparisons," *Population and Development Review* 20 (September 1994): 585–609; Arline T. Geronimus and Sanders Korenman, "Maternal Youth or Family Background? On the Health Disadvantages of Infants with Teenage Mothers," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 137 (January 1993): 213–225; James McCarthy and Janet Hardy, "Age at First Birth and Birth Outcomes," *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 3 (August 1993): 373–392; Mark R. Rosenzweig and Kenneth I. Wolpin, "Sisters, Siblings, and Mothers: The Effect of Teen-Age Childbearing on Birth Outcomes in a Dynamic Family Context," *Econometrica* 63 (March 1995): 303–326; and Arline T. Geronimus, "Black/White Differences in the Relationship of Maternal Age to Birthweight: A Population Based Test of the Weathering Hypothesis," *Social Science and Medicine* 42 (February 1996): 589–597.

[36] Geronimus, "On Teenage Childbearing"; Arline T. Geronimus, "The Health of African American Women and Infants: Implications for Reproductive Strategies and Policy Analysis" in Gita Sen and Rachel C. Snow, eds., *Power and Decision: The Social Control of Reproduction* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Geronimus, "Black/White Differences"; and Jennie Kline, Zena Stein, and Mervyn Susser, *Conception to Birth: Epidemiology of Prenatal Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

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TABLE 1

Infant Mortality Rates by Age of Mother
U.S. Whites and African American Residents of Harlem

	U.S. Whites	*Harlem*
Infant Mortality Rate	6	18
Teen Mothers	9	11
Nonteen Mothers	5	22
Percent of First Births to Teenage Mothers	20	40

Notes: Based on author's calculations for first births using linked birth and infant death certificate data (1990 for U.S. whites; 1989–1991 for Harlem). Harlem refers to African American residents of the Central Harlem Health Center District in New York City. Infant Mortality Rate is per 1,000 live births; percent teen births are tabulated from birth certificates and rounded to nearest 10 percent.

increase in infant risk with advancing maternal age is steepest in poor communities. For example, in Harlem, infant mortality rates for teens are half those for older mothers. (See Table 1.) So, too, among first births in the poorest African American communities in Michigan, infants with 15-year-old mothers are one-half as likely to be low birthweight than those whose mothers are 25, and one-third as likely as those whose mothers are 35. One reason for this is early deterioration in maternal health.[37] The health of poor African American women deteriorates in measurable ways as early as the mid-20s, perhaps the consequence of long-term severe socioeconomic disadvantage.[38]

Empirical findings related to child development and school achievement also fail to provide consistent or strong endorsement for the political viewpoint that teen childbearing harms children. For example, in a national sample Moore and Nancy Snyder find no association between teen motherhood and young children's performance on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test among African Americans or Hispanics.[39] Among whites, crude associations become insignificant, once the researchers control for other maternal characteristics that antecede teen childbearing. In a multivariate, cross-sectional study of a wider range of child development indicators, Moore, Morrison, and Greene arrive at conflicting estimates of the magnitude of any effects of teen childbearing depending on the outcome, the maternal age groups compared, or whether they focus on black or nonblack children.[40] On balance, their evidence of negative effects is modest in comparison to the tenor of public concern. They even find some evidence of positive effects. Among black children in their sample of 4–14 year olds, those whose mothers were 18 or 19 at their birth performed better in reading and math than those whose mothers had been in their early 20s. This finding is of particular interest given that black mothers in their late

[37] Geronimus, "Black/White Differences."
[38] Geronimus, "The Health of African American Women and Infants."
[39] Moore and Snyder, "Cognitive Attainment."
[40] Moore et al., "Effects on the Children."

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teens account for more than half of black and almost one-quarter of all unwed teen mothers.

Moore et al.'s generally modest and conflicting estimates were produced after control for measurable aspects of maternal family background, leaving open the question of their stability in the presence of more comprehensive controls. Evidence on this question is provided by Geronimus, Korenman, and Hillemeier, who also study the performance of preschool and elementary school age children in a national sample on several standard tests of cognitive development and achievement by age of mother.[41] To control for preexisting differences between teen and older mothers, we compare the test scores of the children of sisters who experienced their first births at different ages. Once maternal background characteristics are controlled by this method, the differences between children with teen versus older mothers are generally insignificant. Those tests where statistically significant differences are estimated usually favor the children of teen mothers: such assessments include indices of verbal ability and achievement in reading and math. And this general pattern of findings is suggested even when the teen birth group is restricted to young teen mothers (those <18 years old).

Social Costs

I have argued that political statements of deleterious effects of teen childbearing for teen parents, their infants, or children are out of line with the more modest and conflicting social scientific evidence. However, if there were demonstrably large social costs, policy aimed at reducing teen childbearing might still be justifiable.[42] The belief that teen childbearing is very expensive to society clearly underlies political sentiment and action. For example, Senator Spector noted in 1995 that "Society spends an estimated $34 billion on behalf of families in which the first birth occurred when the mother was a teenager. When we look at the problem of low-birthweight babies . . . they carry scars for a lifetime. Frequently those lifetimes are not very long, but are very expensive to society, costing in the range of $200,000 a child and thousands more each year. It costs society multiple billions of dollars."[43] And a finding stated in PRWORA is, "Between 1985 and 1990, the public cost of births to teenage mothers under

[41] Geronimus et al., "Does Young Maternal Age Adversely Affect Child Development?"

[42] Of course, the documentation of large social costs alone is insufficient to implement policies—heavy-handed ones, in particular—intended to interfere with reproductive freedom. For example, we are unlikely to tolerate policies denying prenatal care to older socioeconomically advantaged mothers or neonatal intensive care to their infants, even though delayed childbearing is associated with increased risk of maternal morbidity, c-section delivery, and neonatal intensive care use, all of which contribute to spiraling health insurance and medical care costs. Gertrud S. Berkowitz, Mary Louise Skovron, Robert H. Lapinski, and Richard Berkowitz, "Delayed Childbearing and the Outcome of Pregnancy," *The New England Journal of Medicine* 322 (March 1990): 659–664.

[43] *Congressional Record*, 27 July 1995, 10771–10772.

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the aid to families with dependent children program, the food stamp program, and the medicaid program has been estimated at $120,000,000,000."[44]

Although large numbers are quoted by politicians, and advocacy organizations have announced evidence of large social costs, in truth, such figures are speculative. They are calculated using estimates of the effects of teen childbearing that are almost certainly exaggerated. The most recent example was a summary report released at a White House Press Conference by the Robin Hood Foundation. It claimed enormous social costs resulting from teenage childbearing (ranging from 6.9 to 29 billion dollars per year). Although the report's conclusions were widely publicized without qualification, the social cost estimates were arrived at by ignoring cautions offered by many of the investigators whose research formed the basis for the report.[45] In fact, the researchers studying the key question of government outlays for public assistance estimated that if all current teen mothers delayed childbearing, "the total annual expenditures on public assistance would increase slightly." Moreover, since they estimated that lifetime earnings of teen mothers would decrease if they delayed childbearing, and hence so would their contribution to the tax base, they calculated "the net (of taxes) annual outlays by government for cash-assistance and in-kind transfers to these women would actually increase by 35 percent, or $4.0 billion. Thus increase in net expenditures associated with delaying childbearing would amount to over $1,200 per teen mother."[46]

The possibility that delaying childbearing by teen mothers might, on balance, increase spending on public assistance was not considered in the debate over welfare reform. Instead, the presumption that preventing teen childbearing would result in substantial cost savings was taken as axiomatic. Yet a full and careful accounting of social costs remains to be performed. A prudent accounting would include sensitivity analyses based on the range of estimates produced by state-of-the-art evidence for economic and child health or developmental outcomes. Such an accounting would likely result in social cost figures that are far lower than those quoted above to rationalize welfare reform. For example, the reviewed evidence suggests that if current teen mothers postponed childbearing, the social costs paid for income transfers or food stamps might be decreased only marginally, if they were decreased at all. Meanwhile the formidable expenses associated with low birth-weight babies—including medicaid, funding of public hospitals, and uncompensated care—might well increase.

Family Support

The dominant cultural ideal in the United States is for a baby to be born into an intact nuclear family. A critical reason teenage childbearing has been prob-

[44] P. L. 104–193: 2112.

[45] See Arline T. Geronimus, "Mothers of Invention," *The Nation,* August 1996, 6–7.

[46] Hotz et al., "The Costs and Consequences," 85–86.

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lematized is its perceived link to single parenting. Senator Spector observed that "It may well be the most important problem as we grapple with teenage pregnancy where we have a family coming into existence without any family structure at all."[47]

Sociological and anthropological evidence suggests that categorizing families as either nuclear or nonexistent is overly simplistic. However, the tendency to do so in the case of teen mothers has been reenforced by overdrawn popularized images. Because a teen mother is more likely to be unmarried now than in the past, the popularized image of teen parenthood is of an absent father and an immature, problem-prone girl raising her (unwanted) child alone. Given this image, common sense suggests that teen childbearing must jeopardize the health and well-being of children and be costly to society.

These nagging doubts might be assuaged by reconstructing this image to be more consistent with the literature. Teen mothers in the United States tend to be older (two-thirds of teen mothers are 18–19 years old; only 2 percent are under age 15), are more likely to be married (about 40 percent are married and teens constitute less than one-third of all unmarried mothers), or, if not married, to benefit from the support and guidance of others than the popularized image suggests. That is, welfare policy makers—along with many middle class Americans—fail to distinguish between the function of providing stability, care, and economic support to children that is most often provided by married couples in the United States from the form of marriage itself.[48]

Within the United States, population-variation in family structure is well documented, both for the current period and historically.[49] Some scholarly theories to explain this variation take nonnuclear family structures as deficient, prima facie, while others attempt to appraise their strengths, weaknesses, and origins without prejudgment.[50] This latter academic tradition was ignored in the welfare reform debate. Yet, consistent with this tradition, some research suggests it may be more accurate to think of a poor teen mother (at least in African American communities that have been studied the most extensively) as an emerging adult participant in active multigenerational social networks than as a rebellious adolescent set apart from her elders, raising her baby alone.

Ethnographic observation and analyses of survey data provide evidence in African American communities that mothers, fathers (or father surrogates),

[47] *Congressional Record*, 25 May 1994, 6345.

[48] For a general discussion of the distinction between form and function of union types, see Robert A. LeVine and Susan C. M. Scrimshaw, "Effect of Culture on Fertility: Anthropological Contribution" in Rudolfo A. Bulatao and Ronald D. Lee, eds., *Determinants of Fertility in Developing Countries,* vol. 2 (New York: Academic Press, 1983).

[49] S. Philip Morgan, Antonio McDaniel, Andrew T. Miller, and Samuel H. Preston, "Racial Differences in Household and Family Structure at the Turn of the Century," *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (January 1993): 799–828.

[50] Steven Ruggles, "The Origins of African-American Family Structure," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 136–151; Antonio McDaniel, "Historical Racial Differences in Living Arrangements of Children," *Journal of Family History* 19 (January 1994): 57–77.

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grandmothers, aunts, uncles, and others from both maternal and paternal sides (regardless of parental marital status) actively contribute to the support and nurture of the young.[51] This approach to shared childrearing in effect pools risk among poor families, providing social insurance against common risks. These include risks of severe income shortfall due to the unpredictability of wages, employment (or welfare benefits); risks of hunger, homelessness, or early adult disability; and risks of physical separation between children and any specific individual adult (for example, because of inflexible work requirements, incarceration, or premature death). If we concern ourselves with family functioning rather than form, it is possible that in some circumstances greater stability, care, and economic support for children may be realized through family systems and forms of union that are not nuclear and that do not place high value on legal marriage per se.[52]

This argument may appear to run counter to recent studies suggesting that children raised by single parents fare worse than those raised by two parents.[53] Such studies provide a scientific basis to support policies to enhance the attractiveness of marriage. Yet, there are two general problems with this policy response in the context of teen mothers. First, the empirical findings are based on cross-sectional evidence and do not answer the key question of whether children of single parents would do better if their parents stayed together (if di-

[51] Carol B. Stack, *All Our Kin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) and *Call to Home* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Linda M. Burton, "Teenage Childbearing as an Alternative Life-Course Strategy in Multigeneration Black Families," *Human Nature* 1 (no. 2, 1990): 123–143; Arline T. Geronimus, "Clashes of Common Sense: On the Previous Child Care Experience of Teenage Mothers-To-Be," *Human Organization* 51 (Winter 1992): 318–329; Kari Sandven and Michael D. Resnick, "Informal Adoption Among Black Adolescent Mothers," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* 60 (April 1990): 210–224; Marta Tienda and Jennifer Glass, "Household Structure and Labor Force Participation of Black, Hispanic, and White Mothers," *Demography* 22 (August 1985): 381–394; Dennis P. Hogan, Ling-Xin Hao, and William L. Parish, "Race, Kin Networks, and Assistance to Mother-Headed Families," *Social Forces* 68 (March 1990): 797–812; and S. Philip Morgan et al., "Racial Differences."

[52] Let me emphasize that if informal support systems are critical sources of support and even personal identity in some poor populations, this would not imply that these systems resolve the problems associated with persistent poverty nor come without problems of their own. Mutual support systems are not uniformly positive—just as no type of family organization is uniformly positive—for all participants all of the time. The key question is whether such arrangements are better or worse ways of caring for children than would be the alternatives that are realistic options. There are certainly new assaults on kin networks resulting from the loss of prime-aged adults in some urban areas to AIDS or drug epidemics. And then threats to kin networks have arisen concurrently with increased housing costs, decreased value of real wages, and declining AFDC benefits, all of which leave families with fewer resources to spread across greater needs. Some have argued that specific urban planning policies have also disrupted or strained social networks. See Roderick Wallace and Deborah Wallace, "Origins of Public Health Collapse in New York City: The Dynamics of Planned Shrinkage, Contagious Urban Decay and Social Disintegration," *Bulletin of New York Academy of Medicine* 66 (1990): 391–434; or J. Philip Thompson, "The Failure of Liberal Homeless Policy in the Koch and Dinkins Administration," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Winter 1996–1997): 639–660.

[53] See Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, *Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

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vorced) or married (if unmarried). Second, in the select populations where teen childbearing is common, early parental death or disability may be a major threat to a child's chance of being raised by two parents. Encouraging shotgun weddings is unresponsive to this problem.

To the extent that welfare reformers are concerned that welfare rules themselves have served as a disincentive towards marriage, it would be reasonable to expand programs such as AFDC-UP and in-kind benefits for which two-parent families qualify or to change restrictions such as the 100-hour rule that may encourage fathers with low-wage jobs to leave their families. Such an approach would remove welfare-driven disincentives toward marriage without in effect penalizing the poor or members of minority groups if they maintain multigenerational extended families.

Of course, theoretically, kin network participation and legal marriage are not mutually exclusive. Many teen mothers are married. But even among those who are not legally married, ethnographers have observed in specific poor, African American communities that a father and his kin often comprise an important segment of a mother's kin network. The father's kin may remain as a resource to a mother and children even if the father is out of the city, out of the state, or out of the picture.[54] Empirical sociologists also find evidence to question the tendency to infer father absence from the lack of legal marriage. They argue that norms related to marriage and nonmarital fertility are and have been more fluid among African Americans than among U.S. whites.[55] In addition, based on his longitudinal analysis of a national sample of children, Frank Mott concludes that "the concept of a discrete discontinuity between father's presence and absence, particularly for black children, is singularly inappropriate whether used as an analytical tool or as a policy instrument.[56]

In addition to having kin support, a typical teen mother may be more mature and experienced in childcare than popular images suggest. The majority of teen mothers are 18 or 19 years old. Older teenagers in poor communities may be more mature than the typical American teenager. They are more likely to be economic contributors to their families and to have had to grow up fast and assume a range of responsibilities, including for babies and young children in their social networks.[57] More generally, the relationship between late teen age and social maturity is variable.[58] Being a teenager and being an adolescent

[54] Stack, *All Our Kin*; Stack, *Call to Home*; Carol Stack and Linda Burton, "Kinscripts," *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 24 (Summer 1993): 157–170.

[55] Morgan et al., "Racial Differences"; Deanna Pagnini and S. Philip Morgan, "Racial Differences in Marriage and Childbearing: Oral History Evidence from the South in the Early Twentieth Century," *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (no. 6, 1996): 1694–1718.

[56] Frank Mott, "When Is Father Really Gone? Paternal-Child Contact in Father-Absent Homes," *Demography* 27 (November 1990): 514.

[57] Stack, *All Our Kin*; Burton, "Teenage Childbearing"; Geronimus, "Clashes of Common Sense."

[58] John Demos and Virginia Demos, "Adolescence in Historical Perspective," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 31 (November 1969): 632–638; and Glen H. Elder, Jr., "Adolescence in Historical Perspective" in Joseph Adelson, ed., *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology* (New York: Wiley, 1980).

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are not always synonymous. For example, although we now assume that teenagers are never developmentally ready to be responsible parents, many of our grandmothers bore their first children in their teen years.

The tendency to categorize poor teens in terms of their adolescent status instead of their socioeconomic group may also be misleading if it conceptually sets the individual teenager (or teenager and her boyfriend) as having impulses opposed to the viewpoints of more mature elders and as taking risks and making pregnancy-resolution decisions in a vacuum apart from mature guidance. At least in specific socioeconomically disadvantaged local settings, there is evidence to suggest that teens generally decide how to resolve unplanned pregnancies in collaboration with elders.[59] In some instances, teens are encouraged to become mothers by elders who speak from life experience. In these instances, ethnographers interpret the elders as drawing on their socially-situated knowledge that poor families must rely on each other for caretaking as well as for economic support.[60] As poor families configure themselves, elders may make judgments about which teens are promising economic providers and which ones are better at caretaking. They may recruit teens for whichever aspects of kinwork are currently required. In communities where babies are highly valued, longevity is in question, and the experience of grandparenthood is longed for, elders may also encourage early childbearing. More speculatively, if as the research suggests, in extremely disadvantaged communities, early childbearing maximizes the health and well-being of infants, a caring elder might encourage it.

Poor Teens and Life Prospects

Middle-class teens have opportunities stretching well beyond age 18 or 19 to become better educated, better skilled, and thus eventually more employable. If they bore children as teenagers, their childcare obligations might well conflict dramatically with their ability to utilize these opportunities. Given such opportunities, middle-class youth have every reason to believe that they will be better providers for their children if they delay parenthood. But this is not true for the young women most likely to become teen mothers. Poor youth and minority youth in general, as well as those who have suffered early school failure, face more restricted educational or labor market opportunities.[61] Poor families do appear to mobilize to support those teenagers believed to possess the skills

[59] Mercer L., Sullivan, "Absent Fathers in the Inner City," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501 (January 1989): 48–58.

[60] See Joyce Ladner, *Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman* (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Burton, "Teenage Childbearing"; Stack, *All Our Kin*; Stack and Burton, "Kinscripts"; Arline T. Geronimus, "What Teen Mothers Know," *Human Nature* 7 (1996): 323–52.

[61] Rebecca M. Blank, "Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market and Prospects for Low-Wage Entry Jobs" in D. Nightengale and R. Haveman, eds., *The Work Alternative: Welfare Reform & the Realities of the Job Market* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1995).

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TABLE 2

Per Cent Surviving to Age X Conditional on Survival to Age 15 in Selected Populations, 1990

Age	*U.S. Whites*	*Harlem*	*Chicago*
		WOMEN	
45	98	87	88
55	95	78	79
65	87	65	63
		MEN	
45	94	71	73
55	89	55	55
65	77	37	37

Notes: Harlem refers to African American residents of the Central Harlem Health Center District in New York City. Chicago refers to African American residents of highly impoverished southside Community Areas of Near Southside, Douglas, Oakland, Fuller Park, Grand Boulevard, and Washington Park. Mortality calculations based on data from the 1990 Census of the Population (adjusted for coverage error) and from death certificates for 1989–1991. See Geronimus et al., "Excess Mortality Among Blacks and Whites in the United States" for general methods.

necessary to overcome chronic barriers to achievement and upward mobility, including discouraging them from engaging in the dating activities of their peers.[62] But other poor teens may have less to gain from postponing childbearing. Meanwhile, to the extent they have access to kin support for childcare, the trade-offs between school, work, and childcare may be diminished.[63] In targeting policy to address unequal opportunity among American youth, it is likely that social forces other than early childbearing constitute the major impediments to labor market success among poor teen mothers.

Differences in life prospects between poor and better-off teenagers are evident at their most basic and literal level. The most profound inappropriate assumption that leads us to believe that postponing childbearing well beyond the teen years is always in children's best interests is that teens from all social classes face a predictable future with death far off in its "logical position . . . at the close of a long life."[64] Yet in the United States, one of the most disturbing expressions of social inequality is the variation across socioeconomic groups in rates of premature adult mortality.

For example, Table 2 shows the probability that a 15-year-old male or female will survive to age 45, 55, or 65 for U.S. whites and for African American

[62] Ladner, *Tomorrow's Tomorrow*; Burton, "Teenage Childbearing"; Stack and Burton, "Kinscripts."

[63] Stack, *All Our Kin*; and Geronimus, "Clashes of Common Sense."

[64] Robert Blythe, *The View in Winter: Reflections on Old Age* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); cited by Hagestad, "On-Time, Off-Time, Out of Time?" in V.H. Bengston, ed., *Continuities and Discontinuities in Adulthood,* forthcoming.

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residents of two poor communities: Harlem and Chicago's south side. Ninety-five percent of white women, but less than 80 percent of Harlem or Chicago women, survive to their 55th birthday. More than one-third of Harlem or Chicago women die by age 65. For men, the statistics are more grim. Less than three-quarters of Harlem or Chicago men survive to age 45, compared to 94 percent of U.S. whites. Little more than half of Harlem or Chicago men can expect to survive to age 55, and almost two-thirds who reach their 15th birthday will not live to see their 65th. (This represents less than half the probability that the typical white 15-year-old-male nationwide will survive to age 65.) In Harlem and Chicago, 15-year-old men have less chance of surviving to age 45 than the typical white 15-year-old nationwide has of surviving to age 65. Deaths from chronic diseases, rather than the more publicized instances of homicide, are the primary reason.[65]

Lower, but still strikingly high rates of early adult mortality for women and men have been described for other urban areas such as Watts in Los Angeles or Central City Detroit.[66] In predominantly African American poor urban populations—some of the same populations where early childbearing is common and engenders the most concern in the general population—the probability of premature mortality appears sufficiently high that, unlike the average American teenager, teens in these areas cannot confidently expect to survive through or even to middle adulthood.

Without such confidence, to postpone central goals such as childbearing is to risk forgoing them. And if one believes that responsible parenthood includes maximizing the chance that a parent will survive to see and help her child grow up, then insecurity about one's own longevity would be a serious consideration when contemplating whether to defer parenthood.

When these aspects of the life experience of the poor are ignored and teen mothers are viewed merely as youth, the state may appear justified in moving in loco parentis to regulate the behavior of poor teens, whether through the "tough love" approaches advocated by conservatives or the paternalistically supportive approaches suggested by liberals. As Representative Linda Smith (R-WA) argued on 23 March 1995: "The most compassionate thing we can do for these little kids and their kids is to not give them cash grants, to not go on and reward the wrong decisions, to not reward sometimes their mothers who encourage them in some tenement house to go get pregnant so they can get the welfare that they have learned to live on."[67]

But if compassion is what we aim for, then this approach of constructing all sexually active teenage women as unsupervised adolescents and using that image to justify government policy as surrogate parent is deeply problematic.

[65] Arline T. Geronimus, John Bound, Timothy A. Waidmann, Marianne M. Hillemeier, and Patricia B. Burns, "Excess Mortality Among Blacks and Whites in the United States," *New England Journal of Medicine* 335 (November 1996): 1552–1558.

[66] Geronimus et al., "Excess Mortality Among Blacks and Whites in the United States."

[67] *Congressional Record,* 23 March 1995, 3718.

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It pathologizes the role of elders in the decisions of poor teens. It definitionally attributes the same psychosocial developmental trajectories, opportunities, and human resources for helping to rear children (now or in the future) to all teenagers. But, as we have seen, there are marked variations across social groupings in all of these factors. Generalizing from middle class to poor teens may lead to mistaken characterization of the motivations of unmarried, sexually active teens who are poor and of the opportunities and resources dependably available to them for realizing more socially approved goals than early childbearing. It is not only incorrect in its premise that every teen, by definition, is unprepared to be a responsible mother, but also in its implication that every teen by definition will be in a better position to be one at a later date.

An Alternative View: The Rationality of Teen Childbearing

The perspective on teen childbearing that helped to inform the PRWORA is not only inconsistent with important empirical evidence, but it is also only one among several theoretical perspectives on the relationship of teenage childbearing to socioeconomic disadvantage. Here I outline one alternative perspective that is consistent with existing empirical evidence, but leads to a different conclusion regarding the rationality or "responsibility" of early fertility timing, at least among an important subset of teen mothers. I focus on poor, urban African Americans for two reasons. First, there is more research evidence about this subset of the disadvantaged. Second, insofar as public concern about teen childbearing is now racialized,[68] teenage childbearing is construed as one in a constellation of pathological behaviors particularly engaged in by an urban, African American "underclass."[69] I argue instead that the generally earlier fertility exhibited in these communities relative to the national average has a quite different meaning. It does not represent the abandonment by teens or their elders of the mainstream "family value" that responsible parents strive to bring children into the world when they are most prepared to provide for their children's well-being. Instead, it expresses attempts to embrace this view of the appropriate time for childbearing within extremely adverse circumstances that constrain and qualitatively alter the routes available for achieving this goal.

What if a poor, African American teen wants the following: to have two or three healthy children who will continue to thrive and will be provided for materially and emotionally until they reach adulthood. Moreover, she (or he) wants to achieve this result while minimizing the chance of needing government assistance in order to do so. If this is what she values, what age would she or the elders who advise her think would be the most appropriate to begin childbearing?

[68] Nathanson, *Dangerous Passage.*

[69] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); and Christopher Jencks, "What is the Underclass—And Is It Growing?" *Focus* (Special Issue: Defining and Measuring the Underclass) 12 (1989): 14–26.

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What if, as the literature suggests, in pursuing these goals, there are complicating factors? The poor teen might die at any time, might well not survive through middle age, and is likely to suffer from a chronic disease or disability starting at even younger ages. If she delays childbearing, this early health deterioration will jeopardize her chances of bearing normal-weight infants who survive infancy. If she does bear a low birthweight baby, that child is at increased risk of long-term developmental deficits.[70] If she has a "special needs" child, that will be a drain on family resources and may depress the child's school performance and future economic prospects. The possibility of early death or disability also characterizes the people a poor mother depends on to support and care for her children—be they her baby's father or members of a broader social network. And a child with a disabled family member is more likely to exhibit behavior problems.[71] The research findings suggest that a poor mother faces particular uncertainty if she follows the nuclear family model and depends primarily on a husband for economic, practical, or emotional support. His chance of early death is distressingly high. Meanwhile, his earnings potential is likely to be low and unreliable.

In fact, whether or not she marries before her first birth, a poor mother must expect to contribute substantially to the financial support of her children. But her chances for labor market attachment are also unreliable.[72] If she finds employment, the wages and benefits she can command may not offset the costs of being a working mother.[73] She cannot expect paid maternity leave; nor is accessible or affordable daycare available that would free her from reliance on kin for childcare once she does return to work.[74] Moreover, she faces the social expectations that she help care for her kin as their health falters. Postponing childbearing increases the chance that her young children compete with ailing elders for her energies and decreases the chance that their father will survive through much of their childhood. Her greatest chance of long-term labor force attachment will be if her children's pre-school years coincide with her years of peak access to social and practical support provided by relatively healthy kin. Her best chance of achieving her stated goals is by becoming a mother at a young age.

[70] Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Cecilla M. McCarton, Patrick H. Casey, Marie C. McCormick, et al., "Early Intervention in Low-Birth-Weight Premature Infants," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (*JAMA*) 272 (October 1994): 1257–1262; Marie C. McCormick, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Kathryn Workman-Daniels, JoAnna Turner, et al., "The Health and Development Status of Very Low-Birth-Weight Children at School Age," *JAMA* 267 (April 1992): 2204–2208.

[71] Felicia B. LeClere and Brenda Marsteller Kowaleski, "Disability in the Family: The Effects on Children's Well-Being," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 56 (May 1994): 457–468.

[72] Blank, "Outlook for the U.S. Labor Market."

[73] Hotz et al., "The Costs and Consequences"; Kathy J. Edin and L. Lein, *Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers Survive Welfare and Low-Wage Work* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1997).

[74] Sheila B. Kamerman, and Alfred J. Kahn, *Starting Right: How America Neglects Its Youngest Children and What We Can Do About It* (New York: Oxford Press, 1995).

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Note that the kin-network approach to childbearing is motivated, among other reasons, by the community-level social expectation that adults work whenever they can, however they can, and that others pitch in to make this possible. Put another way, if the poor place value on economic self-sufficiency through gainful employment, then they often must accept jobs that separate them from their children, sometimes for long periods. Low-skill jobs provide income and other practical and psychological rewards, but they may also exacerbate disease risk and the chance of early disability or mortality.[75] Working-poor parents may experience legitimate worries of becoming compromised in their capacity to provide for their children or of leaving them orphaned. If along with their work ethic, parents also value providing consistent emotional and material support for their children, then they must develop, invest in, and rely on informal social capital. By doing so, they do their best to insure their children have caring adults willing and able to supplement or even substitute for parental support.

In sum, one need not assume the abandonment of personal responsibility to explain persistently high rates of early childbearing in poor communities. Instead, the scenario described here suggests the possibility that poor teens in collaboration with their elders may be making rational and responsible decisions. Instead of being a sign that their values place them apart from the mainstream, the behavior of teen mothers can be read as representing mainstream values whose phenotypic manifestations take different forms as suits the environmental contingencies that must be addressed. Of course, it is not being assumed that poor teens or their elders know the precise statistical odds they face of restricted opportunities, early death and disability, or infant mortality. But it is equally unreasonable to assume that their life experiences do not impress some version of these facts upon them.[76]

The perspective that teenage childbearing represents trade-offs made in order to maximize children's well-being in hard circumstances may also explain why early childbearing has persisted in extremely disadvantaged communities, despite increased access to contraceptive technology and abortion and in the face of very public disapproval of the behavior. It would suggest that it may continue to persist in the face of welfare reform.

Implications for Social Policy

The harshest measures against teen childbearing proposed or adopted by welfare reformers are not supported by a careful review of the social scientific re-

[75] Sherman A. James, David S. Strogatz, Steven B. Wing, and Diane L. Ramsey, "Socioeconomic Status, John Henryism, and Hypertension in Blacks and Whites," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 126 (October 1987): 664–673; Sherman A. James, "John Henryism and the Health of African-Americans," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 18 (June 1994): 163–182; Geronimus, "The Health of African American Women and Infants"; and Leith Mullings, "Minority Women, Work and Health" in Wendy Chavkin, ed., *Double Exposure: Women's Health Hazards on the Job and at Home* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984).

[76] Geronimus, "What Teen Mothers Know."

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search on the costs and consequences of teen childbearing. The literature is sufficiently equivocal to render radical policies or the conclusions on which they are based exceedingly premature. Nor does the literature justify the current equation of antipoverty policy with welfare reform. Indeed, the scenario I paint suggests nonmarital teenage childbearing is sometimes a strategy for coping with economic uncertainty emanating from many sources, including, but not limited to, welfare generosity. It can also be a strategy for insuring against the adverse health effects of poverty. To the extent this scenario applies, welfare policies meant to be disincentives to early childbearing would at best play a small role in reducing teen birth rates.

If teen birth rates were reduced by welfare policy alone, we might witness some increase in other social problems, such as low birthweight rates and their sequelae, at least among African Americans. However, whether or not these policies will reduce teen birth rates is open to question. Despite two decades of active attempts to reduce teenage childbearing in poor communities, there has been little evidence of a successful targeted program. Meanwhile, teen childbearing rates have fallen and risen along with secular trends in childbearing obtaining to greater or lesser extent among mothers of all ages.[77] Trends in nonmarital childbearing rates among teens also appear to mimic more general trends in nonmarital childbearing rather than be particularly responsive to expansions or retrenchments in welfare generosity. Nonmarital birth rates did begin rising in the 1960s when AFDC was relatively generous, but they continued to rise through the 1970s and 1980s when eligibility requirements became more stringent and the real value of benefits declined.[78]

Like everyone else, poor teens and their elders respond to incentives when making fertility-related decisions. But the most important incentives to them may not be narrow carrot-and-stick incentives of the kind envisioned and manipulated by welfare reformers. Instead, they may derive from larger, more enduring aspects of their life experience. For example, faced with this trade-off,

[77] Among other explanations, the timing of changes in teen childbearing rates can be interpreted as reflecting the changing fortunes of the poor. For example, teen birth rates steadily declined through the 1960s and 1970s as opportunities for women and minorities increased and the desire to end poverty was a prominent part of the national political agenda. They rose somewhat for the first time in decades in the late 1980s at a time when the fortunes of the socioeconomically disadvantaged suffered reversals related to deep recessions and the threat to their well-being posed by the Reagan/Bush administrations, including cuts in government-sponsored welfare programs.

[78] See David Ellwood and Lawrence Summers, "Poverty in America: Is Welfare the Answer or the Problem?" in Sheldon Danziger and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds., *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1986); and Robert Moffitt, "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System," *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (March 1992): 1–61. For a discussion of the effects of economic incentives on premarital childbearing among teens, see Shelly Lundberg and Robert D. Plotnick, "Adolescent Premarital Childbearing: Do Economic Incentives Matter?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 13 (no. 2, 1995): 177–200.

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a woman might accept reduced welfare benefits, if by early childbearing she increases the chance that her child will be born healthy and have able-bodied caretakers who survive through his childhood.

I argue that the motivations underlying high rates of teenage childbearing in poor communities may be versions of exactly those values that many now believe the poor generally, and African American residents of central cities in particular, lack. These motivations can be understood in light of the problems that together form the larger context in which teen childbearing takes place. These problems merit policy attention. They include problems in educational systems, labor market opportunities, child care, housing, and health that impede the productivity and shorten the lives of young through middle-aged adults in some poor communities, making it difficult for them to escape the anxieties that accompany the profound uncertainties they face. These anxieties, in turn, may move responsible, future-oriented, and caring adults to arrange and invest in elaborate systems of social insurance, which in turn exert pressure toward earlier childbearing and away from marriage.

Through PRWORA, President Clinton and the 104th Congress have set policies in motion that are likely to exacerbate anxiety among the poor, perhaps providing indirect incentives toward early childbearing. Meanwhile, the Congress did little to improve job or educational prospects for the poor and appeared to be set on dismantling the public health service.[79] Increasingly stringent Medicaid and Food Stamps eligibility criteria included in provisions of PRWORA threaten the health and longevity of the poor and may effectively deny the option of nursing home care to some segments of the poor population. In turn, young adults in these segments may be increasingly called upon to care for ailing elderly. If early childbearing reduces the stress of juggling this obligation with work and child care responsibilities, and if ailing elders long to be grandparents, social expectation in these communities may move in the direction of teenage childbearing.[80]

How did this happen? Certainly, the so-called Republican revolution contributed importantly to the configuration of the recently enacted welfare reform bill. Yet some liberal advocacy organizations have been among the most industrious in their efforts to maintain a public misperception that was important for its success. The misperception is that irrefutable scientific evidence shows teenage childbearing to be highly costly to poor teens, their children, and society.[81] Liberal advocates may hope that the broad-based social consensus

[79] John K. Inglehart, "Politics and Public Health," *New England Journal of Medicine* 334 (January 1996): 203–207.

[80] Burton, "Teenage Childbearing"; Stack and Burton, "Kinscripts."

[81] See Nathanson, *Dangerous Passage*, for a discussion of Planned Parenthood's role in constructing and publicizing the idea that teenage childbearing is a social problem of epidemic proportion. See Arline T. Geronimus, "Teenage Childbearing and Social and Reproductive Disadvantage: The Evolution of Complex Questions and the Demise of Simple Answers," *Family Relations* 40 (October 1991): 463–471 for a discussion of the Children's Defense Fund's active public resistance to research findings challenging the conventional wisdom that were reported at the 1990 annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. More recently, the Robin Hood Foundation has played

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that teen childbearing is destructive can be used to funnel resources to poor women and children that they could not otherwise mobilize. Or they may hope to take advantage of this consensus—combined with the common failure to distinguish between teenage childbearing and teenage pregnancy—to protect the reproductive freedom of middle-class teens to avoid conception or childbirth. A full discussion of the merits of such tactics is beyond the scope of this article. However, there is little evidence that any such strategy has succeeded. The premature consensus that teenage childbearing is a major social ill is now exploited to legislate abstinence education programs, while mandated support for family planning programs and abortion has eroded. This consensus has been effectively used to help undercut support for the social safety net and other antipoverty programs.

For whatever reasons, liberals have played an active role in perpetuating myths about teen childbearing. These myths, alongside others, have been used to portray the poor as morally marred and have helped justify proposals by radical Republicans to suspend rights and freedoms of poor teens and to direct resources away from their children. They have put Democrats in the position of making proposals and voting for or signing legislation that are now seen as compromises, but which in a different era would have been unthinkable by liberals or moderates. The result is antipoverty policy that is estimated to push 1.1 million children—and 2.6 million people overall—into poverty.[82] And PRWORA is an act that is likely to increase material hardship of the most severe forms including homelessness and infant and premature adult mortality. At a time when local governments will have limited resources to address expanding urgent needs, they now must commit some of those resources to developing political, administrative, and operational responses to devolution,[83] as well as to activities whose success in reducing teen birth rates are highly speculative, such as conducting programs on the problem of statutory rape.

When the crusade against teen childbearing fails, will that failure be interpreted as evidence that the poor are morally even more far removed from the mainstream than they are already thought to be? Will that failure provide further ammunition for those who argue that public spending on social programs is wasteful? Or will we take the opportunity to learn that the poor continue to suffer from many compelling problems, problems that could be reduced by

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a visible role proliferating the distortion that teen childbearing is known to have staggering social costs, through its highly publicized distribution of an alarmist report. Of interest, Hotz et al.'s findings that teenage mothers gain no economic advantage by delaying childbearing formed part of the scientific base of the Robin Hood report. This was underplayed in the publicity, with no attempt to wrestle with the profound challenge to conventional wisdom Hotz et al.'s findings represent.

[82] Estimate made by the Urban Institute, July 1996. David Super, Sharon Parrott, Susan Steinmetz and Cindy Mann in "The New Welfare Law," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 13 August 1996, argue this is a conservative estimate.

[83] See Thomas Corbett, "The New Federalism: Monitoring Consequences," *Focus* 18 (Summer 1996): 3–6.

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public intervention? Rather than being a cause of public problems, teenage childbearing may be emblematic of the price paid by the poor themselves—not by the the larger society—as they work actively to fulfill the values of self-sufficiency, hard work, and responsibility to children and elders in a hostile environment that wears away their health and limits their life chances.*

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Unfolding Promises: Trust Funds and the Politics of Precommitment

ERIC M. PATASHNIK

Long-term policy commitments pose a fundamental dilemma for democratic polities. Unless officeholders can devise ways of credibly committing themselves and their successors to a particular policy path, many desirable social outcomes will be unattainable. Yet if prior policy commitments are irrevocable, governments will lose the flexibility they need to respond appropriately when conditions change.

This tension between credibility and flexibility, in which the present struggles with the future and with the past plays out in countless policy domains.[1] Nowhere is this tension more evident, however, than in budgetary politics. As the end of the twentieth century approaches and aging populations become eligible for retirement and health programs, industrial democracies around the globe are finding that their fiscal policies are more and more being driven by what economist C. Eugene Steuerle aptly describes as the "yoke of prior commitments."[2] Despite the relative stinginess of the American welfare state, the United States has not been immune from this trend. Prior commitments for Social Security, Medicare, and other programs, combined with the elimination of "bracket creep" by the indexing of income taxes, have all but eliminated fiscal slack in the federal budget. One need not be an enemy of public social provision to worry about the attendant loss of fiscal policy discretion.

[1] For an excellent empirical analysis, see Richard Rose and Philip L. Davies, *Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without Choice in Britain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

[2] C. Eugene Steuerle, "Financing the American State at the Turn of the Century" in W. Elliot Brownlee, ed., *Funding the Modern American State, 1941–1995* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Cambridge University Press, 1996), 409–444. See also Joseph J. Cordes, "How Yesterday's Decisions Affect Today's Budget and Fiscal Options" in C. Eugene Steuerle and Masahiro Kawai, eds., *The New World Fiscal Order: Implications for Industrialized Nations* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1996), 95–116.

ERIC M. PATASHNIK is assistant professor of political science and lecturer in law at Yale University.

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In a democratic polity, how much should we commit policy to a particular direction, and how might we craft credible public commitments if we want to do so? Can a political system "undo" inherited commitments when they become incompatible with an assessment of current needs? To address these questions, this article examines the politics of federal government trust funds—separate budget accounts established to precommit resources for specific programs and activities, such as the Social Security, Medicare Hospital Insurance, Highway, and Airport and Airway trust funds. Trust funds now account for almost 40 percent of total federal receipts, up from under 20 percent in 1960. They are at the center of current debates over the future of U.S. social provision because of reports that both the Social Security and Medicare Hospital Insurance trust funds are headed toward "insolvency." Trust fund politics provides an excellent setting for exploring whether and how policy makers can make credible commitments about the government's future conduct. Policy makers deliberately and purposely create trust funds in order to make their promises more durable. The effect of trust funds on policy outcomes is not immediately obvious, however. The credibility of trust funds is not subject to an external enforcement mechanism, such as the discipline of international financial markets. Moreover, trust funds earmark resources for designated uses, but they do not in and of themselves force legislators to spend any particular amount on the programs.

This article's basic argument is that trust funds contribute to policy credibility less by prescribing or proscribing particular budgetary outcomes than by shaping actors' beliefs and expectations of what constitutes political fidelity and defection.[3] When programs are financed through trust funds, clientele groups come to view their benefits as earned rights that should be isolated from normal budgetary pressures. But while trust funds structure the strategic environment in which budgeting takes place and channel politicians' incentives, they eliminate neither the possibility of political choice nor the potential for policy change. Indeed, the expectation that trust funds should remain in balance frequently leads Congress to enact "corrective" legislation when surpluses or deficits in the funds emerge. Moreover, the sanctity of trust funds is shaped by a host of political and institutional factors that are themselves subject to change. In sum, I show that credible commitment in democratic politics is best conceived not as a final policy result or outcome, but rather as an "unfolding historical process," in which collective promises may strengthen or weaken over time, but are nearly always subject to periodic renewal and renegotiation.[4]

[3] In this regard, my analysis parallels Hugh Heclo's insightful discussion of the "interactive force of ideas and institutions" in politics. See Hugh Heclo, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations,* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 381.

[4] The phrase "unfolding historical process" is borrowed from John T. Woolley, "Policy Credibility and European Monetary Institutions" in Alberta M. Sbragia, ed., *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the 'New' European Community* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 158.

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The argument is presented in several steps. First, the article briefly surveys the theoretical literature on credible commitment. Next, it analyzes the actual characteristics of government trust funds as commitment devices. It then discusses the factors that shape the enactment of trust funds and the political dynamics that unfold once trust funds are created. The concluding section pulls out the implications of this analysis for an understanding of precommitment in democratic politics.

The Problem of Government Commitment

The problem of credible commitment is receiving increasing attention. Rational choice scholars, following an approach developed by political philosopher Jon Elster and economist Thomas Schelling, basically treat credible commitment as a problem of "self-binding," in which people deliberately constrain themselves in order to increase their power. Elster recounts the famous tale of Ulysses, who chained himself to his mast so as not to be seduced by the Sirens.[5] Schelling highlights the virtues of self-binding in bargaining situations, showing that if a party can demonstrate the impossibility of making concessions, he or she can force the other party into capitulating.[6] Self-binding thus solves the "time-inconsistency" problem that arises when a plan of action that seems optimal *ex ante* becomes incompatible with an actor's incentives *ex post*.

This problem exists at the collective level as well as the individual one. In the case of monetary policy, for example, there is an incentive for officeholders to debase the money supply in order to promote short-term economic growth, even though it is in their nation's long-term interest to avoid inflation. There is a voluminous political economy literature that explores the many factors that may enable policy makers to guarantee they will not be "drawn into this inflation trap," ranging from "entrusting monetary policy to an independent central bank" to incorporating rules that preclude inflation in statutes.[7] The risk of capital outflows resulting from the independent actions of financial markets under certain conditions may serve as an external enforcement mechanism on policy makers' inflation commitments.

Kenneth A. Shepsle argues that the time consistency problem is in fact a pervasive one in policy making, and that it shapes many political activities beyond managing the money supply.[8] Indeed, Shepsle argues that an important

[5] Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

[6] Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay in Bargaining," *American Economic Review* 46 (June 1956): 281–307.

[7] Woolley, "Policy Credibility and European Monetary Unions," 160. See also Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," *Journal of Political Economy* 85 (June 1977): 473–491.

[8] Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment" in Pierre Boudieu and James S. Coleman, eds., *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 245–263.

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effect of institutional arrangements ranging from an independent judiciary to the congressional committee system is to foster political exchange by serving as "guarantors of government credibility." According to Shepsle, institutional arrangements prevent opportunistic actors from reneging on their bargains, thereby expanding the set of deals actors can strike. This in turn widens the range of actions governments can take in promoting improvements in social welfare.

The basic argument that restraints can be liberating is persuasive. However, the image of "self-binding" arguably fails to capture what is distinctive about political institutions. A more realistic treatment of political commitment is offered by Terry Moe. In a series of essays, Moe points out that political commitment invariably involves elements of both coercion and compromise.[9] Political actors craft institutional arrangements not only to promote time consistency, or to solve collective action problems, but also to serve their long-term interests at the expense of their opponents. Fearing that their programs will be vulnerable to the interventions of successor politicians, winning coalitions try to institutionalize their preferences. Yet while institutional arrangements are mainly designed to serve the interests of political winners, the need for compromise in the legislative process typically gives "losers" the chance to demand structural concessions. As a result, institutional arrangements often contain embedded contradictions. This analysis offers important insights into the politics of trust funds.

Trust Funds as Commitment Devices

What is the significance of federal government trust funds, and what contribution do trust funds make to policy credibility? In brief, trust funds embody attempts to precommit the government to a particular policy direction, typically for long or indefinite periods of time. Although federal trust funds, as they are presently constituted, have economic ramifications, their significance is primarily political.[10] The implications of this point are fleshed out in three steps. The analysis first distinguishes government trust funds from trust funds maintained in the private sector. It then examines the place of government trust

[9] Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6 (Special Issue 1990): 213–253; and Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy" in Oliver Williamson, ed., *Organization Theory From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 116–153.

[10] Matters would be far different if Social Security were substantially privatized by creating a system of personal savings accounts, a concept endorsed by several members of a recent government advisory council. Under this approach, individual workers would direct all or a portion of their payroll taxes into capital market investments of their own choosing. Workers would have a legally enforceable claim to the money they earned, a sharp break with past practice. In contrast, just investing a portion of the Social Security surplus in equities—an option suggested by former Social Security Commissioner Robert Ball—would not by itself undermine the principle of social insurance.

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funds in the larger political economy and, finally, compares the risks of private and social insurance.

Federal trust funds are meant to draw an analogy to private sector trust funds, but the analogy does not hold, because they are not based on a fiduciary relationship. In the private sector, trust funds are managed and conserved for the exclusive benefit of recipients, whose interests trustees are legally obligated to protect. The earliest federal trust funds arguably conformed to this model. Among the first to appear in the federal budget were Indian tribal funds, which were established beginning in 1824 to hold money for tribes and individuals arising from leasing arrangements on Indian lands. The federal government does not own this money, and it is supposed to function merely as trustee.[11]

Virtually all other federal trust funds, however, are not genuine trust funds in the private sector sense. While the creation of a government trust fund involves a legal commitment to use the money for designated purposes, Congress has the right to "unilaterally alter" the tax rates and benefit levels of trust fund programs by changing existing law.[12] This applies even to the minority of trust funds that finance entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare, in which eligible individuals have a legal claim to benefit payments. In short, trust funds do not enable one Congress to bind another.

Federal trust funds differ in another important sense from their private sector counterparts. Private trust funds hold genuine economic assets that can be drawn down over time to finance payments to beneficiaries. The major federal trust funds, however, presently invest in special Treasury securities. In some ways, these securities are like the government bonds held by private individuals. While the specific investment practices of major trust funds vary, by law trust fund holdings of securities generally are backed by the government's full faith and credit, are subject to the legal debt ceiling, and earn interest at competitive rates of return. Moreover, trust fund surpluses increase national savings insofar as they reduce the level of federal borrowing from what it would be otherwise. Unlike government debt held by the public, however, the securities posted to trust funds, with rare exceptions, cannot be purchased in credit markets. From an economic perspective, these securities merely represent an intragovernmental IOU. When the time comes to make good on them, the government must do what it ordinarily does to finance programs—raise taxes, reduce other spending, or increase public borrowing.

Examination of the institutional niche that federal trust funds occupy in the overall political economy brings their capacities and incapacities as commitment devices into relief. Peter Hall usefully distinguishes among three levels of institutions, each of which is more or less politically "mutable." At an overarching level are the basic structures "associated with a democratic polity and

[11] In fact, however, Indian tribal funds have a long history of abuse and mismanagement. See Rochelle Stanfield, "Why Indian Trust Funds are in Disarray," *National Journal,* 2 May 1992, 1062.

[12] General Accounting Office, *Budget Issues: Trust Funds and Their Relationship to the Federal Budget*, GAO/AFMD-88-55 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1988), 6.

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capitalist economy" that impose severe constraints on government action, including economic institutions that leave assets in "private hands." Down one level are "features intrinsic to the basic organization of the state," such as labor unions, that determine the distribution of power and the type of policies that can be most easily implemented. Finally, there are a host of formal and informal factors that, although less potent than institutional factors at higher levels, also constrain the discretion of policy makers. Examples here are regulations and the standard operating procedures of agencies.[13]

Federal trust funds in their current incarnation occupy the third institutional tier. They are much more susceptible to political intervention than factors located at the first tier, and can be altered somewhat more readily than factors at the second. If the government attempted to expropriate money set aside in private trust funds or held in private bank accounts, affected parties could seek judicial relief. Moreover, the government's credibility in world capital markets would be destroyed. The United States would no longer be able to borrow the money it needs to finance its deficit, and foreign markets would justifiably view investment in U.S. concerns as extremely risky. By contrast, if the federal government decided to eliminate its public trust funds, financial market participants would be unlikely to react, viewing it as an internal political matter.[14] The government bonds held by private individuals and the federal securities posted to federal trust funds both represent commitments of the U.S. Treasury, but only the former commitment is directly subject to an external enforcement mechanism.

Yet while federal trust funds are not embedded as deeply in the political economy as economic institutions, they possess certain offsetting credibility advantages. Indeed, along some dimensions, government trust funds are superior to private sector alternatives. Government expropriation, after all, is not the only risk people face. There are also the risks associated with capitalism itself. Consider the economic risks of private and social insurance. Private insurance companies can go bankrupt. Accordingly, in order to make a credible commitment to pay their legal obligations, such companies must amass sufficient reserves to cover all future benefits. Programs like Social Security, in contrast, can be run on a pay-as-you-go basis. As leading students of the welfare state write, the federal government "has resources in its power to tax and to create money that lend credibility to its unfunded liabilities in a way that no private insurance company can match.[15]

[13] Peter Hall, "The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 1970s" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreths, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 96.

[14] See the useful analysis contained in Congressional Budget Office, *Federal Debt and Interest Costs* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1993), 27–35. What financial markets really care about is the size of the total budget deficit, not the financial condition of individual programs.

[15] Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey, *America's Misunderstood Welfare State* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 166.

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The real threat to Social Security, as with any other government activity, is not economic but political. Future coalitions may not be supportive of the programs' continuation. Officeholders are, to be sure, always constrained by prior commitments. But the institutional design of many programs makes little, if any, independent contribution to policy credibility. According to Aaron Wildavsky, the budget can be seen as a "contract" stipulating how Congress and the president promise to use taxpayer money.[16] This social contract is extremely loose for the general operating budget, which finances a myriad of public activities. Taxpayers "may or may not approve" of particular expenditures and, in any event, have little or no expectation "of getting money back from the government in the future."[17] The trust fund mechanism makes the social contract much tighter and more transparent by establishing a statutory linkage between revenue and expenditures for specified programs. This linkage "couples the benefits and costs of these programs more closely, and it also lends a degree of assurance to beneficiaries [that the benefits] once established will be protected."[18]

As political contracts, trust fund promises fundamentally depend upon the political process for their enforcement. Several features of trust funds, however, are designed to promote credibility.[19] Trust fund status flags designated programs in the political process, sending a signal that a "sacred trust" and not merely federal dollars is at stake. Nearly all federal trust funds, unlike most general fund accounts, are authorized to carry over and earn interest on their unspent balances. This strengthens the bargaining position of clientele groups, who can argue that money is being unfairly and illegitimately hoarded whenever surpluses build up in the funds. The integrity of the largest and most important trust funds (Social Security, Medicare Hospital Insurance) is further reinforced through congressional committee arrangements. The fact that the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance committees have jurisdiction over both tax and benefit levels facilitates efforts to keep these trust funds solvent.[20] Finally, the laws establishing trust funds typically require an accounting of trust fund disbursements to be published annually either by the Department of Treasury or, in the case of the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, by their own quasi-independent Boards of Trustees.[21] Such reports are designed to create the

[16] Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (New York: Little Brown, 1964), 2.

[17] John E. Dawson and Peter J. E. Stan, *Public Receipts in the United States: 1952–1994* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1995), 5.

[18] President's Commission on Budget Concepts, *Report of the President's Commission on Budget Concepts* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967), 26.

[19] For an excellent discussion of the advantages of trust fund status, see Roy T. Meyers, *Strategic Budgeting* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 138–142. See also Irene Rubin, *The Politics of Public Budgeting* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990), 109–110.

[20] John F. Cogan, "The Dispersion of Spending Authority" in John F. Cogan, Timothy J. Muris, and Allen Schick, eds., *The Budget Puzzle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).

[21] The Boards of Trustees are comprised of the secretary of the Treasury, the secretary of Labor, the secretary of Health and Human Services, the commissioner of Social Security, and two members of the public appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. One of the public trustees must be from each of the political parties.

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image of the trust funds as "separate" pots of money and to make it easier for politicians and clientele groups to monitor the funds' financial status.[22]

Trust funds share enough features and reflect common enough political logics that it makes sense to regard them as a class. Details matter for policy credibility, however, and trust funds in fact vary in their characteristics. The vast majority of the more than 150 trust funds in the federal budget are minuscule in size and have narrow clienteles. A relatively small number of trust funds, however, are very broadly based. The dozen largest trust funds account for more than 90 percent of total trust fund income and spending.[23] A number of the largest trust funds (Social Security, Hospital Insurance, Federal Retirement) finance entitlement programs in which spending levels are driven by the eligibility standards set in authorizing legislation. But most trust funds—including both the Highway and Airport and Airway funds—are subject to the regular appropriations process. Although all trust fund money is dedicated for specific uses, some trust funds are financed in part through general fund transfers. An example is the Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, which derives only a portion of its income from beneficiary premiums. It is even possible to have a trust fund with no specific earmarked funding source. For example, the Military Retirement Trust Fund is financed entirely by payments by the Department of Defense on behalf of military employees, general fund payments to reflect the unfunded liability that existed when the fund was created, and interest earnings. In sum, the trust fund device precommits budget resources, but all trust funds are not created equal.

The Enactment of Trust Funds

The struggle between the future and the past inherent in trust funds plays out in two stages: in decisions to create trust funds and in the political dynamics that unfold when trust funds begin operation. A serious weakness of some rational choice literature is that it pays little attention to the first stage. As Adam Przeworski and Fernano Limongi point out, investigation of this first stage is crucial because the process of making commitments may be subject to all the same political distortions and problems that precommitments are designed to

[22] Some of the most important effects of trust funds are thus informational. Trust funds shape the "traceability" of policy change by making voters more aware of what they are getting for their taxes; by focusing political attention on the balance between earmarked revenues and designated spending; and by obscuring the negative effects of actions taken to keep the funds solvent. On traceability chains, see R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); see also Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[23] Measured by total receipts, the twelve largest trust funds in the fiscal year 1996 budget were: Social Security, Hospital Insurance, Civil Service Retirement, Military Retirement, Supplementary Medical Insurance, Unemployment, Disability Insurance, Highway, Federal Employees Health Benefits Fund, Foreign Military Sales, Railroad Retirement, and Airport and Airway.

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solve.[24] Precommitment loses its normative appeal as a social choice mechanism if commitments are made to bad policy decisions.

The process by which precommitments, in this case trust funds, are entered into also merits attention from the standpoint of positive analysis. Indeed, the existence of trust funds generates puzzles irrespective of scholarly premises about the sources of political behavior. If elected officials value discretion and have a budget-wide perspective or concern for the long run, why have they found the trust fund device appealing? Alternatively, if elected officials primarily represent narrow interests and act for the moment, why haven't trust funds taken over an even larger portion of the budget?

A review of the legislative origins of a range of federal trust funds, selected for their variance along important policy dimensions, suggests several conclusions about the politics of trust fund enactment. First, trust fund architects can only be understood as purposive actors aiming to commit the government in a particular policy direction. Actors seem to be surprisingly farsighted, concerned not only about next year's budget but also about institutionalizing their policy visions. The classic example here is Franklin Roosevelt's insistence that Social Security be financed through payroll taxes, rather than general revenues, in order to insulate the program from the meddling of his successors, whom he referred to in a famous quote as "damned politicians."[25] In a similar vein, the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund was designed to enhance the credibility of federal health care commitments by allowing beneficiaries, in the words of Johnson administration Budget Director Kermit Gordon, to "see that their own contributions were financing the program."[26]

While the creation of policy legacies is sometimes thought to be an exclusive concern of presidents, key legislative actors often exhibit concern for the long term as well. Dwight Eisenhower's original proposal for an interstate highway system, for example, called for it to be financed through bonds issued by an independent Federal Highway Corporation. These bonds were to be excluded from calculations of the official public debt. However, Senator Finance Committee Chairman Harry F. Byrd (D-VA) argued that the bond approach would encourage future politicians to engage in similar accounting tricks, leading to "endless outlays" for school building, hospital construction, and other activities. Byrd warned that the government could eventually end up with "two sets of books," undermining both the integrity of the budgetary process and congressional power of the purse. A gasoline tax-financed Highway Trust Fund subsequently emerged as a more acceptable solution.[27]

[24] Adam Przewroski and Fernano Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (Summer 1993): 51–70, at 67.

[25] Quoted in Martha Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1979), 230.

[26] U.S. Congress, *Hearing Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Medical Care for the Aged*, 89th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), 98.

[27] *Congressional Record*, 23 May 1955, 6765; see also Rubin, *The Politics of Public Budgeting*.

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Second, political actors recognize that the creation of a trust fund typically entails a loss of policy discretion. As a result, battles over new trust funds are often hard fought. Most bills to create new trust funds fail. In this, trust fund proposals are no different from the many other bills that die on Capitol Hill. What is more revealing is that Congress sometimes rejects the trust fund structure even while accepting either the proposed new tax, expenditure program, or both. For example, President Jimmy Carter in 1979 proposed an Energy Security Trust Fund, which would use the money from a tax on windfall oil profits for various energy conservation initiatives. Although Congress ultimately accepted the profits tax and approved some of Carter's spending initiatives, it balked at the creation of the trust fund. Key budget guardians, including Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Warren O. Magnuson (D-WA), felt the trust fund would weaken their fiscal control. They also believed that the trust fund mechanism was inappropriate, because the level of revenue that would be generated through the profits tax could not be predicted and because Carter's energy programs did not merit the "long-term security" of dedicated funding.

Third, although trust funds are the product of intentional intervention, their institutional designs rarely conform to the standards of policy "experts." A case in point is Superfund, which uses the proceeds of taxes on chemical and oil producers to finance cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Economic efficiency requires such liability-based taxes to be levied in proportion to the harms caused by specific parties and to be used for prospective damages. In fact, Superfund finances cleanup of damages that occurred before the taxes were enacted, and the taxes do not reflect whether particular firms disposed of their waste properly. A close reading of Superfund's legislative history suggests that efficiency was not the dominant concern of many of its key supporters. Congressional debate centered on the appropriateness of forcing general taxpayers to pay for cleanup of waste sites. Legislators created the trust fund because it enabled them to symbolically assign responsibility for the program's cost to "polluters," thus enabling the impasse over funding to be broken. Many other trust funds for environmental cleanup and health damage compensation programs—Leaking Underground Storage Tank, Black Lung Disability, Vaccine Injury Compensation—also emerged as "compromise funding mechanisms."[28]

Fourth, while trust funds evolve in response to the goals of political actors, trust funds do not all rest on a single motivational foundation. Actors in fact create trust funds for a variety of reasons: to charge users of publicly-provided services; to insulate program budgets from competition with other activities; to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing political bargains; and to protect the general fisc and keep income taxes low. Because of the multiple veto points of the legislative process, a wide range of actors—program advocates, congressional tax writers, clientele groups—are typically

[28] This phrase is from Nonna A. Noto and Louis Alan Talley, *Excise Tax Financing of Federal Trust Funds*, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (93-6 E), 5 January 1993, i.

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involved in making trust fund decisions. Such participants rarely share the exact same objectives or face identical resources and constraints. Trust fund proposals are more likely to succeed when many actors have incentives to support them. The Highway Trust Fund passed overwhelmingly in 1956, for example, because it seemed to offer something for every relevant party. Budget actors in the executive favored the idea of making highway users pay their way. The highway lobby viewed the trust fund as a vehicle for bigger highway budgets. And congressional tax writers liked the assurance offered by formal earmarking, which they believed would make gasoline taxes easier to raise.

A fifth conclusion is that trust funds often contain internal tensions, a reflection of their creation by actors with competing goals. A case in point is the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. Prior to its establishment in 1970, federal investment in aviation infrastructure fluctuated from year to year. Program advocates viewed the creation of a dedicated trust fund as a mechanism for locking in increased capital investment. The trust fund concept also received the support of less parochial budget actors, including President Richard Nixon and members of the Ways and Means committee. What made the trust fund attractive from their perspective, however, was that it provided a means of imposing user taxes and reducing spending on aviation from the general fund. While spending proponents in Congress contended that capital expansion should be the trust fund's priority, Nixon argued that aviation tax revenues also should contribute to the day-to-day costs of operating the air traffic control system. Both positions found expression in the law establishing the trust fund. In sum, it is too simplistic to argue that trust funds embody "solutions" to the problem of collective commitment—since very often different actors are trying to commit the government in multiple directions.

Finally, trust fund adoptions are shaped not only by the goals of current officeholders, but also by the "feedback" from preexisting trust fund structures.[29] Preexisting trust funds influence subsequent trust fund adoptions in two major ways. First, they influence the *timing* of trust fund enactments. As Table 1 shows, trust funds have not entered the budget randomly. Rather, they have evolved according to a clear historical pattern, diffusing across policy sectors in three major "waves." The first significant group of trust funds (after Indian tribal funds) to appear in the budget was the federal retirement and insurance trust funds in the 1920s. The next wave of trust fund adoptions, which began in the 1930s, saw the creation of the major social insurance trust funds, including Unemployment Insurance (1935) and Social Security (1939).[30] While the estab-

[29] On the importance of policy feedback, see Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," *World Politics* 48 (January 1996): 143–179.

[30] It may be surprising that the enacting date of the Social Security Trust Fund is given as 1939 rather than 1935. Although the original Social Security Act of 1935 did impose a payroll tax, which FDR wished to link with benefit payments in the public mind, it did not formally create a trust fund mechanism, because the constitutionality of federal social insurance was then in doubt. Once the Supreme Court gave Social Security its blessings in its 1937 *Helvering v. Davis* decision, however, the New Dealers moved quickly to institutionalize the insurance concept. Provision for a formal trust fund mechanism was included in the Social Security Amendments of 1939.

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TABLE 1

Diffusion of Trust Funds Across Policy Sectors

Policy Area	*1920s and prior*	*1930s*	*1940s*	*1950s*	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*	*1990s*
Veterans and Federal Employees	Government Life Insurance Fund (1919)		National Service Life Insurance Fund (1940)	Employees Life Insurance fund (1954)	Retired Employees Health Benefits Fund (1960)		Military Retirement Fund (1984)	
	Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (1920)			Employees Health Benefits Fund (1959)				
Social Insurance		Unemployment Trust Fund (1935) Railroad Retirement (1937) Social Security (1939)		Disability Insurance Trust Fund (1956)	Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (1965) Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund (1965)			
Transportation				Highway (1956)		Airport and Airway (1970) Inland Waterway (1978)	Mass Transit Account (1982) Harbor Maintenance (1986)	

(continued)

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TABLE 1

(continued)

Policy Area	*1920s and prior*	*1930s*	*1940s*	*1950s*	*1960s*	*1970s*	*1980s*	*1990s*
Environment						Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund (1977) Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing (1979)	Superfund (1980) Leaking Underground Storage Tank (1986) Post-closure Liability (1980) Oil Spill Liability (1989)	
Health Damage Compensation						Black Lung Disability (1977)	Vaccine Injury Compensation (1987)	Radiation Exposure Compensation (1990)
Nature Conservation							Aquatic Resources Trust Fund (1984)	National Recreation Trails Fund (1991)

Sources: OMB, *Budget of the U.S. Government*, various years; Nonna A. Noto and Louis Alan Talley, *Excise Tax Financing of Federal Trust Funds*, CRS Report for Congress 93-6 E, 1993; Tax Foundation, *Federal Trust Funds: Budgetary and Other Implications*, (New York: Tax Foundation, 1970).

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lishment of the Highway Trust Fund (1956) may have appeared to be an isolated event to contemporary observers, it clearly opened the door for establishment of the Airport and Airway (1970), Inland Waterway (1977), Boat Safety (1980), Mass Transit (1982), and Harbor Maintenance (1986) trust funds, each of which provides infrastructure benefits to transportation users. The transportation funds were created during a wave of trust fund adoptions that peaked between 1977 and 1989. This wave also saw the creation of trust funds for both environmental cleanup (Superfund in 1980 and Leaking Underground Storage Tank in 1986) and health damage compensation (Black Lung Disability in 1977 and Radiation Exposure Compensation in 1990) programs.

What accounts for these patterns? The feedback from preexisting trust funds shapes both policy makers' goals and the political hurdles that trust fund proposals must clear to win enactment.[31] When interest groups learn that other clienteles have obtained trust funds for their programs, they become more likely to press for trust funds of their own. The perceived budgetary success of the Highway Trust Fund, for example, convinced the aviation lobby that it too needed access to a dedicated funding source. At the same time, the introduction of trust funds into a given policy sphere tends to soften the opposition to further penetration. When proponents can point to an existing trust fund of a similar type as precedent, it becomes much harder for opponents of the proposed new fund to argue that it is illegitimate or unworkable.

Policy feedback affects not only when new trust funds are adopted but how they are designed. This can be seen in the landmark Medicare bill of 1965, which created the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (financed through payroll taxes), the Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund (financed through a combination of beneficiary premiums and general revenues), and the Medicaid program (financed through general revenues and matching state funds). The Medicare bill was conceived, drafted, and enacted in the shadow of Social Security. The basic legislative vehicle originally included only the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, which liberals had deliberately built on the Social Security model. At the last moment, however, the bill's major architect, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-AK), added the two other institutional layers. A determined fiscal conservative, Mills was strongly committed to maintaining the actuarial soundness of Social Security. He feared that the Social Security system, with its attendant payroll taxes, could not support the costs of comprehensive national health insurance. By restricting payroll taxes to the hospital insurance component of the package and accepting a federal role in providing health insurance for the medically indigent, Mills aimed to preserve the government's capacity to finance its preexisting pension com-

[31] On barriers to adoption of budget structures, see R. Kent Weaver, *Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), esp. chap. 10.

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mitments.[32] In sum, strategic actors create trust funds, but trust funds are not created in an historical vacuum.

The Unfolding of Trust Fund Promises

Making promises is one thing; living with them quite another. The politics of precommitment, the struggle between credibility and discretion, does not come to an end when trust funds are created. In a sense, it only then begins.

Two competing arguments are made about the effect of trust funds. Public choice scholars emphasize that trust funds offer intended beneficiaries of dedicated revenue no guarantee that politicians will actually spend the money on the promised uses. Public finance experts, however, argue that trust funds hamper effective budgetary control, preventing revenue from being allocated on the basis of objective need. In one account, trust funds are too weak; in the other, too strong. The two perspectives rest on different normative premises. The public choice perspective assumes that politicians are self-interested, if not venal; while the public finance perspective assumes that officeholders are benevolent and seek to promote the public interest.[33]

For all their differences, however, the perspectives share certain basic defects. Both make the mistake of assuming that "the impact of a given set of institutions on economic policy can be 'read' directly from the institutional structure itself."[34] In fact, trust funds are such complex institutional mechanisms that their impact can only be assessed through a careful examination of the specific political context in which they are situated. To be sure, trust funds do structure politics in certain overarching ways. They foster the perception of "earned rights"—even when trust fund programs are formally subject to the appropriations process. This leads trust fund clienteles to regard themselves as more worthy and morally deserving than the beneficiaries of other government programs.[35] The trust fund device also creates an expectation that particular trust funds, with the important exception of those that have unlimited access to

[32] On the role of Wilbur Mills in the creation of Medicare's financial structure, see Julian E. Zelizer, *Taxing America: Wilbur Mills, Congress, and the State* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). See also Theodore R. Marmor, *The Politics of Medicare* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970).

[33] For a discussion of these competing perspectives, see Richard E. Wagner, *Charging for Government: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1991); and Ranjit S. Teja and Barry Bracewell-Milnes, *The Case for Earmarked Taxes: Government Spending and Public Choice* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1991).

[34] For a cautionary statement against making just this mistake, see Colleen A. Dunleavy, "Early Railroad Policy" in Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreths, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis,* 139.

[35] Argues the Seniors Coalition: "Today the word 'entitlement' is used to describe any government benefit program that, for one reason or another, is a sacred cow and cannot be violated. But the concept is even stronger in the case of Social Security because people have actually paid for their benefits; those benefits aren't just a gift from Uncle Sam." See The Seniors Coalition, *What Everyone Should Know About Social Security* (McLean, VA: The Seniors Coalition, 1992), 51–52.

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general fund subsidies, will remain in balance, although the period over which balance must be achieved varies across programs. And the commitment implied in trust funds often serves to ease adoption of tax increases, as evidenced by the massive increase in trust fund taxes from 2 percent of GDP in the mid-1950s to 7 percent in the 1990s. These generic effects, taken together, give budget politics a distinctive cast. Indeed, debates surrounding trust funds are replete with references to contractual obligations, sacred trusts, and keeping faith. Such "rights talk," as Mary Ann Glendon puts it, is not mere rhetoric. It "has a powerful effect on how we imagine the role and the ends of government," especially when, as here, it is voiced by policy makers themselves.[36]

Yet while trust funds define how political issues are perceived and mediate the decisions elected officials make, they neither dictate a specific outcome for all trust funds nor bias results in a single policy direction. Trend data reveal that historically trust fund taxes, considered in the aggregate, have been a more stable revenue source than general fund taxes. Depending upon the details of the situation, however, the generic effects mentioned above can either reinforce or contradict one another. Perceptions of earned rights and acceptance of tax hikes foster program growth, but the need to match spending and revenue may lead to budgetary retrenchment. Because of these complex interactions, trust funds are compatible with the full range of feasible program trajectories.

Another defect of both perspectives is their tendency to conceive of credibility in largely static terms. A static conception may be appropriate for an understanding of precommitment in market settings, where property rights are generally very secure. Democratic commitment, however, is an evolutionary process, in which both the nature and the strength of political promises are subject to change. As the politics of trust fund commitments unfolds over time, five basic dynamics can be observed.

First, the capacity of politicians to radically alter inherited policy decisions declines as people become increasingly dependent upon the maintenance of existing governmental arrangements. These "lock-in" effects, as Paul Pierson describes them, occur when individuals or groups make hard-to-reverse commitments in expectation of future public benefits.[37] Policy lock-in is extremely common in trust fund programs. Individual workers, for example, decide to put away only a certain amount in personal retirement savings because they expect to receive Social Security or civilian retirement benefits. Or engineering firms invest in transaction-specific assets because they are awarded a highway construction contract. Once payroll taxes are withdrawn for Social Security, or cement begins to be poured for the highway system, or the removal of toxic waste begins at a Superfund site, it becomes very difficult for politicians to halt government action, even if they never would have supported the programs in the first place.

[36] Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights Talk* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 12.

[37] Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State*, 42–48.

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Second, political actors battle over the terms under which particular trust funds operate. While the enabling legislation that creates a trust fund sets out the rules governing the use of its resources, these rules are not written in stone. They can be rewritten by future Congresses. As Terry Moe points out, the "game of structural politics never ends."[38] In the case of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, for example, authorizing committee members repeatedly pushed through restrictive legislative changes intended to ensure that total aviation spending would rise and that the bulk of this increased spending would go for capital projects. Appropriators, who felt that aviation spending levels needed to be controlled, and that it was equitable for aviation users to bear the burden of FAA's routine operating expenses, responded to these restrictions by essentially refusing to spend from the trust fund, instead financing aviation activities through general revenue at a lower level than the aviation lobby wanted. Because money was not being spent from the trust fund, the reported balance of the trust fund began to rise. Aviation clienteles expressed outrage at this growing balance, arguing that the government was in effect hoarding user taxes for deficit reduction. Although legislative truces in this battle have been reached, allowing a greater share of aviation taxes to be used for maintenance, the basic conflict over the proper use of the trust fund has never been resolved.

Conflicts may be exacerbated when trust funds fail to live up to their expectations. The adoption of Superfund in 1980, for example, was based on the premise that only the chemical and oil industries would be singled out for new taxes, and that the trust fund would be self-replenishing through cost recoveries from companies found liable for specific waste sites. As matters turned out, however, recoveries from responsible parties covered only a tiny fraction of cleanup costs. As a result, Congress in 1986 was forced to revise its bargain with private industry, imposing a new broad-based corporate tax over the vehement opposition of general manufacturers.

Fluctuations in the financial conditions of specific trust funds provide a third source of change. The Congressional Budget Office reports: "The specter of exhausting [trust fund] balances frequently leads to legislative action to stabilize a program; conversely, large and growing balances may lead to pressures for greater spending or tax cuts."[39] The balanced budget norm is widely accepted for major trust funds that depend primarily on earmarked taxes for their income.[40] Because of this norm for the major trust funds, actors can sometimes

[38] Terry Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure" in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 284.

[39] CBO, *Federal Debt and Interest Costs*, 35.

[40] The major earmarked trust funds have all experienced years during which they spent more than they generated from their dedicated funding sources, resulting in annual deficits in the funds. Budget expert John F. Cogan has shown, however, that such annual deficits tend not to persist. Within a few years after annual deficits emerge, the major trust funds usually begin accumulating surpluses. In contrast, deficits in the total federal budget have been far more persistent. See Cogan. "The Dispersion of Spending Authority," 37.

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exploit the projected financial conditions of particular funds to advance their strategic objectives. This may facilitate program enlargement when the trust funds are in their formative periods. As Martha Derthick has shown, until the early 1970s long-term financial forecasts for Social Security were based on the extremely unrealistic assumption that workers' earnings would remain level. When earnings invariably rose, "unanticipated" actuarial surpluses would appear. Congress—all the while proclaiming its commitment to the system's "actuarial soundness"—would quickly exploit these rosy forecasts by liberalizing benefits, thereby preventing substantial surpluses from actually materializing. New forecasts based on the level-wage assumption would then be made, unanticipated actuarial surpluses would reappear, and the cycle would start over.[41]

Program builders also can exploit projected trust fund deficits. Because the cost of interstate construction turned out to be far higher than estimated, the Highway Trust Fund threatened to go broke almost as soon as it was created. This gave Congress a pretext for increasing user charges, helping to secure the highway program's future claims on government resources. The consequences of the norm of trust fund balance are not unidirectional, however. When mature trust funds face the prospect of depletion, the need to keep the funds solvent shifts leverage to those who favor benefit cutbacks.[42] Perhaps the leading example is the bipartisan rescue of Social Security in 1983. Forced to act in order to "save" Social Security from imminent "bankruptcy" and keep benefit checks flowing, Congress accelerated planned increases in the payroll tax, raised the normal retirement age to 67 from 65, and required upper-income recipients to pay taxes on their benefits. Many other trust funds besides Social Security have experienced similar rescue packages. Indeed, owing to faster than expected medical inflation, the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund has faced the prospect of insolvency nine times since 1970. On each such occasion, Congress has renewed its basic political commitment to the Medicare program, while changing specific tax and benefit provisions, typically in ways that keep the direct impact on current beneficiaries to a relative minimum, to stabilize the system's finances.[43]

Fourth, the integrity of trust funds varies in response to periodic shifts in the larger political and institutional environment in which trust funds are embedded. Two aspects of this environment should be differentiated. One is the

[41] Derthick, *Policymaking for Social Security*, 48–51. See also Joseph A. Pechman, Henry J. Aaron, and Michael K. Taussig, *Social Security: Perspectives for Reform* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1968), 71.

[42] On the role of solvency crises in facilitating retrenchment, see Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State*, 173–174.

[43] From an economic perspective, trust fund solvency crises are highly dubious. While solvency crises may highlight a gap between what programs cost and taxpayers are willing to pay, the government is not in any danger of literally going out of business. Policy makers can always bail out a trust fund that threatens to go broke simply by infusing it with general revenues. Solvency crises are thus mainly political constructs, an example of what political scientist John Kingdon calls "focusing events."

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distribution of political support for particular government activities, which shifts according to election returns, public opinion, interest group mobilization, and exogenous economic and social conditions. The second important feature is the overall groundrules of federal budgeting. These groundrules have been changed repeatedly in recent decades as Congress has struggled to expand its institutional capacity to shape fiscal policy and control the deficit. Indeed, each of the three major budgetary reforms since the 1970s—the Congressional Budget Act (1974), Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (1985), and the Budget Enforcement Act (1990)—has had important consequences, both intended and unintended, for trust fund politics.

The Congressional Budget Act exempted many trust funds from new curbs on spending and borrowing outside the regular appropriations process. At the same time, however, it gave the appropriations committees a procedural opening to begin exercising annual spending control over a number of trust funds lacking entitlement status. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings afforded some trust funds preferential treatment in baseline forecasting rules, but its emphasis on fiscal restraint increased the incentive for appropriators both to expand the permissible uses of trust funds beyond those contemplated by their original legislative sponsors and to siphon off revenue from one trust fund to replenish another. By far the most important of the changes for trust funds, however, has been the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), which caps discretionary spending and established pay-as-you-go rules for revenues and mandatory spending. The BEA increased the incentive for clientele groups to lobby for trust funds as a means of protecting their favored programs. At the same time, the BEA also weakened the procedural integrity of certain trust funds by making their income and spending subject to two entirely different budget enforcement rules. If a particular fund's spending is scored as discretionary, and its income counts as receipts (rather than as what is known in budgetary parlance as offsetting collections), then earmarked revenue can no longer be used to directly finance program expansions. In the case of the National Recreational Trails Trust Fund, the BEA has totally eliminated the advantages of dedicated funding. As of 1996, this trust fund has never been activated, and no money has been appropriated for its use.

The history of the Highway Trust Fund shows how a series of procedural and political changes can have a large cumulative impact on trust fund integrity. The Highway Trust Fund was created in 1956 on the premise that gasoline tax revenue would be dedicated exclusively for road building. Political developments over the 1960s and 1970s—including the energy crisis and the rise of the environmental movement—conspired to weaken the power of the highway lobby. Until the early 1980s, however, the original deal remained basically intact. At its inception, the Highway Trust Fund enjoyed off-budget status and a host of other procedural protections. By the mid-1970s, however, these protections were largely gone. Appropriators, given an opening by the new budget process, began setting annual spending caps. In 1982, Congress agreed to divert

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a portion of highway revenues for mass transit projects. This was followed by additional diversions of highway funds for environmental cleanup and other activities. These diversions did not amount to much. A sharper break with past earmarking practice occurred in the 1990 and 1993 budget agreements. In 1990, Congress increased the gas tax by a nickel, but temporarily reserved half for deficit reduction. And in the 1993 budget reconciliation act, Congress in effect treated the entire proceeds of a 4.3 cent fuels tax as an addition to general revenue. Such actions demonstrate the "declining political 'sanctity' of the classic claim that highway programs are the sole legitimate object for which highway tax revenues can be expended.[44]

The final dynamic observable in trust fund politics is the evolution of policy commitments themselves. In this dynamic, the trust fund structure itself remains more or less stable, but the nature of the promise underlying the trust fund changes. A dramatic example of this dynamic and the political stresses it creates is Social Security. Traditionally, the major function of the Social Security Trust Fund was to add political durability to the government's pension commitments. From the 1940s to the early 1980s, the trust fund was basically maintained on a pay-as-you-go basis. While people paid into the system in the expectation of future benefits, Congress set payroll tax rates so that annual revenues and expenditures would remain roughly in balance. No attempt was made to build up a large reserve fund.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the nature of the Social Security program, what it implicitly promised citizens, underwent a profound, if subtle, change. As a consequence of the 1983 rescue package mentioned above and faster than expected economic growth, Social Security began running large annual surpluses, moving the system away from pay-as-you-go and more in the direction of partial reserve funding. Policy experts argued that these surpluses should be set aside to prepare for the coming retirement of the huge baby boom generation. Now the implied promise was not simply that people could have faith in Social Security, but that the accumulation of surpluses would enable future retirees, the baby boomers, to avoid economically burdening working generations.

In order for this intergenerational promise to be kept, however, Congress would actually have to save the surpluses. It would have to avoid the temptation to use them to finance current government spending. To be credible, the commitment to saving the surpluses thus requires a clear differentiation between Social Security and the rest of the budget. By design, however, the Social Security Trust Fund presently lacks the capacity to provide this differentiation. Payroll taxes flow into the general Treasury, and trust fund surpluses are invested entirely in federal securities. As a mechanism for compelling future politicians to make good on preexisting benefit promises, the trust fund remains quite

[44] James A. Dunn, Jr., "The Politics of Motor Fuel Taxes and Infrastructure Funds in France and the United States," *Policy Studies Journal* 21 (Summer 1993): 282.

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strong. As a mechanism for prefunding pensions through the expansion of national savings, however, it is extremely weak. In short, the trust fund is now being asked to play two fundamentally different commitment roles, only one of which it was designed for. This helps explain how the trust fund mechanism, in debates surrounding Social Security, can simultaneously be claimed to be a major contributor to Social Security's status as the "third rail of American politics" and a mere accounting fiction.

Rethinking Democratic Commitment

This article has analyzed trust funds as unfolding promises. My claim is not that trust funds or other kinds of collective commitments in democratic polities inevitably break down or fall apart, but rather that they are often subject to evolution and historical change. Since the establishment of the major social insurance trust funds in the 1930s, virtually all the money set aside for trust funds has in fact been spent on the promised uses. People have counted on Social Security, Medicare, and other trust fund programs; and the programs have been there. Trust funds have offered assurance of the government's intention to make good on its commitments. Yet trust funds have not been inviolable. Indeed, a few trust funds have even been repealed. For example, the General Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, which was far more politically vulnerable than most trust funds, because it relied entirely on general fund transfers for its income, was terminated after large budget deficits emerged in the 1980s. Abolishing trust funds has been a very rare event, however. The far more common pattern has been for the terms of trust funds to be modified. Such modifications, which typically involve incremental adjustments to preexisting arrangements, have occurred mainly in the context of efforts to protect the solvency of particular trust funds, or as byproducts of other legislation, especially reforms of the budgetary process of which trust funds are necessarily part.

Just as trust funds have not been spared the effects of change, neither have they been free from conflict. How could matters be otherwise? Trust funds finance more than 40 percent of federal spending and were enacted by actors with conflicting incentives and objectives. In the case of trust funds, indeed probably most other aspects of democratic politics, precommitment does not rule out future conflicts so much as shape what the conflicts will be about.

This analysis has not emphasized a number of factors often stressed in the literature on credible political commitment, notably the capacity of actors to punish one another for "opportunistic" behavior. There is no doubt that punishment or its threat significantly influences trust fund politics.[45] A major reason

[45] One limitation of conventional models of electoral punishment is that they assume that voters care only about maximizing their wealth, and that it makes no difference whether taxes flow into trust funds or whether government transfers are labeled "earned benefits." Yet as Paul M. Romer argues in a paper that attempts to formally model the public psychology associated with entitlements, there are good reasons to expect that voters will also care about promises made to them by officeholders. People get angry when their wealth declines, but they become even angrier when an implied moral

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why legislators support Social Security is precisely because they fear electoral retribution from senior citizens. In a democratic polity, in which influence is highly fragmented and recourse can seldom be made to an external enforcement mechanism, however, the capacity of any particular actor or group to invoke sanctions for failure to deliver is often weak. This does not mean that political commitment is impossible. Indeed, without reasonably credible promises to tie citizens and groups to the polity, and elected officials to one another and to their successors, democracy could scarcely exist. What this analysis does suggest, however, is that the sources of democratic commitment may lie not only in punishment, but also in shared understandings, accepted routines, and the web of social relationships that democratic politics by its very nature creates.

As the twenty-first century approaches, the United States faces the prospect of deficits of unprecedented size. Some argue that automatic spending for preexisting budgetary commitments will destroy the economy and drain every last drop of discretion from the budget. That seems an implausible scenario, however. In a democracy, inherited commitments shape policy but never wholly determine it. Indeed, precommitments themselves often promote change and sometimes contain the seeds of their own modification. Already reports of long-term deficits in the Social Security and Medicare trust funds are stimulating healthy debates about the future of these programs. In light of the important personal commitments they have induced people to make, it seems highly unlikely that these programs will be destroyed. It seems equally unlikely, however, that no significant adjustments will be made. As events unfold in democratic polities, old commitments are reworked, and new promises are made.

contract on which they have relied in making major life decisions has been broken. Romer suggests that voters will be more prone to punish a politician who has reneged on such long-term agreements than another political official who simply cut an ordinary transfer program. See Paul M. Romer, "Preferences, Promises, and the Politics of Entitlement" in Victor R. Fuchs, ed., *Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 195–220.

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Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru

WENDY HUNTER

Have the armed forces maintained their influence in Latin America's new democracies? Or has the reinstallation of free political competition diminished their political clout? Have overbearing militaries tightly constrained popular sovereignty? Or have democratic responsiveness and accountability extended into wider spheres of political life and reduced military influence? These questions are of crucial importance for the future of the fledgling civilian regimes in the region.[1]

Scholars adhering to a modes-of-transition perspective expect a high level of continuity in military clout. Following Alfred Stepan, they focus on the fact that Latin American militaries usually maintained control over the democratization process and therefore managed to extract from resurgent democratic forces important institutional prerogatives, such as extensive representation on national security councils and other decision-making bodies with broad political responsibilities, to shield themselves from civilian control, to keep watch over civilian forces, and to interfere in many arenas of democratic politics.[2] The modes-of-transition argument thus expects persistent military influence based on institutional structures that are frozen into place during the regime transition.

[1] For an informative overview of how state and military power expanded under Latin America's bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, see Jorge Domínguez, "Political Change: Central America, South America, and the Caribbean" in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Understanding Political Development* (New York: Harper Collins, 1987).

[2] Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

WENDY HUNTER is assistant professor of political science at Vanderbilt University. This article draws from her book, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers.*

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While the continuity thesis initially predominated in the scholarly debate on Latin America's new democracies, it has come under increasing challenge.[3] Invoking politicians' self interest, I have shown that in the Brazilian case, the military's influence has diminished greatly under the new democracy.[4] Although the armed forces maintained considerable control over the regime transition, unrestrained electoral competition has gradually eroded their initial political strength. In order to attract votes, politicians have sought to embrace popular causes and distribute patronage. They have disregarded the military's insistence on restricting popular participation, for instance, by removing limitations on the right to strike. They also increased pork-barrel spending based on reductions in defense expenditures. In these and related ways, electoral competition has led civilian politicians to encroach upon military prerogatives and resources. The "electoral dynamic" argument inspires greater hope in change than the modes-of-transition argument provides.[5]

The scholarly debate on these contrasting views has focused mainly on Brazil.[6] This article extends the discussion to Argentina, Chile, and Peru. In these nations, the political clout of the military varied greatly at the end of the regime transition. The Argentine armed forces were discredited by defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982, a deep economic crisis, and the horrendous human-rights abuses that soldiers had committed under the dictatorship of 1976–1983. Political weakness limited their ability to extract institutional safeguards during the hurried regime transition (1982–1983). By contrast, the Chilean military, which had successfully restructured the economy and administered the country, was able to secure extensive institutional safeguards and financial guarantees before leaving the government. Thus, Argentina and Chile constitute "crucial cases"[7] for the electoral-dynamic and the modes-of-transition arguments, respectively: if scholars are to have any confidence in these hypotheses, the former should account for the Argentine case (where no major institutional obstacles should prevent the electoral dynamic from unfolding)

[3] Examples of the continuity thesis include Stepan, *Rethinking*; Terry Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23 (October 1990): 1–21; and Francis Hagopian, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?" *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (July 1990): 147–70.

[4] Wendy Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil," *Comparative Politics* 27 (July 1995): 425–43; Hunter, *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the recent decline of military power in Latin America and other regions, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (October 1995): 9–17; Paul Sigmund, "Approaches to the Study of the Military in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 26 (October 1993): 111–122.

[5] Analyses that employ a rational choice framework similar to that used here include Barry Ames, *Political Survival* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Barbara Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[6] See Stepan, *Rethinking*; Hagopian, "Democracy"; Jorge Zaverucha, *Rumor de Sabres* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994); and Hunter, "Politicians" and *Eroding Military Influence*.

[7] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7: *Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

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and the latter for the experience of Chile (where the military's position in the transition was extremely strong).

The Peruvian case introduces additional variation. While military influence during the regime transition (1978–1980) fell in between the extremes of Argentina and Chile, the new democracy slid into an ever more severe political crisis during the 1980s. What impact did the rise of a powerful guerrilla movement, the Shining Path, have on the political influence of the armed forces? Which one of the two rival approaches can better account for this interesting case, which is unusual in contemporary Latin America, but reminiscent of the troubles and travails assailing the region's democracies in earlier time periods?

The following case studies yield three main conclusions. The first two support the electoral-dynamic hypothesis. The third places the hypothesis in context. First and foremost, democracy diminished the military's political influence in all three countries most of the time. Thus, the electoral competition unleashed by democratization eroded the political and economic clout of the military across three cases marked by widely divergent levels of military strength at the outset of the new regime.[8]

Second, the electoral-dynamic argument also helps account for the differential strength of the downward trend in military influence in different countries. Weak party systems may experience an especially dramatic fall in military influence, but be followed by a temporary backlash or a more lasting reversal of this trend.

Third, although the modes-of-transition argument, with its emphasis on stasis, fails to account for the overall reduction of military influence under democracy, it makes an important contribution in explaining the different starting points and the varying strength of this downward trend. Thus, the general reduction of military influence under democracy, which the electoral-dynamic hypothesis stresses, occurs in a setting that the modes-of-transition argument helps elucidate.

The Reduction of Military Influence in Chile

Chile's regime transition was highly constrained by authoritarian incumbents and thus upheld many military prerogatives. A modes-of-transition perspective would, therefore, expect persistently high military influence under the new democracy. Yet in line with the electoral-dynamic hypothesis, Chilean politicians have diminished the armed forces' institutional powers and made policy decisions against military preferences. However small and gradual these measures, they constitute an impressive achievement in light of the extensive institutional safeguards the military preserved in the regime transition. Programmatic com-

[8] My assessment focuses on relative change over time (taking the end of military rule as a baseline), not on the attainment of an ideal model of civil-military relations in a democratic polity or the precedent established in the West.

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mitments to popular sovereignty and social reform figured prominently alongside electoral calculations for weakening the military politically. The organizational strength of political parties in Chile has allowed the center-left governing coalition to coordinate its members around a strategy of reducing military influence that is deliberate and assertive, yet at the same time careful to uphold the collective interest in democracy's survival by not pushing the military beyond its tolerance.

Institutional Safeguards

Eroding military power would be a feat for Chilean politicians in light of the strong legal bulwark that General Augusto Pinochet, in power from 1973 to 1990, constructed to "protect" Chilean democracy after a continuation of military rule appeared untenable. The core of Pinochet's efforts lay in the establishment of a strong political right and a military that commanded ample power. Through the 1980 constitution and the 1989 Organic Law of the Armed Forces, he hoped to bind the hands of his civilian successors. These legal rules had a greater likelihood of persisting than the military prerogatives retained in Brazil through more informal agreements.[9] The Pinochet regime also showed considerable foresight in securing advantages for conservative electoral forces, who were expected in turn to protect military prerogatives.

Provisions for designated senators and a binomial electoral system benefitted the political right. Nine seats in the Senate were reserved for nonelected officials selected by the outgoing military regime. As a result, over one-third of the Senate would be comprised of rightists sympathetic to the armed forces. The binomial majoritarian system, which provides for two seats per district, gives a party (alliance) commanding a little more than one third of the vote and one-half of the seats. Designed under the assumption that the center-left opposition would have a majority and that the right would have slightly more than one-third of the vote, the binomial system has limited the predominance of the former opposition and guaranteed the military's conservative supporters a disproportionate share of legislative influence.

As for military prerogatives, the Pinochet charter called for a military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) with veto power over a wide range of policies.[10] It enhanced the armed forces' autonomy further by limiting the president's ability to dismiss the chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and Carabineros (the militarized police). This safeguard assured the continuation of General Pinochet as army commander until 1998, a position he has used to keep a watchful eye over the new democracy.

[9] On the Constitution and attempts to reform it, see Mark Ensalaco, "In with the New, Out with the Old?" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (May 1994): 409–429; and Francisco Geisse and José Antonio Ramíirez Arrayas, *La reforma constitutional* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Sociales, 1989).

[10] Rodrigo Atria, *El Consejo de Seguridad Nacional* (Santiago: Programa de Estudios Prospectivos, Papeles de Trabajo no. 34, January 1994).

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The Pinochet charter also impeded change by establishing barriers to amending the constitution that would be nearly impossible to overcome, given especially the artificial strength of the political right. Thus, by conferring constitutional guarantees on the armed forces and passing legislation to boost the representation of conservative politicians, the outgoing authoritarian regime covered its bases well. Whether democratic forces could undo these "safeguards" forms a crucial test of the electoral-dynamic hypothesis.

The rejection of the military regime in the plebiscite of 1988 augured well for the reform effort. It empowered the opposition *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), led by the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties and the *Partido por la Democracia* (Party for Democracy—PPD), to demand major constitutional reforms even before the election of the new government. Negotiations between the authoritarian regime and the opposition yielded a reform package that enlarged the Senate and thus reduced the relative weight of the designated members to less than one fifth. It also confined the NSC to an advisory role and eliminated the military's majority status on the council. Finally, the reforms lowered the quorum for amending the constitution.

These negotiations were an important step in democratizing the authoritarian order. In line with the electoral-dynamic argument, even rightist parties supported some of the reforms, especially where restrictions imposed by the military regime hindered their own efforts to mobilize voters. This striking divergence among long-time allies exemplifies the conflicts of interest between electoral politicians, who need to attract mass support, and the armed forces, who strive to contain mass mobilization. Several provisions that limit popular sovereignty and civilian control have remained in place, however, including the designated senatorial seats, the binomial electoral system, and the president's inability to dismiss the top military commanders. The Concertación's clear victory in the 1989 election induced it to pursue further constitutional reforms. But would a Senate that was skewed to the right approve additional amendments?

The same opportunism that inspired right-wing parties to oppose aspects of the authoritarian constitution hindering their own advancement motivated them to defend arrangements that enhance their electoral standing, such as the designated senators and the binomial electoral system. Following the 1989 election, the right commanded a majority in the Senate as a result of these rules.[11] The Concertación, therefore, needed support from some segment of the right to pass legislation, especially constitutional amendments. Rightist parties, however, had little interest in altering rules conferring such advantage on them and therefore blocked reform efforts to make the electoral system fairer.

Despite the paucity of constitutional reforms, important assertions of civilian authority did take place under the presidency of Patricio Aylwin (1990–

[11] Among elected senators, the Concertación enjoyed a 22 to 16 majority. But the designated senators (eight, following the death of one) gave the right-wing opposition a two-seat edge.

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1994). For instance, President Aylwin boldly used his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief to reject several of General Pinochet's proposals for army promotions. The officers who Aylwin vetoed tended to have records marred by financial irregularities, or were known as political articulators within the army. By blocking the ascent of these officers, Aylwin influenced the composition of the high command.[12]

The Aylwin government also weakened the military's role in internal security. Above all, it returned the Carabineros to the Interior Ministry after a seventeen-year period under the Ministry of Defense. This transfer makes internal security the preserve of the police and not the military. The Aylwin government maintained its resolve to keep the military out of internal security by rejecting the army's demand to participate in a new agency established to coordinate an antiterrorist program, the *Oficina Coordinadora de Seguridad Pública* (Coordinating Agency of Public Security—OCSP).[13] In sum, Aylwin made some progress in asserting the authority of the presidency, although he failed to break through many important constraints of Pinochet's legacy.

Since coming to office in March 1994, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle has pressed on with reforms—namely, to diminish military prerogatives and make the electoral system fairer—while seeking to preserve political stability. Frei's impressive electoral mandate (58 percent of the vote), combined with the prosperity and stability that his administration has guaranteed, undoubtedly strengthens his government vis-à-vis the military. In October 1995, the government submitted to Congress a package of constitutional amendments, including the elimination of the designated senators, the restructuring of the national security council to allow for greater civilian authority, and the granting of greater oversight powers to Congress.

Public opinion polls have suggested that at least 60 percent of the electorate favors these reforms.[14] Hope for their passage rose when the moderate wing of the center-right *Renovación Nacional* (RN) agreed to back them. This faction of the party is acutely aware of the need to move to the center and distance itself from the military government in order to capture more electoral support.[15] In short, democratic competition induced these center-right politicians to back measures that would weaken the military. Yet seven hard-line senators within the party made a different calculation. Rather than moving toward the center, they were motivated by the imperatives of Chile's binomial electoral system, which induces parties to form coalitions, to ally with the far-right *Unión Democrática Independiente* (UDI). Political opportunism within the context of

[12] "Juegos de Guerra," *El Mercurio*, (Santiago), 4 November 1990; and "Aylwin Impone su Autoridad," *Que Pasa*, 5 November 1990, 12–16.

[13] "No Part for Army in Anti-Terrorist Unit," *Latin American Regional Reports-Southern Cone*, 30 May 1991, 6.

[14] "Reformas Constitucionales: Pesadilla IV," *Revista Hoy* (Santiago), 4–10 March 1996, 4–7.

[15] Author interview with Marco Riveros Keller, adviser to the RN party leadership, Santiago, 9 February 1995. See also "Los 'Chascones' de RN," *Revista Hoy*, 25–31 March 1996, 10–11.

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Chile's electoral rules reinforced the ideological sympathies of these right wing senators and led them in May 1996 to block government efforts to change the constitution. While the reforms foundered upon their resistance, many analysts are confident that they will pass eventually,[16] especially as the departure of the current designated senators in 1997 becomes imminent. If no reform package has yet been approved when they step down, the executive will retain the right to appoint new *designados*, at least some of whom will be sympathetic to the *Concertación*.[17] Because such an eventuality will put at risk the artificial majority of the political right in the Congress, members of the right will no longer have an interest in retaining this vestige of the authoritarian past. This may well move them one step closer to approving a set of reforms to the 1980 constitution.

Budgetary Prerogatives

As part of his larger effort to ensure military autonomy from civilian politicians, Pinochet took measures to guarantee the armed forces ample fiscal resources. The Organic Law of the Armed Forces (1989) stipulates that the defense budget may not fall below the absolute amount of 1989. The armed forces are also entitled to 10 percent of all profits of the state-owned copper company, CODELCO, with a minimum of U.S. $180 million.[18] Given the political and legal barriers to changing these stipulations, a modes-of-transition analysis would expect the military to remain insulated from civilian economic pressures.

In line with the electoral-dynamic hypothesis, however, democratization has indeed subjected the armed forces to budgetary constraints. Both Concertación governments have sought to attract more voters by enacting a range of social programs[19] and equity-enhancing reforms to prevent pent-up social demands from exploding into a populist upsurge.[20] Under the dictatorship, social inequality and poverty had worsened considerably. Both democratic governments have raised levels of social spending in order to undertake improvements in health care, education, social security, popular housing, and labor policy. As a result, defense shares declined from 11.34 percent of the national budget in 1989 to 8.65 percent in 1995, while social expenditures rose from 64.75

[16] "Sospechas Mutuas," *Revista Hoy*, 1–7 April, 11; "Los Designados del 97," *Revista Hoy*, 6–12 May 1996, 6–8.

[17] See Ensalaco, "In with the New," for details on the rules for selecting the designated senators. "Los Designados del 97," *Revista Hoy*, 6–12 May 1996, 6–8, suggests that the Concertación might be able to designate as many as six pro-government figures to fill the available posts.

[18] See Francisco Rojas, "Chile y el gasto militar," in Rojas, ed., *Gasto Militar en América Latina* (Santiago: Facultad Latinamericano de Cienciaes Sociales, 1994), 239–277.

[19] Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación of Chile, *Avanzando en Equidad* (Santiago: Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación, 1992); Kurt Weyland, "'Growth with Equity' in Chile's New Democracy?" *Latin American Research Review* 32 (Spring 1997): 37–67.

[20] Alejandro Foxley, *La Economía Política de la Transición* (Santiago: Dolmen, 1993) 7, 17.

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percent to 67.52 percent.[21] With respect to absolute levels, civilians have regarded the level of military expenditures of 1989, a figure they are legally required to match, as a ceiling, not a floor. Whereas defense expenditures increased only from 401.744 to 439.007 million pesos between 1989 and 1995, social spending rose from 2.317.449 to 3.425.030 million pesos in the same period.[22]

Thus, military spending has faced competition from public policies designed to address social needs, build political support, and promote democratic consolidation. Even in an area where legal restrictions seemed to tie the hands of the new democracy, electoral politicians have advanced their own interests at the expense of the armed forces. This finding corroborates the electoral-dynamic hypothesis and casts doubt on the modes-of-transition argument.

Human Rights

Human rights has been the most controversial issue in Chile's new democracy. The Chilean case bears out the difficulties that resolution of this issue poses in general. For the military, having to account for past abuses strikes a raw nerve. Officers are willing to resist prosecution at considerable political cost. For people who suffered the loss of family members, bringing the armed forces to justice is more important than any other aspect of civil-military relations. Faced with these cross-pressures, the strong parties of the Concertación have pursued a firm yet cautious course, contesting the military without endangering political stability and democratic consolidation. As results in Chile and elsewhere suggest, prosecuting officers for human rights violations is arguably where civilian politicians have met with least success. Even here, however, civilian politicians have made more progress than many expected initially.

Public opinion, reinforced by his own commitment to the rule of law, demanded that President Aylwin address the problem of accountability for the death and disappearance of over 2,000 people during the dictatorship. In 1990, Aylwin set up a commission to investigate the most flagrant breaches of human rights under the dictatorship. This commission, named after its chairman Raúl Rettig, was charged with compiling a record of the victims—not the offenders—and recommending forms of moral and material reparation.[23] The report's imminent release prompted the army to make threatening gestures in December 1990. Military leaders feared that the Rettig report might unleash pressures to repeal the amnesty that the dictatorship had granted itself for abuses committed between 1973 and 1978. President Aylwin remained undeterred and released the Rettig report in March 1991. Although the government

[21] Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos, *Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas, 1987–1995* (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1996), 37.

[22] Ibid., 38.

[23] Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, "Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación," *Estudios Públicos* 41 (Summer 1991).

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did not promote trials of human-rights violators, it did invite the families of victims to work through the courts, using information gathered by the Rettig commission as evidence. Thus, Aylwin was willing to uphold the amnesty, but only after the truth about human rights offenses had been revealed by the Rettig commission, and in some cases, after individual officers had been tried. Many observers were surprised that he was willing to press the military this far.

In subsequent years, family members of the killed and "disappeared" took scores of military personnel to court. The way in which these trials and the truth commission report compromised the image of the Pinochet regime greatly distressed officers of all ranks and threatened to destabilize government-military relations. Before leaving office, Aylwin sought closure on the human rights issue. He proposed a compromise in early August 1993 in the form of a bill stipulating that special judges try soldiers in ways conducive to rapid judgment (compared to the time-consuming procedures in civilian courts); that the proceedings take place in secret; and that the amnesty law decreed under the dictatorship be applied for abuses committed before 1978. Yet members of his coalition refused to go so far. In late August 1993 the Socialists and the PPD blocked the proposed Law Aylwin out of objection to the secrecy clause, which they feared would allow the judiciary, a close ally of the military, to abdicate its responsibilities once again.[24] Human rights groups reminded the center-left of its long-standing commitment to defending human rights. Besides their own commitment to principles, center-left politicians were uneasy about their constituents' reaction to Aylwin's compromise with the military.

Partisan interests also led the political right to reject the bill, although it had earlier advocated secrecy in human rights trials and it knew that the military wanted to see the court proceedings brought to a speedy conclusion.[25] The rightist parties used the opportunity to embarrass the governing coalition, whose internal division forced Aylwin to withdraw the bill. Under the Frei government, the issue of accelerating the court proceedings has emerged again. The catalyst was the 30 May 1995 Supreme Court conviction of retired General Manuel Contreras, former chief of Chile's secret police, and second in command, General Pedro Espinoza, for ordering the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier, foreign minister under the Allende government. This decision assumed monumental symbolic significance, because it marked the first conviction of high-ranking Chilean officers for human rights violations. Public opinion (65.8 percent of all Chileans polled) strongly supported the imprisonment of Contreras and Espinoza.[26]

Eventually both Espinoza and Contreras went to jail. Their imprisonment, especially after Contreras averred that he would never spend "a single day in

[24] "Viera-Gallo pide al Gobierno que considere la posición del PS-PPD," *Ultimas Noticias*, 23 August 1993; "Manifestó la Senadora Laura Soto," *El Mercurio*, 26 August 1993.

[25] "Advierten Senadores de RN," *El Mercurio*, 21 August 1993.

[26] "No Se Ha Logrado Plena Reconciliación Nacional," *El Mercurio, Edición Internacional*, 20–26 July 1995.

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jail," was a clear victory for human rights. Getting them behind bars, however, involved concessions by the Frei government. Hours before the court issued arrest warrants, elements within the army and navy harbored Contreras and Espinoza, making their release conditional upon government promises to impede the prosecution of other military men. They soon released Espinoza, but former Pinochet confidante Contreras went to jail only in late October 1995 after the government conceded a pay hike and proposed legislation to put closure on some 600 odd remaining court cases.[27] The proposed legislation does not, however, include the military's demand to extend the amnesty law to 1990. Even so, as earlier, the Socialists have resisted endorsing the president's compromise bill. In sum, the military's human-rights violations have been the most contentious issue facing Chile's new democracy. Civilians have made progress in this area, but it has been gradual and mixed. By exposing human rights abuses in the Rettig report, Aylwin went further in challenging the military than many observers initially expected. But he sought to moderate conflict and accepted short-cuts to wind down the trials. Legislators of the president's own coalition, however, refused to compromise with the military. It remains to be seen how long they will stand their ground against President Frei, who faces continued military pressures to bring the trials to closure.

Even in the most bounded of Latin American transitions from authoritarianism, democracy has reemerged with more vigor and resilience than a modes-of-transition perspective would predict. Electoral politicians have managed to enact some democratizing reforms, shift priorities away from military spending, and investigate human-rights abuses. The heretofore scholarly focus on the continuity of military autonomy in Chile has detracted from attention to these important aspects of change. The fact that these changes occurred with General Pinochet still at the helm of the army suggests that there will be continued strong pressure against residual pockets of military power. After the general steps down in March 1998 and the Frei government wins the right to appoint a new set of "designated senators" or abolishes this undemocratic institution, the governing coalition will undoubtedly seek to reduce military privileges further. Moderate rightist politicians, whom electoral competition in contemporary Chile pulls toward the center, may well support these reform efforts.

The success of civilian politicians will be critical in determining the fate of remaining military prerogatives. So far, governance under the new democracy has militated in favor of a gradual yet irreversible reduction of military power. Low inflation, economic prosperity, diminishing poverty, social stability, and repeated demonstrations of electoral support for mainstream politicians have marked Chile's new democracy. These successes bode well for civilian efforts to confine the military to the apolitical, by-and-large professional role that they

[27] On the military pay hike, see "Gobierno Decide Subir Sueldos de las FF.AA," *El Mercurio, Edición Internacional*, 21–27 September 1995. On concessions to humans rights, see "Presidente Frei Anunció Medidas de Reconciliación," *El Mercurio, Edición Internacional*, 17–23 August 1995.

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had before the coup of 1973. Chile's strong parties are likely to pursue this goal prudently by contesting the military in a firm yet cautious fashion.

The Decline of Military Influence in Argentina

If the electoral-dynamic argument applies to cases of constrained transitions like Chile and Brazil, it should apply *a fortiori* to a less constrained case like Argentina. The collapse of the military government in 1982/1983—the product of an atrocious human rights record, poor economic performance, defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982, and society's overwhelming repudiation of the military[28]—left the armed forces in a weak bargaining position at the inception of the new democracy. This allowed President Raúl Alfonsín (1983–1989) to pursue a tough approach. Since the return to civilian rule in 1983, the Argentine armed forces have lost far more standing than their Chilean counterparts.

In the presidential campaign of late 1983, the candidate of the Radical Party, Raúl Alfonsín, focused on restoring the rule of law. He had long been a defender of human rights. Public opinion and electoral incentives reinforced his advocacy of constitutional liberties. By contrast, rumors of a military-union pact and promises by Alfonsín's Peronist adversary to honor the amnesty that the military had granted to themselves hurt the Peronist party.[29] Alfonsín indeed won with a stunning 52 percent of the vote, handing the Peronists their first defeat in a free election.

President Alfonsín took advantage of the military's weakness and used his impressive electoral mandate to push the armed forces harder than attempted in any other South American country. He severely undercut their political prerogatives, promoted trials against leading officers accused of human-rights abuses, and drastically reduced defense spending. The subsequent government of Peronist Carlos Menem (1989–present) has upheld Alfonsín's efforts to curb the political involvement of the military and to keep defense expenditures in check, yet it relented on the prosecution of officers for human rights violations.

Political Prerogatives

The Alfonsín administration instituted numerous organizational changes to reduce the military's political autonomy and influence.[30] It transferred decision

[28] Public opinion data that reflect society's animosity toward the military include Edgardo Catterberg, *Argentina Confronts Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991) 56, 93; and Rosendo Fraga, *La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa* (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1991), 239–259.

[29] See Ernesto López. *Ni la Ceniza Ni la Gloria* (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 1994), 43–49.

[30] This section draws on López, *Ni la Ceniza*; Deborah Norden, *Between Coups and Consolidation* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), chap. 4; and David Pion-Berlin, "Between Confrontation and Accommodation," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23 (October 1991): 543–571.

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making over important policy areas—such as the military budget, arms production, and national defense policy—from the heads of the three military branches (downgraded from commanders to chiefs of staff) to a civilian-led Ministry of Defense. It also eliminated military control of various defense industries. The transfer of these issues away from the armed forces created an important sphere of civilian authority.

The Radical government also succeeded in limiting the armed forces' influence over internal security. Most importantly, the National Defense Law of 1988 separates national (external) defense, the domain of the military, from internal security, for which police forces and border patrols are primarily responsible. The new law bans the military from planning scenarios for internal conflict and from using military intelligence for domestic purposes. It also denies the military a seat on the National Defense Council, allowing civilians to set defense priorities without military interference. Broad bipartisan support in Congress backed the basic goals of the National Defense Law, which contributed in vital ways to establishing civilian supremacy.

While projecting a more conciliatory image towards the military than his predecessor, Menem has upheld most of the measures that reduce the military's political influence. The transfer of institutional prerogatives to the civilian-led Ministry of Defense and the provisions limiting military participation in internal security remain intact. Menem went a step further and in 1994 eliminated obligatory military service, long esteemed by the officer corps as a way to inculcate Argentine youth with the values of their institution. The elimination of the draft came in the wake of negative publicity about hazing practices within the army, youth protests, and discussions within the Peronist party about how to attract the support of young Argentines.[31] In his 1995 Presidential Message to Congress, intended to prepare his reelection, Menem twice mentioned the termination of conscription among his accomplishments.[32]

Compared to Alfonsín, Menem's reasons for contesting the military appear more pragmatic than principled. In line with the electoral-dynamic hypothesis, it is Menem's interest in enhancing his own personal power and autonomy that has compelled him to marginalize established power centers, including the military, and win direct support from the electorate.

Defense Spending

Both of Argentina's presidents since 1983 have reduced defense spending. Under Alfonsín, the armed forces' share of public expenditures plummeted from 32.3 percent in 1982 to 18.4 percent in 1990. In absolute terms, defense spending dropped from US $2,203 million in 1982 to $1,244 in 1989 (in constant

[31] On public opinion toward compulsory military service, see "Sondeo favorable a la eliminación del servicio militar obligatorio," *Nueva Provincia*, 2 October 1994.

[32] Argentina, Presidencia de la Nación, *Mensaje Presidencial, 1° de Marzo de 1995* (Buenos Aires: Presidencia, 1995), 15, 20.

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US $ of 1982).[33] Economic goals as well as political incentives motivated this reduction of defense spending. Alfonsín inherited a crisis-ridden economy and soon faced pressures to enact austerity. In addition, the new president deliberately sought to diminish the standing of the armed forces, as most of Argentine public opinion demanded. By the late 1980s, the drastic budget cuts had indeed weakened the military's operational and training capacity.

Economic goals and electoral motivations have led the Menem government to continue the trend toward lower military budgets. Economic adjustment and neo-liberal restructuring have caused the government to contain defense spending, privatize military industries, reduce force levels (from 95,000 men in 1989 to 65,000 in 1993)[34] and eliminate the development and purchase of sophisticated weapons technology to which the United States objects, such as the Condor missile project. When pressured by international lending agencies to cut public spending, the government has regarded military expenditures as one of the most expendable items. Military expenditures fell from 2.6 percent of GNP in 1989 to 1.7 percent in 1993.[35] Thus, while assuming a less confrontational posture than his predecessor, the Menem government has continued to restrict the resources available to the military.

Human Rights

The prosecution of military officers for the horrendous human rights violations committed under the dictatorship was the most conflictual aspect of the Alfonsín government's policies toward the armed forces. While the human-rights trials would undoubtedly provoke some officers within the military, to not hold them seemed morally indefensible and politically risky. In the 1983 election campaign, Alfonsín had pledged to punish the former military juntas for their extensive misdeeds—a promise he could not easily break. The fact that none of the junta members held a command post—contrary to General Pinochet in Chile—facilitated the decision to prosecute.

These factors favored government efforts to prosecute the top brass. Unprecedented for Latin America, nine former junta members were brought to trial. Five of them, including two former presidents, were convicted to long prison terms. Remarkably, the military did not resist the condemnation of these former superiors. Holding leading officers accountable for the misdeeds committed under their command was an extraordinary accomplishment for Argentina's new democracy. Of enormous symbolic and political importance, it reaffirmed the rule of law and signaled the subordination of the armed forces to civilian authority.

[33] Thomas Scheetz, "Military Expenditures in South America" (paper for United Nations Disarmament Conference, Asunción, Paraguay, 1993), tables 4 and 5.

[34] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993–1994* (Washington, DC: ACDA, 1994), 52.

[35] Ibid.

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The continuing prosecution of military officers soon triggered a backlash, however, tainting the initial accomplishment. Rather than stopping with junta members, the trials were extended to unit commanders, which implicated scores of junior officers and led many to wonder where retribution would end. Notably, members of Congress—thirty deputies from the Radical party and the entire Renovation wing of the Peronists—wanted the trials to affect officers beyond the former junta members. Thus, competition inside Argentina's internally divided parties, which are weaker than their Chilean counterparts, led to especially strong pressure on the military. Aware of the resulting danger for the stability of democracy, President Alfonsín sought to restrict the numbers of officers facing prosecution by passing legislation in December 1986 that called for a sixty-day limit on new indictments. But the prospect of an end point (*punto final*) only led human-rights groups and lawyers to push an onslaught of new cases into the courts.[36]

The extension of the trials downward into the ranks, driven by normative concerns as well as competition inside Argentina's weaker parties (compared to Chile), exacerbated civil-military conflict. Tensions came to a head in the rebellion of junior officers during Easter week of 1987. The leaders of the uprising demanded a termination to the trials. To end the rebellion, Alfonsín submitted to Congress a bill that eventually absolved all officers below the rank of colonel on the grounds of the "due obedience" they paid to commanding officers. The Easter-week revolt and two subsequent rebellions under Alfonsín served as a reminder that even the most favorable context for the assertion of civilian control placed limits on how far civilians could go in confronting the armed forces.[37]

Human-rights policy constitutes the main area in which the Menem government relented on his predecessor's stance toward the military. In order to guarantee the political stability required for his drastic economic reforms, Menem needed to ease the civil-military tensions that erupted in the latter half of the Alfonsín administration. But he was unwilling to concede greater expenditures for defense and did not wish to grant the military more political autonomy. Instead, Menem sought reconciliation with the armed forces by pardoning the imprisoned leaders of the dictatorship and those who led uprisings under the Alfonsín government. Although Menem knew he would pay a political price for this unpopular gesture, he proceeded nevertheless. Coupled with a host of symbolic measures to enhance the military's prestige, the presidential pardons granted in the first year and a half of the government did indeed serve their intended purpose: to attenuate civil-military conflict and thereby allow Menem to focus on new problems, namely Argentina's severe economic crisis. But Menem also sent the message that he would stand firm against military insubor-

[36] Approximately 400 new names were added to the list of those to be tried. See Norden, *Military Rebellion*, 103.

[37] On these rebellions, see ibid., chaps. 5–6; and Marcelo Sain, *Los Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987–1991*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1994).

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dination by taking swift and harsh measures against a military revolt in December 1990, the only rebellion launched under his tenure.

As the electoral-dynamic hypothesis would expect, civilian politicians in Argentina challenged the armed forces. Certainly, their efforts to "push the military to the wall," especially in the prosecution of human rights violations, did exceed the tolerance of an important segment of officers. Yet Menem managed to rein in the military and contain defense spending even after a group of officers had reminded civilians of their coercive potential. Thus, presidents who guarantee economic and political stability and who deal with the military in a firm yet cautious fashion can hold their ground and extend civilian control in important ways. The greater involvement of civilians in defense issues and an increasing acceptance among officers of restricted budgets and the need for military reform are sure signs of progress.[38]

The Initial Decline and Later Resurgence of Military Influence in Peru

The case of Peru since the return to civilian rule in 1980 further confirms the claim of the electoral-dynamic hypothesis that electoral politicians will tend to downgrade military autonomy and influence. But it also suggests that a severe political crisis, especially a powerful guerrilla threat, can cause a partial reversal of this trend. Peru's second postauthoritarian president, Alan García (1985–1990), took impressive steps to assert political control over the military in the wake of a landslide electoral victory in 1985. But in combatting the Shining Path guerrillas, civilian politicians conceded some of their power and autonomy to the armed forces for the sake of restoring stability. Facing an ever more formidable terrorist challenge, García's successor, Alberto Fujimori (1990–present), embraced the military's counterinsurgency strategy. He also used the armed forces to suspend democracy in his "self-coup" of April 1992. But while Fujimori has made important concessions to the military, he has kept its members under tighter personal control than his predecessors.

The Belaúnde Administration

The Peruvian military left its governing role (1968–1980) with many institutional prerogatives intact. Its standing was favorable compared to the Argentine military, though not as secure as the Chilean armed forces. Much of the institutional framework enacted under the military regime remained in place under President Fernando Belaúnde (1980–1985). The Joint Command of the Armed Forces remained involved in state planning and intelligence agencies,

[38] On changing attitudes within the military, see especially J. Samuel Fitch, "Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies" (paper for XIX International Congress, Latin American Studies Association, Washington, DC, 28–30 September 1995).

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and the military participated on the National Defense Council, which had the power to define national objectives. The military also retained substantial autonomy in its internal affairs. Since state repression under military rule had been limited, the new civilian government faced little pressure to take the military to task for past human-rights violations.[39]

Although Belaúnde did not aggressively seek to limit the military's role, the exercise of the military's institutional powers contracted notably between 1980 and 1985. Inaction on the part of the Belaúnde government, which rarely convened the National Defense Council, for instance, effectively confined military influence in politics. Moreover, among officers themselves, a professional, institutionalist position predominated that favored a withdrawal from political decision making after the divisive effects of twelve years of military rule.[40] Defense expenditures also began to contract under the Belaúnde government. Whereas military spending constituted on average 24.3 percent of public-sector outlays from 1969–1979, it represented an average of only 18.6 percent between 1980 to 1985. From 1980 to 1985, military expenditures averaged 4.19 percent of Peru's GDP, down from an average of 4.73 percent between 1969 and 1979.[41]

The Government of Alan García

If the Belaúnde government trod lightly on the military, the García administration contested it openly and tried actively to subordinate it to civilian command. Taking advantage of Peru's weak party system, García used all means to attract electoral support, including populist appeals and large-scale patronage. His unrestrained political tactics made him highly popular in the first half of his term, but soon exacerbated Peru's economic and political crisis. Whereas García initially succeeded in pushing back military influence, concern for minimal stability soon forced him to give the armed forces a freer hand. Thus, Peru's weak party system made García's early populist success possible, but it also made it difficult for civilian politicians to resolve the country's severe problems, inviting a resurgence of military influence.

Based on populist tactics, García won the presidential contest of 1985 by a wide margin. Military leaders recognized the electoral mandate this gave him.[42] García promised a "new beginning" in Peruvian politics. Making a break with the past included establishing civilian supremacy over the armed forces. A con-

[39] On the military's role in Peru's regime transition, see Julio Cotler, "Military Interventions and 'Transfer of Power to Civilians' in Peru" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 148–172.

[40] Enrique Obando, "El Poder de los Militares" in Augusto Alvarez Rodrich, ed., *El Poder en el Perú* (Lima: Apoyo, 1993), 79–80.

[41] Scheetz, "Military Expenditures," tables 4 and 5.

[42] On the rise of García, see John Crabtree, *Peru under García* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), chap. 3.

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fident García set out to reduce the military's institutional powers, stand up to top commanders over human-rights abuses, and cut defense expenditures. His government transferred several attributions away from the military-dominated National Defense Council to the civilian Council of Ministers, which diminished the armed forces' ability to influence a wide range of political decisions. Without negotiating or even consulting much with leading officers, the president also created a Ministry of Defense to replace the separate service ministries. García overcame military resistance, including a show of force by the air force.[43] In sum, under García the military lost considerable influence within the state.[44]

The president also insisted on improving human-rights standards, a point of serious tension with the armed forces. In the first year of his presidency, he underscored his seriousness about the matter by summarily dismissing three high-ranking army commanders after the discovery of a massacre of peasants by soldiers in the village of Accomarca. This dramatic assertion of the commander-in-chief's authority, never seen before in Peru, was not lost on the security forces. The numbers of dead and disappeared recorded from mid-1985 through 1987 fell to one-third the levels of the 1983–1984 period.[45]

Furthermore, García made sizable cuts in defense spending. Military expenditures constituted an average of 2.40 percent of GDP under his term, down from 4.19 percent under the predecessor government. Defense spending equalled on average 16.0 percent of public sector outlays under García, compared to 18.6 percent under Belaúnde.[46] The García government kept officers' salaries at modest levels and cut back on big ticket items, for example, canceling an order of twenty-six Mirage 2000 fighter jets from France.[47]

García's ability to stand firm against the military rested on his popularity. The return to growth and the increase in real incomes that many Peruvians experienced in the first two years of the administration reinforced his electoral mandate. Until early 1987, García received high approval ratings. But his populist support was fickle. With the reemergence of serious economic problems in 1987 and the advance of the Shining Path in the late 1980s, his popularity plummeted.[48] García therefore lost the upper hand he had previously enjoyed vis-à-vis the military. The government's reaction to another massacre (at Cayara) reflected this changing balance of power. García did not even attempt to cashier the commanders under whom the atrocities took place, as he had done earlier in his term.[49] Thus, the government's inability to resolve Peru's ever more se-

[43] Ibid., 111.

[44] Obando, "El Poder," articulates this perspective.

[45] Cynthia McClintock, "The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a 'Least Likely' Case: Peru," *Comparative Politics* 21 (January 1989): 134.

[46] Scheetz, "Military Expenditures," tables 4 and 5.

[47] McClintock, "Prospects," 134.

[48] On García's changing popularity over time, see Crabtree, *Peru*, 159.

[49] Ibid., 204.

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vere economic and political crisis, and the resulting plunge in support for the president, caused a reversal of the earlier trend towards a reduction of military autonomy and influence.

The Presidency of Alberto Fujimori

The failure of Peru's weak parties and enfeebled state to meet the simultaneous challenges of a severe economic crisis and powerful guerrilla insurgency led to the victory of political outsider Alberto Fujimori in 1990.[50] In April 1992, President Fujimori derailed democracy in a coup by his own hand. Hard-pressed by profound political and economic problems, a large majority of Peruvians supported him.[51] Lacking organized party backing, Fujimori looked to a small number of civilian technocrats and the military to support his effort to rebuild the Peruvian state.[52] Notably, the president sought out the military as a power base, not vice versa.[53]

As regards the legal structure of decision making in the defense sector, Fujimori has not reversed or diminished much of what García achieved to extend civilian control.[54] Yet military autonomy has expanded with respect to counterinsurgency. Decrees issued by Fujimori extended the authority of local army commanders beyond policing functions to all government activities in the emergency zones, which cover extensive areas of the country, and gave military units the right to enter prisons and universities, strongholds of the Shining Path.[55]

How did the invocation of military power affect Fujimori's standing with the Peruvian public? Certainly, his government has made considerable progress in overcoming the economic crisis and combatting the guerrilla insurgency. These achievements gave Fujimori clout to lobby for a constitutional change allowing for immediate presidential reelection, which he won in April 1995 with

[50] On Fujimori's rise, see Carlos Iván Degregori and Romeo Grompone, *Elecciones 1990: Demonios y Redentores en el Nuevo Perú* (Lima: IEP, 1991).

[51] After the April 1992 coup, Fujimori achieved an approval rating of 60 percent or higher. IMASEN, *IMASEN Confidencial* 17 (January 1994): 13. See Catherine Conaghan, "Polls, Political Discourse, and the Public Sphere" in Peter H. Smith, ed., *Latin America in Comparative Perspective* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), 227–255.

[52] See Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions, and the Neoliberal *Autogolpe* in Peru," *Latin American Research Review* 30 (1995): 7–37.

[53] Cynthia McClintock, "The Breakdown of Constitutional Democracy in Peru" (paper for XVIII Congress, Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, 10–12 March 1994), 1. In fact, many institutionalist officers have objected fiercely to the politicization of the institution that has accompanied Fujimori's use of the military as a power base. See "Las Heridas del Ejército Peruano," *Quehacer* 81 (January–February 1993): 8–15; and Enrique Obando, "Fujimori and the Military," *Report on the Americas* 30 (July–August 1996): 31–36.

[54] Obando, "Poder," 82.

[55] On the rise of military power under the Fujimori government, see Carlos Iván Degregori and Carlos Rivera, "Perú 1980–1993: Fuerzas Armadas, Subversión y Democracia," Documento de Trabajo 53 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1994), 14–22.

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nearly 64 percent of the vote. But reliance on the military as a foundation of personal rule has also entailed political costs. Many of Peru's more politically articulate citizens are uneasy with the autocratic tendencies of the Fujimori government. Public reaction to the government's handling of a high-profile human-rights case, La Cantuta, reflected concern about the degree of military impunity that has prevailed since the 1992 coup. This case involved a secret military court's decision in February 1994 to exonerate the armed forces high command and mete out lenient sentences to the soldiers found guilty of executing nine university students and a lecturer in July 1992.[56] In September 1994, 48 percent of poll respondents criticized the dictatorial nature of the government.[57] Popular protests over the government's decision of June 1995 to give amnesty to violators of human rights indicated further disquiet. The amnesty decision sparked the biggest antigovernment demonstration in years and reduced Fujimori's popularity from 76 percent to (a still high) 68 percent between 12 and 17 June.[58]

President Fujimori's heavy reliance on the military has also strained relations between Peru and the international community. Heavily criticized for his coup of April 1992, the president has faced persistent pressure from foreign governments on the human rights front. Fujimori was caught off guard by the energetic condemnation of the coup by the United States, countries of the European Economic Community, and the Organization of American States (OAS). As early as mid May 1992, he promised in front of the assembly of the OAS to take steps to return the country to democracy.[59] Indeed, Fujimori stands "between the sword and the wall": He faces an army command whose members insist that "excesses" are inevitable in a war against internal subversion, yet he must minimize human-rights abuses to receive the financial aid necessary for sustaining the economic improvements so crucial for maintaining his standing with the electorate.

While Fujimori has granted the military greater autonomy in the struggle against insurgency, it should be borne in mind that "the Peruvian military retains less power and privilege than it did 20 years ago . . ." and that "[t]oday, the military refrains from interfering in non-military aspects of the state's affairs."[60] Furthermore, Fujimori has kept the armed forces under relatively tight personal control overall. Drawing on his intelligence connections, Fujimori's ad-

[56] In the month between the beginning and end of the trials, Fujimori's approval rating fell from 63.8 percent to 54.3 percent. No other event occurred in this period. See "Soldiers Sentenced in Cantuta Case," *Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR)*, 3 March 1994, 86–87.

[57] Quoted in "Pérez de Cuellar Joins the Race," *Latin American Regional Reports-Andean Group*, 13 October 1994, 6–7.

[58] "Amnesty Law Causes Uproar," *LAWR*, 29 June 1995, 287; "Protests Grow against Amnesty," *LAWR*, 6 July 1995, 298.

[59] See Fernando Rospigliosi, "Las Fuerzas Armadas y el 5 de Abril," Documento de Trabajo 73 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1996), 43–51.

[60] Obando, "Fujimori and the Military," 36.

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viser Vladimiro Montesinos has helped the president subordinate the military to his will. While less concerned than President García to confine the military's sphere of influence, Fujimori seems to have much more actual influence over the military than his predecessors. At present, the armed forces are subject to considerable civilian control, but this control is vested in Fujimori as an individual, not in the presidency as an institution. Whether it can outlast the incumbent is therefore unclear.

Since 1980, Peru has gone from Belaúnde, who did little to actively rein in the armed forces, to García, who took bold steps to reduce their autonomy, to Fujimori, who has used them as a foundation of personal rule. This variation cannot be explained by the terms of Peru's transition away from authoritarian rule or the military prerogatives in existence at the outset of democracy. Once again, the modes-of-transition framework provides little leverage. The electoral-dynamic hypothesis fares better. Especially after the first postauthoritarian government, electoral institutions and the incentives and constraints they created were paramount in shaping presidential conduct toward the military. Alan García wanted nothing to come between himself and the electorate. He, therefore, had an incentive and, based on his massive electoral mandate, the power to push back the military.

Yet García only succeeded in subordinating the armed forces as long as he managed to keep Peru's economic and political crisis under control. His populist tactics, made possible by Peru's weak party system, soon backfired and exacerbated the problems facing the country. The drastic deterioration at the end of his term reversed the earlier trend toward the diminution of military influence. The collapse of the economy, the large-scale guerrilla threat, and the self-destruction of Peru's political parties led Fujimori to knock on the barracks' door.

A comparison between the García and Fujimori governments thus shows that weak political institutions, especially undisciplined parties, cut both ways: under noncrisis conditions they generate especially strong incentives for electoral politicians to downgrade military influence. Yet because such inchoate systems are also highly prone to political and economic instability, politicians may soon face the irresistible temptation to rely on the armed forces for support.

Conclusion

Figure 1 constitutes a rough graphic depiction of the changing status of the armed forces in the post-authoritarian contexts of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. For simplification's sake, it refers to "levels" of military influence. This shorthand label encompasses the range of issues in which the armed forces interfere, the amount of influence they have on these issues, and the status of their formal prerogatives. What conclusions can be drawn?

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FIGURE 1
Political Influence of the Armed Forces



The preceding analysis confirms the general downward trend of military influence under democracy that also prevailed in the Brazilian case. Most of the time, the electoral competition unleashed by democratization reduces the formal prerogatives of the armed forces, the scope of issues in which they intervene, and the degree of influence they have on these matters. This finding corroborates the basic thrust of the electoral-dynamic hypothesis and diverges from the fundamental claim of the modes-of-transition argument. Contrary to the continuity expected by that argument, change tends to prevail under democracy.

Peru since the late 1980s constitutes the only exception to this trend of reduced military power. The armed forces have gained autonomy and influence since the second half of President García's term. Until then, civil-military relations in Peru had followed the general regional trend. But the depth of the economic crisis and the unparalleled violence wrought by the Shining Path weakened civilian politicians and led the government to give the military a freer hand. Alberto Fujimori's self-coup increased their clout further. Yet since the Fujimori government has contained the guerrilla threat and tried to relegitimate itself through new elections, pressures to reduce the military's role in politics will probably arise again.

In contemporary Latin America, the natural tendency under stable democracy is for civilian power to extend. Only a fundamental challenge to the established sociopolitical order prompts politicians to sacrifice their immediate competitive interests and allow military power to expand. Given the collapse of communism on a world scale and the rarity of large-scale insurgency in Latin

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America, such a threat is unlikely to emerge in most of the region today. There is good reason to expect that the dynamic of democracy will soon reduce the military's stature in Peru, too.

As the contrast between Peru's and Chile's new democracies suggests, political institutions shape electoral competition and condition the ways in which civilian politicians diminish the political clout of the armed forces. Where political parties are weak, as in Peru, politicians engage in fierce competition that disregards collective interests such as economic and political stability. Where a severe crisis results, a backlash and political reassertion of the armed forces can follow a drastic initial reduction in military influence. By contrast, where political parties are strong, they restrain electoral competition and attend to over-arching goals as well. As a result, politicians are more prudent in contesting the military. The political clout of the armed forces, therefore, diminishes more gradually, but the risk of a backlash is lower. Thus, institutional structures, especially the strength of political parties, modulate the reduction of military influence under democracy.

While disconfirmed in its expectation of continuity, the modes-of-transition argument makes a contribution by helping to account for the starting point of the reduction in military influence under democracy. In the short to medium run, the terms of the transition from authoritarianism are an important determinant of this downward trend. For instance, the Chilean armed forces continue to enjoy higher standing than their Argentine counterparts. This accords with the relative status of the two militaries at the inception of democracy. However, initial institutional constraints do not create permanent limits to the expansion of democracy. Even where the terms of the regime transition were highly advantageous to the military, as in Chile, civilians have managed to reduce the institution's influence and prerogatives. Over time, electoral competition induced and allowed politicians to contest the military even in this least-likely case. The more distant the transition from authoritarianism becomes, the less the armed forces' standing at the outset of democracy shapes the civil-military balance. Factors other than the initial strength of the armed forces gain importance. For instance, the strength of civilian institutions and the impressive governing capabilities they confer on Chilean politicians will help civilians overcome the disadvantages they faced with respect to the military at the outset of the democratic regime, perhaps even allowing them to eventually surpass levels of civilian clout attained elsewhere.

The dynamic and expansive view of democracy advanced in this article departs from the emphasis in the transitions literature on the limits that the military imposes on democracy. My findings underscore instead the limits that democracy places on the military. In his famous analysis of the first modern democracy, the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville depicted the advance of democracy as irresistible. Democracy itself would reinforce the passion for political and civic equality, one of democracy's basic principles, which would spread to ever new spheres of life and erode the privileges of the old ranks and

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orders.[61] That the advance of democracy will be equally unstoppable in Latin America—a region suffering from entrenched inequalities as well as crises of development—is doubtful. Yet as this article shows, democracy has a tendency to expand even in this unfavorable context. If democracy remains a minimally viable system of governance, the competitive dynamic it unleashes can be expected to drive the military to retreat further before an advancing civil and political society.*

[61] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Phillips Bradley, ed. (New York: Vintage, 1945), vol. 1, chaps. iv and xv, and vol. 2, second book, chap. 1, and fourth book, chap. 1.

* I am grateful to Kurt Weyland for his help with this article.

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Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and the Ending of the Cold War

BETH A. FISCHER

The debate over the causes of the cold war's demise is currently raging. Given that scholars are still debating the origins of the cold war, forty-five years after its inception, it is likely that the controversy surrounding its death will continue for some time. This article tries to contribute to the debate by focusing on U.S. Soviet policy at the very beginning of the cold war's demise—the years just before Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union. Its aim is to challenge widely held assumptions about the Reagan administration's role in bringing about the end of the cold war.

The cold war began to draw to a close during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. During the mid-1980s U.S.–Soviet relations began to shift from cold war antagonism toward a rapprochement. Conventional wisdom holds that the United States played a reactionary role in bringing the cold war to an end. Gorbachev's unique outlook and style caused Washington to soften its hardline, so this argument goes, and ultimately led to improved relations between the superpowers. As one scholar has argued: "The . . . milieu of East-West relations profoundly changed . . . largely because Mikhail Gorbachev changed the 'reality' of East-West relations by setting into motion fundamental reforms in the domestic structure of the Soviet Union and by introducing a radical reconceptualization of the Soviet approach to international relations."[1] In short, the conventional view is that the Reagan administration merely responded to Gorbachev's revolutionary approach to international relations.

[1] Alexander George, "The Transition in US-Soviet Relations, 1981–1990: An Interpretation from the Perspective of International Relations Theory and Political Psychology," *Political Psychology* 12 (September 1991): 471. See also John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), 347–50.

BETH A. FISCHER is assistant professor of political science at the University of Toronto. She is the author of the forthcoming book, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War.*

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This article challenges the assumption that American policy became more conciliatory only in response to changes in Soviet policy. I will argue that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union actually became more conciliatory in January 1984. This was fifteen months before Gorbachev became general secretary of the USSR and more than two years before the introduction of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring). The Reagan administration, therefore, did not play a merely passive role in bringing the cold war to an end.

I will begin by reviewing U.S. Soviet policy between 1981 and 1983, paying particular attention to an October 1983 speech by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, which epitomized the administration's early position toward the USSR. The focus will then shift to an address on U.S.–Soviet relations that President Reagan delivered on 16 January 1984. With this address Washington began to take a more conciliatory approach toward Moscow. In order to demonstrate that Reagan introduced lasting changes into American foreign policy, I will then examine U.S. Soviet policy through 1985. The article will conclude with an analysis of the Geneva summit meeting. Although many view this meeting as the beginning of the cold war's demise, I argue that it was actually the culmination of policies Reagan had introduced nearly two years earlier.

U.S. Soviet Policy, 1981–1983

Primary Threats to the United States

The Reagan administration believed the Soviet Union threatened U.S. security in two distinct but related ways. First, Washington charged that Soviet "expansionism" and "interventionism" threatened world peace. Reagan officials asserted that the Kremlin "promoted violent change" throughout the globe, especially in areas of "vital interest to the West."[2] "Moscow is the greatest source of international insecurity today," Secretary of State Alexander Haig declared shortly after taking office. "Soviet promotion of violence as the instrument of change constitutes the greatest danger to world peace."[3] In 1983 Haig's successor, George Shultz, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Soviet expansionism continued to be one of the greatest perils to global stability. Through its imperialistic behavior the Soviets had "needlessly drawn more and more international problems into the East-West rivalry," Shultz charged. Moscow's "unconstructive involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World," and its "unrelenting efforts to impose an alien Soviet 'model'" on foreign countries threatened American security. Shultz urged the committee: "We have to make clear that we will resist encroachments on our vital

[2] Alexander Haig, "A Strategic Approach to American Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2054 (11 August 1981): 11.

[3] Alexander Haig, "A New Direction in US Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2051 (24 April 1981): 6.

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TABLE 1

The Reagan Administration's Soviet Policy, 1981–1985

	1981–1983	*1984–1985*
Perceived primary threats	Soviet expansionism Soviet military strength	War Misunderstanding
Goals of U.S. Soviet policy	Soviet restraint Soviet reciprocity	Cooperation Understanding
Strategies	Linkage Rebuild U.S. military strength Low priority for arms control	Superpower dialogue Emphasize need for global arms reduction

interests and those of our allies and friends. . . . We have to insure that those who have a positive alternative to the Soviet model receive our support."[4]

The Reagan administration also believed that the Soviet Union's military strength threatened American security. U.S. officials maintained that the Kremlin had been engaging in an "unremitting and comprehensive military buildup" since the mid-1960s.[5] The Soviets had been devoting an increasing percentage of their gross national product (GNP) to military expenditures, the White House charged, using these resources to both expand and modernize its arsenal.[6] The administration also maintained that the Soviet military buildup was for offensive purposes. "The Soviet Union has been engaged in the greatest military buildup in the history of man," Reagan asserted in August 1981, "and it cannot be described as necessary for their defense. It is plainly a buildup that is offensive in nature."[7] Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger agreed, cautioning that "it was neither reasonable nor prudent to view the Soviet military buildup as defensive in nature."[8] Moscow's military buildup posed a threat not only because of the sheer size of the Soviet arsenal, but also because of intent behind it.

Moreover, the Reagan administration asserted that while the Soviets had been building up in the 1970s, the West had been unilaterally disarming. This had resulted in a dangerous military imbalance. According to Reagan, the

[4] George Shultz, "US-Soviet Relations in the Context of US Foreign Policy," *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1983* (15 June 1983): 509–10.

[5] Ronald Reagan, Letter to President Leonid Brezhnev, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2056 (22 September 1981): 52.

[6] Among others, see Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Press Club, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (18 November 1981): 1275.

[7] Ronald Reagan, Remarks at Rancho del Cielo, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (11 August 1981): 874.

[8] "Excerpts from Weinberger Statement on Military Budget Outlay," *New York Times*, 5 March 1981.

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United States was militarily inferior to the USSR. "The truth of the matter is that on balance, the Soviet Union does have a definite margin of superiority," the president declared in 1982, "enough so that there is risk and there is what I have called . . . 'a window of vulnerability.'"[9]

Goals of U.S. Soviet Policy

The Reagan administration formed its policy goals in response to these perceived threats. Washington sought "Soviet restraint and Soviet reciprocity" in international relations.[10] "Restraint" entailed an end to Soviet interventionism. The administration required "the Soviet Union [to] cease and desist from instigating, supporting, and carrying out efforts to effect historic change by force, whether it be done through proxy or the direct involvement of Soviet forces. . . ."[11]

"Reciprocity" was a more nebulous demand. At times it pertained to the making and fulfilling of international agreements. "What do we want of the Soviet Union?" Haig asked in the summer of 1981. "We want greater Soviet restraint on the use of force. We want greater Soviet respect for the independence of others. And we want the Soviets to abide by their reciprocal obligations, such as those undertaken in the Helsinki accords."[12]

At other times "reciprocity" implied cutbacks in the Soviet military arsenal. "We hope [the Soviets] move from an excessive reliance on expenditures for military purposes to those which are designed to . . . meet the needs of the Russian people and the non-Russian populations in the Soviet Union," Haig told journalists in 1981. "This would increasingly make the policies of the Soviet Union more compatible with the world view I talked about: restraint, reciprocity, acceptance of historic change by rule of law and not by force of arms."[13]

Strategies

During its first three years in office, the Reagan administration implemented a three-pronged strategy for achieving Soviet restraint and reciprocity.

[9] Ronald Reagan, News Conference, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (31 March 1982): 411.

[10] Among others, see Haig, "A New Direction," *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2051 (24 April 1981): 6; Overview of Recent Foreign Policy, *Department of State Bulletin* 82:2058 (12 November 1981): 16; Reagan, Letter to Brezhnev, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2056 (22 September 1981): 52; William Clark, "President Reagan's Framework for Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 82:2069 (29 October 1982): 33–4; and Lawrence Eagleburger, "Review of US Relations with the Soviet Union," *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1983* (1 February 1983): 499–504.

[11] Alexander Haig, News Conference in Manila, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2053 (20 June 1981): 42.

[12] Haig, "A Strategic Approach," 12.

[13] Alexander Haig, Interview with *The Wall Street Journal*, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2054 (9 July 1981): 25.

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Linkage. First, the administration maintained that an improvement in superpower relations was contingent upon a change in Soviet behavior. If Moscow did not demonstrate restraint and reciprocity, Reagan officials asserted, the United States would insure that there would be no improvements in East-West relations. "The most persistent troubles in U.S.–Soviet relations arise from Soviet intervention in regional conflicts, aggravating tensions, and hampering the search for peaceful solutions," Secretary Haig asserted in 1981. "Unless we can come to grips with this dimension of Soviet behavior, everything else in our bilateral relationship will be undermined. . . ."[14]

The Reagan administration initially linked three issues to Soviet international behavior. The first was East-West trade. Washington would restrict American exports and financial assistance to the USSR if the Kremlin continued its "imperialist" activities abroad. National Security Adviser William Clark declared in late 1982: "For as long as the Soviet Union continues to . . . divert its resources into a massive military buildup, the United States—at a minimum—will not contribute to that process by providing the technology, hardware, or credits to make these Soviet tasks easier."[15]

Reagan officials also made summit meetings contingent upon Soviet behavior. In March 1981, Walter Cronkite asked President Reagan whether he was planning to hold a summit meeting with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The president indicated that certain preconditions had to be met first. "I think that it would help bring about such a meeting if the Soviet Union revealed that it is willing to moderate its imperialism; its aggression [against] Afghanistan would be an example," Reagan explained. "We could talk a lot better if there was some indication that they truly wanted to be a member of the peace-loving nations of the world, the free world. . . ."[16] During a 1981 press conference Haig remarked, "[L]inkage is a prevailing concept in the administration, and . . . talks—the pace, the scope, and the level of them—will be determined by corresponding Soviet international behavior in the broadest sense of the term—that's the American policy."[17]

The White House placed a multitude of other stipulations on the talks, suggesting that the administration sought to avoid such meetings. For instance, the administration asserted that the president would only participate if the talks served a "real purpose" and entailed "legitimate negotiations."[18] Reagan also repeatedly asserted that he could not accept a summit invitation without con-

[14] Haig, "A Strategic Approach."

[15] Clark, "Framework for Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 82:2069 (29 October 1982): 33–4.

[16] Ronald Reagan, Interview with Walter Cronkite, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2049 (3 March 1981): 9–10.

[17] Bernard Gwertzman, "US Likely to Defer Meeting with Soviets on Control of Arms," *New York Times*, 2 March 1981.

[18] Ronald Reagan, "Program for Economic Recovery and US-Soviet Relations," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (24 February 1981): 182–3. See also Alexander Haig, Interview with Ken Sparks, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2051 (16 March 1981): 24.

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sulting American allies first. "The main thing is that you don't just call up and say: 'Yes, let's get together and have lunch,'" the president reasoned. "A summit meeting of that kind takes a lot of preparation and the first preparation from our standpoint is the pledge that we've made to our allies that we won't take unilateral steps. We'll only do things after full consultation with them because they're involved also."[19] (Reagan never indicated that he intended to engage in such consultations, however). In addition, Washington emphasized that a summit meeting could not take place without extensive negotiating beforehand. Such a conference must be "carefully planned," the president insisted. "And an agenda must be set, and that begins with a foreign ministers meeting."[20] Haig maintained that there was so much preparatory work involved in a summit meeting that they "should only be used most sparingly." As a result of all these factors, the administration rejected summit invitations from both Brezhnev and his successor, Yuri Andropov.

Finally, the Reagan administration also initially tied arms control talks to Soviet international behavior. In April 1981, Haig asserted that it would serve "no useful purpose" to engage in any arms talks with the Soviets while they continued their "imperialist activities abroad."[21] Later that year the secretary explained, "We have learned that Soviet-American agreements, even in strategic arms control, will not survive Soviet threats to the overall military balance or Soviet encroachment upon our strategic interests in critical regions of the world. Linkage is not a theory; it is a fact of life."[22]

In the spring of 1982, however, the administration effectively decoupled arms talks from Soviet international behavior. In May, Reagan announced that a new round of arms negotiations, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), would begin the following month.[23] In making this announcement the president did not indicate that the Soviets had satisfied any of the preconditions that he had initially established. This led some to suggest that "linkage was dead."[24] This was an overstatement, however. It is more precise to view the president's call for arms talks as a narrowing in linkage's scope. Although arms talks were no longer beholden to a change in Soviet behavior, East-West trade and summits remained so.

Revitalization of U.S. military strength. The second element in the Reagan administration's strategy for achieving Soviet restraint and reciprocity was an

[19] Reagan, Interview with Cronkite.

[20] Reagan, News Conference, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (28 July 1982): 966.

[21] Alexander Haig, "Relationship of Foreign and Defense Policies," *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2054 (30 July 1981): 18; and Interview with Sparks, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2051 (16 March 1981): 24–25.

[22] Haig, "A Strategic Approach."

[23] Ronald Reagan, Commencement Address at Eureka College, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (9 May 1982): 603.

[24] For speculation on the end of linkage see Bernard Gwertzman, "Major Shift by Reagan," *New York Times*, 10 May 1982; Reagan, Interview, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (21 May 1982): 715–716; and Comments on Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (24 May 1982): 689–690.

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American military buildup. Believing that the USSR had military superiority and that Moscow was building up for offensive purposes, the administration sought to revitalize U.S. military strength. Reagan officials sought military parity and instituted three programs toward this end.

First, they initiated a military modernization program. In March 1981, the White House proposed the largest peacetime military budget in U.S. history. The Reagan administration advocated spending $222.8 billion on the American military in 1983, an increase of $33.8 billion. The president also proposed to increase defense spending by approximately 7 percent per year between 1981 and 1985, totalling over one trillion dollars. Defense expenditures would consume more than 30 percent of the federal budget over the next four years.[25] The administration planned to use these resources to strengthen the American military posture in four primary areas: strategic forces, combat readiness, force mobility, and general purpose forces.

Second, in March 1983 President Reagan initiated the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program. Believing that Moscow was building up for offensive reasons, the president sought to develop a defense against a Soviet nuclear attack. SDI would serve as a shield to protect Americans from incoming Soviet missiles. This shield would in effect mitigate the Soviet Union's military superiority over the United States.

The Reagan administration also decided to honor a 1979 NATO decision that called for the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe. This "dual track decision" as the NATO agreement came to be known, had been made in response to the Soviet deployment of mobile SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe. It called for the NATO allies to pursue arms limitation talks with the Warsaw Pact in order to reduce the SS-20 threat. At the same time, however, the United States would deploy intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe to counterbalance the Soviet SS-20s. The deployment of these missiles was scheduled to begin in 1983.

The low priority of arms control. The Reagan administration's emphasis on the need to match Soviet military capabilities relegated arms control issues to the sidelines. "Arms control is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.–Soviet relations," Haig asserted in the summer of 1981. "The centerpiece must be what contributes to the security of the American people, to international peace and stability. . . ."[26]

Because it sought to strengthen American military capabilities, the Reagan administration was reluctant to enter into any arms talks that might constrict its buildup. In March 1981, the president postponed "for a month or two" a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) meeting that would have been the first U.S.–Soviet meeting on arms control since he took office. Since there had

[25] Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38B Increase in Military Outlays," *New York Times*, 5 March 1981; William M. Kaufmann, *A Reasonable Defense* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 25; Ronald Reagan, Remarks at Dinner for the Conservative Political Action Conference, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 18 (26 February 1982): 237.

[26] Haig, Appearance on ABC's "Issues and Answers," *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2054 (19 July 1981): 24.

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only been one postponement of a SCC meeting since 1972, and then only for two days, this move was highly symbolic and set the tone for early arms control relations.[27] Negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) did not begin until 30 November 1981, while talks on strategic arms did not commence until the summer of 1982.

Reagan also initially rejected the unratified Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) as "fatally flawed." Rather than encouraging Soviet restraint and reciprocity, he argued, the agreement bolstered the military imbalance. Reagan charged that SALT II "allowed the Soviet Union to just about double their present nuclear capacity." Moreover, verification was dubious.[28] Because of allied and domestic pressure, however, the administration did ultimately decide to abide by the terms of the treaty.

Dissatisfied with the SALT process and under pressure to show a commitment to arms control, Reagan proposed a new series of arms negotiations, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Although Reagan proposed the START talks in November 1981, he declined to begin the negotiations until June 1982. Reagan unveiled the U.S. negotiating position for the START talks during a speech in Eureka, Illinois. The proposals were hardly equitable. The president proposed that land- and sea-based warheads should be reduced to the same number of each side, and of that amount no more than 2,500 missiles could be land-based.[29] Since the Soviets had about 5,500 land-based warheads and the United States only 2,152, this plan required Moscow to destroy over half its arsenal while Washington could continue to build up. Moreover, Moscow relied primarily on its land-based missiles for its deterrent. Reducing them by half would have assuredly weakened its position vis-à-vis the West.[30]

In November 1981, Reagan also proposed a new arms reduction plan, the so-called zero option. This proposal called for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe.[31] Since the Soviets were the only ones who had such weapons in Europe at the time, this too was a rather inequitable proposal. (While NATO did have plans to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe, deployment was not scheduled to begin for two years.) Administration officials privately acknowledged that they knew Moscow would reject this plan, since it required much more of the Kremlin than it did of the West. As expected, the Soviets rejected the offer, calling it a "propaganda ploy."[32]

[27] Bernard Gwertzman, "US Likely to Defer Meeting with Soviets on Control of Arms," *New York Times*, 2 March 1981.

[28] Ronald Reagan, News Conference, *Department of State Bulletin* 81:2048 (29 January 1981): 12; and Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Willing to Broaden Talks on Nuclear Arms," *New York Times*, 14 May 1982.

[29] Reagan, Eureka College.

[30] Bernard Gwertzman, "Major Shift by Reagan," *New York Times*, 10 May 1982. Seventy percent of all Soviet strategic missiles were land-based. John L. Gaddis, "The Reagan Administration and Soviet-American Relations" in D. E. Kyvig, ed., *Reagan and the World* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 21.

[31] Ronald Reagan, "Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 17 (18 November 1981): 1273.

[32] Leslie Gelb, "Reagan to Propose Missile Terms," *New York Times*, 17 November 1981; "Reagan's Arms Proposal Assailed, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 33, 1981, 7.

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The zero option and the Eureka proposal were distinctly one-sided plans. Washington made little effort to address Soviet concerns or to offer proposals that Moscow could find remotely acceptable. This strongly suggested that the Reagan administration was not genuinely interested in arms control. As a result, rather than facilitating negotiations, these proposals stymied the arms control process.

In sum, the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was highly confrontational from 1981 through 1983. The Reagan administration perceived Moscow to be the primary threat to American security. Consequently, Washington demanded significant changes in Soviet behavior. It offered little in return, however. Rather than enticing the Soviets to change their policies with promises of improved relations, Washington sought to penalize the Kremlin. Relations would not improve until Moscow conformed.

Deputy Secretary Dam's Speech

On 31 October 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam delivered a speech on U.S.–Soviet relations that epitomized the administration's position since it had taken office. The occasion for the speech was the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.[33] Dam used the speech both to assess the superpower relationship and to offer some thoughts for the future. He spoke at length about Soviet interventionism and the threat it posed to global security. The United States, he said, had "heightened concerns" about the Soviets' "increasingly disruptive international behavior over the past decade." Dam then catalogued some perceived Soviet transgressions.

> In recent years we have seen . . . the Soviet Union's direct military intervention into Afghanistan; its strengthened economic and military involvement with such regional powers as Cuba and Vietnam and its active support for the occupation of Kampuchea; deployment of over 20,000 . . . military personnel in more than 30 Third World countries, . . . [and] its extensive use of surrogate forces—some 40,000 Cuban military personnel are in Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America, not to mention Grenada.

Dam also asserted that the USSR was "the largest arms exporter to the Third World and the principal supplier of over 34 states, twice as many as a decade ago."

As was frequently the case for Reagan officials, the deputy secretary devoted a significant portion of his speech to the Soviet military buildup. He charged that the Kremlin had been devoting increasingly larger percentages of its GNP to the development of weaponry. "The Soviet military sector has first claim on raw materials, transportation resources, personnel, and capital equip-

[33] All quotations from Dam's 31 October 1983 speech are from Kenneth W. Dam, "Challenges of US-Soviet Relations at the 50-Year Mark," *Department of State Bulletin* 83:2081 (31 October 1983): 26–30.

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ment," Dam insisted. "More than one third of all Soviet machinery output now goes to the military and about one half of all research and development expenditures are for military applications." This "military machine," as he called it, caused a deterioration in Soviet citizens' quality of life by siphoning off resources which could have gone into the production of consumer goods.

Dam also spent considerable time detailing the perceived imbalance in military arsenals.

> Over the past decade . . . the Soviets have manufactured approximately 2,000 new intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]; by comparison, the United States built approximately 350 during the same time. The Soviets built 54,000 new tanks and armored vehicles; US production was 11,000. The Soviet Union turned out 6,000 tactical combat aircraft; the United States, 3,000; the Soviets launched 61 attack submarines; the United States, 27.

The Soviets had also "dramatically" improved the quality of their weapons, he asserted.

Because Dam believed the United States had to engage in a military buildup in order to match Soviet strength, he did not call for arms control. Instead, he said he was pessimistic about the future of the arms control process because of repeated "Soviet efforts to stretch treaties and obligations to their very brink and sometimes beyond."

In response to the twin threats of the Soviet military buildup and Soviet expansionism, Dam called for Soviet restraint and reciprocity. The West should "strive to create an environment in which the Soviet Union is faced with . . . drastically reduced opportunities and incentives for adventurism and intimidation,"he argued. "In such an environment we expect that over time the Soviets will see greater restraint on their part as the most attractive option. . . ."

The deputy secretary also declared that progress in a variety of issue areas would be dependent upon a change in Soviet international behavior. Moscow would have to abandon its military buildup, its expansionism, and its "quest for absolute security" in order for relations to improve. Dam acknowledged that there were a number of "modest developments" in the superpower relationship during the summer of 1983, such as the signing of a long-term grain agreement, but he played down their significance. "Contrary to some press speculation," he remarked, "[these modest steps] did not constitute a sudden warming in the relationship, nor were they a prelude to an early summit meeting. . . . The Soviets have not yet responded in any way to reduce tensions." For Dam, the future was bleak. "We are now in a period of uncertainty as to the immediate future of U.S.–Soviet relations," he observed. "We should be wary of illusions about the possibility of quick or dramatic breakthroughs."

U.S. Soviet Policy, 1984–1985

President Reagan's Address, 16 January 1984

Ten weeks after Dam's speech, Reagan delivered an address on U.S.–Soviet relations that introduced striking changes in U.S. Soviet policy. Broadcast

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around the globe, Reagan's 16 January declaration unveiled a significant shift in the administration's understanding of the primary threats to U.S. security. Consequently, Washington's policy goals and strategies also changed. These changes remained in effect through the end of the Reagan presidency.[34]

Primary Threats to the United States

In his speech, Reagan did not argue that the Soviets' expansionism and military buildup were the primary threats to American security. Rather, the president emphasized the threat of war. He discussed this threat in general terms, without pinning it to any one country. "Reducing the risk of war—and especially nuclear war—is priority number one," he declared. "A nuclear conflict could well be mankind's last." Because of the "vast stockpiles of arms in the world" there was an increased likelihood that political disagreements would evolve into armed conflict. This endangered global security, Reagan suggested. Remarkably, the president contended that both the United States and the Soviet Union faced the same perils. "Today our common enemies are poverty, disease, and above all, war," he intoned.

The president also spoke of "dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations," which threatened American security. Reagan was rather ambiguous regarding the exact nature of these "misunderstandings," but he suggested they were related to the threat of war. The "gap in Soviet and American perceptions" of international affairs was "so great," he asserted, that the likelihood of conflict was increased. The president argued that the United States needed to reduce not only nuclear arsenals, but the chances for misunderstanding as well.

Goals of U.S. Soviet Policy

In his 16 January address, Reagan introduced new goals for the superpower relationship. No longer did the United States seek Soviet restraint and reciprocity. Instead, Washington sought a rapprochement. "We must establish a better working relationship," he declared, "one marked by greater cooperation and understanding." Cooperation and understanding would mitigate the chances of war. The superpowers should "rise to the challenges facing us and seize opportunities for peace," the president asserted. "We need to find ways to reduce—and eventually eliminate—the threat and use of force in solving international disputes . . . [O]ur governments should jointly examine concrete actions we both can take to reduce the risk of U.S.–Soviet confrontation [throughout the world]. . . . [A] Durable peace requires ways for both of us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts."

[34] All quotations from Reagan's 16 January 1984 speech are from Ronald Reagan, "The US-Soviet Relationship," *Department of State Bulletin* 84:2083 (16 January 1984): 1–4.

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Reagan's call for cooperation and understanding redefined the American approach to superpower relations in two important ways. First, these changes represented a movement away from the Reagan administration's earlier confrontational posture toward the Kremlin. The White House no longer demanded that Soviet behavior conform to American standards. Washington's focus shifted from attempting to change Soviet policy to the need to peacefully resolve international problems. Second, the administration's calls for cooperation in solving international conflicts implied that Washington had accepted the Soviet Union as a superpower and an equal. This was a significant shift from the administration's earlier posture, which, by demanding changes in Soviet international behavior, implied that the USSR was subordinate to the United States.

Strategies

President Reagan sought to facilitate cooperation and understanding between the superpowers in two ways: by encouraging dialogue and by placing greater emphasis on arms reduction.

Superpower dialogue. In his 16 January address, Reagan called for the institutionalization of superpower dialogue. "We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as constructive as possible," declared the only president in forty years never to have met his Soviet counterpart. "[H]igh level consultations [should] become a regular and normal component of U.S.–Soviet relations." Notably, the president did not link these talks to changes in Soviet international behavior. This directly contradicted the Reagan administration's earlier position toward summit meetings.

Reagan suggested that dialogue would rectify misunderstandings between the superpowers. Mutual understanding, in turn, would foster cooperation. "We seek genuine cooperation, [and] cooperation begins with communication," he intoned. Moreover, dialogue would help the two countries to avoid war. "The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason not to talk," the president reasoned. "Living in the nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk."

More emphasis on arms reduction. Whereas Deputy Secretary Dam did not discuss the need for arms reduction, the president devoted a significant portion of his address to this topic. "Nuclear arsenals are far too high," Reagan insisted. The reduction of these weapons was one of the main tasks confronting the superpowers. Moscow and Washington should join together "to stop arms races around the world."

Reagan did not offer any new arms proposals in his address, but he did emphasize the need to "accelerate our efforts to reach agreements that will greatly reduce nuclear arsenals." Reviewing his earlier call for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the president added: "Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. . . . [M]y dream is to see the day when nuclear

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TABLE 2

Comparative Content Analysis of DAM Speech and Reagan Speech (Percentage of lines referring to key issues in U.S.–Soviet Relations)

Reference	*DAM speech 31 October 1983*	*Reagan speech 16 January 1984*
Soviet military buildup	37	2
Soviet expansionism	24	3
Need for arms reduction	0	16
Common interests	0	19
Need for cooperation	0	17
Need for dialogue	1	13
Misunderstanding/ Need for understanding	0	7

weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth." Remarkably, the president devoted only two sentences to the Soviet military buildup. Unlike Dam and others before him, Reagan did not catalogue the manner in which the Soviets had been improving the quality and quantity of their nuclear weaponry. Nor did he demand that the Soviets dismantle part of their arsenal. Rather, the president focused on the high level of arms in the world and spoke of the need for global arms reduction.

It is also noteworthy that Reagan devoted only one paragraph of his speech to Soviet violations of existing arms agreements. In the past, this had been a sore issue with the administration, and numerous officials had denounced the Kremlin for "stretching treaties to the brink of violation and beyond."[35] In this address the president tread softly around the issue. "Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words," he said. "Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. . . . " Strikingly, the president suggested that the Soviet transgressions might not have been entirely willful, and indicated that some of the problems may have stemmed from "ambiguities" in the accords.[36] The fault was not with the Kremlin, Reagan implied; it was in the treaties themselves.

The manner in which President Reagan redirected U.S. Soviet policy can be seen most vividly in Table 2. This chart compares the number of lines the president devoted to specific topics in U.S.–Soviet relations during his address to the number of lines Deputy Secretary Dam devoted to the same topics ten weeks earlier.[37] The differences are striking.

[35] Shultz, "US-Soviet Relations," 509; and Dam, "Challenges of US-Soviet Relations," 28.

[36] Reagan, "The US-Soviet Relationship," 3.

[37] This analysis used the deputy secretary's speech and the president's address as published in the *Department of State Bulletin*. Therefore, the typeface and spacing is the same for both. Each line of the respective speeches was coded according to whether the speaker was referring to one of the seven

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Dam devoted nearly two-thirds of his speech to Soviet expansionism and the Soviet military buildup. President Reagan allocated a mere 5 percent of his address to these issues. Moreover, the president did not once use the terms "expansionist," "interventionist," or "adventurist," despite the fact that these were recurring phrases in earlier statements by Reagan officials.

Reagan devoted more than one-third of his address to the superpowers' common interests and to the need for Moscow and Washington to work together in order to reduce international conflicts. In October, the deputy secretary had made no such statements. Moreover, while Dam did review the administration's previous arms proposals, he did not suggest that there was an urgent need to move the arms talks process forward. President Reagan, on the other hand, devoted 16 percent of his address to the need for arms reduction.

There are also some qualitative differences between the two speeches. Dam's references to "dialogue" revolved mainly around detailing the administration's past contracts with Soviet officials. He did not indicate that there was a pressing need for dialogue. Neither did he suggest that the administration was actively pursuing dialogue with the Soviet Union. Rather, Dam simply suggested that Washington would be "open" to the idea if Moscow were to pursue it. The tone of Reagan's references to the need for dialogue was entirely different. The president asserted that there was an "imperative" need for East-West communication and implied this was a matter of utmost urgency.

President Reagan's 16 January address was not simply an aberration. Rather, he introduced lasting changes to U.S. Soviet policy. In the interest of space, this article will examine U.S. policy through the 1985 Geneva summit meeting, a conference that is usually recognized as the official beginning of the end of the cold war.

Primary Threats to U.S. Security

After January 1984, the Reagan administration spoke infrequently of the Soviet military buildup or expansionism. War, especially nuclear war, was the main threat to American security. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," the president repeatedly proclaimed.[38] Officials continually asserted that "the vast numbers of nuclear armaments in the world" rendered nuclear war more likely.[39] In November 1984, Reagan commented: "I just happen to believe that we cannot go into another generation of the world living

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themes under examination. Some lines may have referred to more than one topic and, therefore, may have been coded twice. Other lines were not coded at all because they dealt with subjects not under examination.

[38] See President Reagan's address to the Irish Parliament, *Department of State Bulletin* 84:2089 (4 June 1984): 17.

[39] See Ronald Reagan, Address to the United Nations, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* 1984 (24 September 1984): 220–7; and George Shultz, Statement at the CDE [Conference on Disarmament in Europe] in Stockholm, *Department of State Bulletin* 84:2084 (17 January 1984): 34–6.

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under the threat of those weapons and knowing that some madman can push the button some place. It doesn't have to be one of the superpowers. A war could be triggered, as nuclear weapons proliferate, by someone else doing it."[40]

The administration also continued to emphasize the dangers of misunderstandings in international relations. Shortly after the president's 16 January address, Secretary Shultz devoted an entire speech to the need to "reduce the danger of surprise attack, miscalculation, or misunderstanding" between nations. Washington sought "measures to increase openness and improve communication [in order] to provide . . . greater insurance against miscalculation," Shultz declared.[41] During an address to the United Nations later in the year the president drove home the same message. There was an urgent need to correct "miscalculations" in the superpower relationship, he argued, because they increased the "potential risk of U.S.–Soviet confrontation."[42]

Goals of U.S. Soviet Policy

Washington continued to pursue cooperation and understanding in the superpower relationship. In a 1984 speech in Stockholm, Shultz repeated the president's call for a "better working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding."[43] In a February 1984 radio address, Reagan reiterated this theme. "I emphasize once again America's desire for genuine cooperation between our two countries," he remarked. "Together we can help make the world a better, more peaceful place."[44] Seven months later, the president devoted an entire address to the United Nations to outlining "what the United States and the Soviet Union can accomplish together in the coming years."[45]

The Reagan administration also continued to treat the Soviets as colleagues rather than as subordinates. For example, in September 1984 President Reagan invited Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the White House. This was the first time Reagan had had an extended discussion with a member of the highest ranks of the Soviet leadership. By inviting Gromyko to the Oval Office, Reagan conferred a sort of legitimacy on the Soviet leadership that he had previously denied them. The president underlined this shift in his public remarks at the end of the meeting. "The United States respects the Soviet Union's status as a superpower," Reagan proclaimed, "and we have no wish to change its social system."[46]

[40] "An Interview with the President," *Time*, 19 November 1984, 36.

[41] Shultz, Statement at CDE, 34.

[42] Reagan, Address to the UN, 225.

[43] Shultz, Statement at the CDE, 35.

[44] Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1984* (11 February 1984): 413.

[45] Reagan, Address to the UN, 224.

[46] "Holding Their Ground," *Time*, 8 October 1984, 16.

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Strategies

Superpower dialogue. Throughout 1984 and 1985, the Reagan administration fervently pursued dialogue with the Kremlin. "We believe in dialogue and in solving problems. We believe in realistic and meaningful engagement with others to advance the cause of peace," Shultz declared early in 1984. "Let us . . . embark here and now upon renewed, open, and comprehensive East-West dialogue. Let us conduct ourselves in our deliberations that historians of the future will mark this . . . as a turning point in East-West relations."[47] At the February 1984 funeral of Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, Vice President George Bush repeated, "Living together in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we talk to each other, discuss our differences, and seek solutions to the problems that divide us." Bush also "conveyed the president's determination to move forward in all areas of our relationship with the Soviets, and our readiness for concrete, productive discussions."[48]

During a news conference in June 1984, the president repeated his strong desire to have a summit conference with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. "We're ready, willing, and able" to meet with the Soviet leadership, Reagan declared. "I am willing to meet and talk anytime."[49] More importantly, the president softened the preconditions in order for such a meeting to take place. Originally he had tied a conference to Soviet international behavior and had asserted that the United States would have to consult its allies before it would consent to a summit meeting. The administration had also asserted that such a meeting would have to have a specific agenda. These conditions no longer applied. Moreover, whereas the goal of a summit meeting had been to produce concrete results, such as arms agreements, the aim now was simply to gain a better understanding of each other. Reagan remarked: "I'm not talking about a preconstructed meeting in which you've got a list of points. You can have an agenda in which it is the general idea of things that you think could lead to better understanding. And that's good enough for me. . . . Now, if they agree with me that there are things we can talk about that might clear the air and create a better understanding between us, that's fine."[50]

In September 1984, the president repeated his call for the institutionalization of cabinet-level meetings between the two countries. These discussions would focus "on the whole agenda of issues before us, including the problem of needless obstacles to understanding," Reagan stated. "I believe such talks could work rapidly toward developing a new climate of policy understanding, one that is essential if crises are to be avoided and real arms control is to be

[47] Shultz, Statement at CDE, 35–36.

[48] "Bush: 'We Too Want Deeds,'" *Washington Post*, 15 February 1984.

[49] Ronald Reagan, News Conference, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 20 (14 June 1984): 852, 853.

[50] Ibid., 852, 830.

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negotiated."[51] "We can't accomplish anything talking about each other," the president declared later that month. "We have to talk to each other."[52]

Need for arms reduction. The Reagan administration continued to stress the need for arms reduction throughout 1984 and 1985. In January 1984, Shultz reiterated "the American commitment to reduce the vast stockpiles of arms in the world," and introduced a new proposal for the "complete and verifiable elimination of chemical weapons on a global basis."[53] The president proclaimed later that year, "There is no sane alternative to negotiations on arms control and other issues between our two nations which have the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it."[54] In a September 1984 address to the United Nations, Reagan called for an "historic breakthrough in arms control" and introduced a new framework for arms negotiations that was the antithesis of his earlier policy of linkage. "[W]e need to extend the arms control process to build a bigger umbrella under which it can operate—a road map if you will, showing where, during the next 20 years these individual efforts can lead," he explained. "If progress is temporarily halted at one set of talks, this newly established framework for arms control could help us take up the slack at other negotiations."[55]

The Reagan administration also took a more collaborative approach to arms control than it had in earlier years. Before 1984 the White House had been in the habit of putting forth one-sided proposals that would have allowed the United States to build up its military while requiring the Soviets to dismantle parts of their arsenal. This was no longer to be the case. "Our approach," Reagan stated, "will be designed to take into account concerns the Soviet Union has voiced."[56]

The Reagan administration also indicated a willingness to reduce the levels of U.S. armaments. For example, in his September 1984 meeting with Gromyko, Reagan offered "strategic trade-offs" to the Soviets if they would resume the START talks. This implied that Washington was willing to reduce its arsenal of heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles, where there was a U.S. advantage, in return for a Soviet reduction in land-based ICBMs, where they had the advantage.[57] Washington's proposals were no longer intended solely for American gain.

It cannot be argued that the Reagan administration brought about a breakthrough in arms negotiations by the end of 1985. Although arms talks resumed in March 1985, little progress had been made by the end of the year. But what

[51] Reagan, Address to the UN, 226.

[52] Lou Cannon and David Hoffman, "Soviet's Visit Set in Secrecy," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1984.

[53] Shultz, Statement at CDE, 36.

[54] Reagan, Address to the UN, 224.

[55] Ibid., 226.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Cannon and Hoffman, "Soviet's Visit."

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is important for the present purposes is the administration's stated position regarding arms control. By 1985 the Reagan administration was pursuing arms control more actively than it ever had, and more realistically. Rather than offering one-sided proposals, it had begun to negotiate.

The Geneva Summit Meeting, November 1985

Although the Geneva summit meeting is often seen as the beginning of the end of the cold war, it was actually the culmination of the new policy that Reagan had introduced in early 1984. The Geneva summit embodied the administration's commitment to dialogue, cooperation, and understanding. Moreover, it took place a mere eight months after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union. He had not yet introduced *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and no one could foresee at that time how revolutionary the new Soviet leader would prove to be. The American approach to the Geneva summit meeting, therefore, could not have been merely a response to changes in Soviet policies.

As already noted, the Reagan administration had been very evasive about a summit conference prior to 1984. In 1985, however, Reagan initiated the Geneva summit. On 10 March 1984, the Kremlin announced that Konstantin Chernenko had passed away. Within hours of learning that Gorbachev would be the new Soviet leader, the Reagan administration invited him to a summit meeting. No preconditions were attached. There was no agreed-upon agenda. There was no certainty that any concrete agreement would result from the conference. In fact, the administration did not yet know what Gorbachev's policy positions would be. The Reagan administration extended an invitation to a summit meeting solely because there was an imperative need for dialogue.

Washington hoped the Geneva summit would address the threats to American security. "My mission, stated simply, is a mission for peace," the president remarked as he departed for Switzerland. "It is to engage the new Soviet leader in what I hope will be a dialogue for peace that endures beyond my presidency."[58] Through dialogue the leaders of the two countries would facilitate understanding and cooperation. Reagan explained, "It is my fervent hope that the two of us can begin a process which our successors and our peoples can continue—facing our differences frankly and openly and beginning to narrow and resolve them; communicating effectively so that our actions and intentions are not misunderstood; and eliminating the barriers between us and cooperating wherever possible for the greater good of all."[59]

"Formal agreements are not the important thing," Secretary Shultz remarked. "The important thing is that we understand each other." Another aide

[58] Ronald Reagan, "Hopes for the Geneva Summit," *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* 1985 (14 November 1985): 423.

[59] Ibid.

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added, "The president believes this can be a watershed meeting "[if both sides] hear each other out and begin to understand each other better."[60]

During the summit meeting Reagan underscored his commitment to dialogue. Despite the fact that only a fifteen-minute meeting between the two leaders had been scheduled beforehand, the president wound up consulting one-on-one with the Soviet leader for nearly five hours. Reagan spent more time talking with Gorbachev than he had with any other world leader.[61]

Despite the administration's new emphasis on the need for arms reduction, the Geneva summit meeting did not yield any new arms agreements. Reagan proposed a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms and the eventual elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which Gorbachev found acceptable. However, the Soviet leader would not consent to any of these proposals until the United States agreed to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan refused, arguing that SDI would be for defensive purposes only. He also offered to share SDI research with the Soviets. But Gorbachev found these arguments unconvincing. As a result, there were no historic breakthroughs in arms control as Reagan desired.[62]

The most notable achievement of the Geneva meeting was an agreement to institutionalize dialogue: two more summit meetings would be held by 1987. Although the Geneva summit produced little else in the way of specific accords, both sides portrayed the meeting to be a great success. Reagan officials described it as "very worthwhile" and noted the "friendly mood and good atmosphere."[63] The Soviets called the meeting a "watershed." "Because of the Geneva summit," Gorbachev declared, "the world has become a more secure place."[64]

Conclusions

In January 1984, fifteen months before Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the USSR, the Reagan administration dramatically shifted course and began seeking a rapprochement with Moscow. Washington began calling for dialogue, cooperation, and understanding between the superpowers. This new conciliatory policy led directly to the Geneva summit meeting in November 1985. Although the Geneva summit is commonly viewed as the beginning of the end of

[60] David B. Ottaway and Celestine Bohlen, "Shultz Terms Soviet Talks 'Good First Step'," *Washington Post*, 1 August 1985; Lou Cannon and David Hoffman, "Possible Accord on Arms Talks Seen," *Washington Post*, 19 November 1985.

[61] David Hoffman and Don Oberdorfer, "Gorbachev Agrees to Visit US Next Year," *Washington Post*, 21 November 1985.

[62] Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From Cold War to a New Era* (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 145–54.

[63] Lou Cannon, "Gorbachev Sincere, Reagan Tells Aides," *Washington Post*, 23 November 1985; and Hoffman and Oberdorfer, "Gorbachev Agrees to Visit."

[64] Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev Discusses 'Lively' Exchanges," *Washington Post*, 22 November 1985.

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the cold war, it is clear that the meeting was actually the culmination of policies that Reagan had introduced in early 1984.

This argument, therefore, directly contradicts prevailing views regarding the end of the cold war. Conventional wisdom holds that the Reagan administration became more conciliatory only in response to changes within the Soviet Union. I have demonstrated that the Reagan administration switched to a more conciliatory Soviet policy even before Moscow began to reform. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the Reagan administration planned the demise of the cold war. It is unlikely that any U.S. official anticipated the momentous events of the late 1980s. However, this article does aim to revise conventional assessments of the Reagan administration's role in concluding the cold war. The Reagan administration did not simply play a passive, reactive role; it took the first steps toward defusing superpower hostilities even before Moscow showed signs of change. Mikhail Gorbachev took the ball and ran with it, but it was Ronald Reagan who had put the ball in play.

This article raises further questions that warrant additional research. For one, it raises the question of why the Reagan administration changed its Soviet policy when it did. It is possible that the impending presidential election of 1984 played a role. Perhaps the administration was seeking to appeal to moderate voters who had been disturbed by the president's hardline rhetoric. Such an explanation, however, might not explain why Reagan continued with the new approach even after he had secured a second term. Another possibility is that the administration felt that it had sufficiently strengthened U.S. military capabilities and that the United States was now in a better position to discuss arms reduction. Having secured a position of strength, Washington was now able to pursue peace.

One must also consider what role the changes in U.S. policy played in the subsequent changes in Soviet foreign policy. Did Gorbachev change Soviet policy in response to Washington's new approach? Or did Gorbachev implement changes regardless of the new American perspective? If future research supports the former, then a substantive revision of conventional understanding of the end of the cold war is warranted. These and other questions promise that political scientists will debate the causes of the cold war's demise for at least as long as they have been debating the origins of the cold war.*

* I would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their generous support of this project.

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Book Reviews

Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals *by Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996. 393 pp. $27.50.*

This important book culminates many years of research on what Kinder and others used to call symbolic racism but now, somewhat modified, identify as racial resentment. Its focus is a careful analysis of the well known 1986 National Election Studies survey, supplemented by other poll results and succinct discussions of America's racial history, racial structure, and (especially) contemporary racial politics. It offers no surprises to those who already know Kinder's and Sanders's work, but it focuses and consolidates this significant line of research. And, of course, hard though it is to imagine, there may actually be some people who are not already immersed in the details of studying American racial attitudes; for them this book is both inviting in style and rich in content.

Divided by Color revolves around the fact that white and black Americans are widely divided in their views of appropriate policies with regard to equal opportunity in schools and jobs, federal efforts to aid blacks, and affirmative action. Many whites oppose racially distinctive policies; most blacks support them. Why? Kinder and Sanders present evidence that is methodologically sophisticated, carefully explained, informally written, and deeply considered to make the following claims:

•Except in a few circumstances, self-interest does very little to motivate whites' or blacks' views on racial policies. Group animosities among whites, and the desire for racial group advantage among blacks do somewhat more.

•White racial resentment—uncertainty "not whether blacks possessed the inborn ability to succeed, but rather whether they would try" (p.105)—explains much more of the variation in white support for American racial policies (although, curiously, no R-squared is presented on this point). Racial resentment also motivates whites' views on policy concerns that are implicitly racial (food stamps, capital punishment) and even partly motivates whites' views on policy concerns with no apparent racial connotation (competition with the Soviet Union, gay rights).

•Principled beliefs about equality and limited government (although not about economic individualism) also substantially affect both races' views about racial policy. These principles, like racial resentment, extend beyond racial issues into many arenas of social and foreign policy.

The second half of *Divided by Color* focuses on the role of framing in determining survey responses and by implication political views. It analyzes framing both narrowly, in terms of how media elites and candidates presented issues to the public in the 1988 (Willie Horton) presidential election. In some ways this section seems not to fit with, or even to contradict, the first section; if the vote or answers to survey questions are highly responsive to framing, then

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what is the status of the underlying explanations for racial policy views that were previously discussed? Kinder and Sanders do not address this question; thus the analytic status of framing and the empirical import of the results they present remain rather in limbo in the overall logic of the book.

Despite the excellence of *Divided by Color*, I have a few complaints. The first is overclaiming. Most people in the Robert Taylor Homes, for example, would not agree that "the most complicated aspect of race relations in America today concerns attitudes" (p. 6). Similarly, it is unfair to claim that "most contemporary scholarship on white racial attitudes . . . portray[s] . . . America as moving inexorably toward a racially integrated and egalitarian society" (p. 125). Among the five quotations the authors give in support of this statement are two from 1955 and 1966—an era when the best educated and most sophisticated African Americans were themselves highly optimistic. Furthermore, Kinder and Sanders ignore here work by Lawrence Bobo, Andrew Hacker, Stephen Steinberg, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, and myself. They are not so unique. As a final illustration of overclaiming, they emphasize the importance of racial resentment in determining views on a broad array of policy issues (it "plays an important and expansive role in white public opinion" [p. 124]), and deemphasize the importance of principles ("principles matter, then, but the imprint they leave is not uniformly strong" [p. 159]). But their tables show that beliefs about equality had more impact than did racial resentment on policy views in just as many cases as the reverse.

Another set of complaints has to do with the content of the surveys themselves. Kinder's and Sanders's measure of subjective self-interest is unsatisfactory. It asks if whites think they might sometime suffer as a consequence of an undeserved affirmative action appointment, and is thus a projective test rather than a measure of whether whites think their interests have actually been harmed. That projection is interesting and politically important, but one cannot draw conclusions about self-interest from it. Similarly, results of the 1986 survey lead the authors to claim that "from the black perspective, school choice looks like a program to deny equal opportunity" (p. 156), even though every other survey shows at least as much support among African Americans as among whites for vouchers for private and parochial schools. They dismiss class variations within the black community in three brief sentences, although other surveys show class variation to be great and growing in some aspects of African American belief systems. The authors focus on the huge racial divide in policy views about race, but say nothing about other surveys, which show that on a surprising number of policy issues—such as controlling crime and increasing student achievement—blacks and whites give almost identical prescriptions. And so on; excellent though they are, this series of surveys gets a few things wrong or simply misses some very important racial dynamics.

I do not want to conclude on a negative note, however; this is an enjoyable, authoritative, assertive book on a terribly important topic. We should all be so lucky as to write one like it.

JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD
Princeton University

From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994 *by Dan T. Carter. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1996. 133 pp. $22.95.*

Dan Carter's "subject is the interrelationship of race and presidential politics since the 1960s" (p.63), and he treats it in four short chapters. Covering this subject well, let alone

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in a volume as slim as the one under review, would challenge anyone; but the author, a distinguished and prize-winning historian of race relations and Southern politics, pulls it off. He describes nine presidential campaigns: George Wallace's and Richard Nixon's 1968 and 1972 campaigns, Ronald Reagan's 1980 and 1984 campaigns, George Bush's campaigns in 1988 and 1992, and Bill Clinton's first presidential campaign. Each discussion is based both on personal interviews with campaign strategists and on political journalism, campaign memoirs, newspaper dailies, and transcripts of television interviews.

Dan Carter's finding is clear: George Wallace led a social movement so angry and powerful that he forced Richard Nixon to learn the arts of skillfully exploiting white voters' racial fears without running openly racist campaigns or governing in a racist way. Since then, presidential aspirants and presidents have refined and evolved these tricks into racially coded political advertisements, slogans, and symbolically charged events.

Though Dan Carter's theme is hardly new, he goes beyond previous discussions in presenting new facts and vividly redescribing forgotten political incidents, such as George Wallace's 24 October 1968 monster rally at Madison Square Garden, Richard Nixon's secret funding of George Wallace's gubernatorial opponent in 1972 and his use of the IRS and the Justice Department to scare George Wallace away from a third-party effort in 1972, the birth and evolution of the Willie Horton ad in 1988, and the rise of Lee Atwater and James Carville. The author does acknowledge that he has not shown how important racial strategies have been to electoral success. Also, his premise, of course, is that campaigns matter to presidential electoral outcomes. About this there is lively debate within political science. But the controversy has not yet taken adequate account of racial coding in campaign ads and speech, and anyone interested in the issue ought to consult this book.

Equally provocative but far less convincing is the effort to suggest that the politics of racial coding has contributed to and been fed by "a more general debasement of the culture of American politics" (p. 118). By this Dan Carter means a "steady escalation in the use of political invective" (p. 118); the emergence of voter frustration, apathy, and cynicism; the rise of "violent and apocalyptic antipolitical movements" (p. 121); and politicians' increasing reliance on cynical "political handlers" (p. 84) whose job it is to manipulate voter perceptions. He stresses, further, a context of economic decline and growing income inequality. He sees the potential for a disturbing realization in American politics of the kind of politically organized obscurantism and demonology that George Orwell described in his classic dystopia, *1984*. In short, the author could not resist mixing the rise of racially coded politics into a heady witches' brew of America's various political poisons. Yet the book's core—the shrewd lively treatment of how our most successful politicians have handled white racial fears—is damning enough.

Perhaps, though, the disjuncture between impeccable research and broad impressionism was a deliberate choice for Dan Carter. If so, such a conscious lack of caution is itself instructive. Having had a richly accomplished academic career, he has taken the liberty of revealing his deepest worries about issues close to his mind and heart. Dan Carter wishes—one suspects—for a more redemptive and republican politics, one in which Americans collectively struggle to realize their political ideals rather than compromise them. Who can blame him?

RICHARD M. VALELLY
Swarthmore College

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Affirmative Action and the Stalled Quest for Black Progress *by W. Avon Drake and Robert D. Holsworth. Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 1996. 214 pp. Paper, $16.95.*

W. Avon Drake and Robert Holsworth have produced an in-depth analysis of the black politics of Richmond, Virginia. Not only have black elected officials become the majority on the city council, they have formed a working coalition with Richmond's white economic elite. The new task for these politicians is the integration of the black masses into the economic mainstream. In other words, Richmond black politicians wanted "to integrate the money."

Richmond's mandated minority set-asides became the vehicle for this economic transformation. The set-asides program required that at least 30 percent of the total dollar amount of city contracts be awarded to minority firms. Drake and Holsworth carefully lay out the genesis of the program and describe how it led to the now famous court decision *J. A. Croson Company v. City of Richmond* (1989). In striking down the program, the U.S. Supreme Court announced that such programs must meet a *strict scrutiny* requirement, which hobbled the ability of cities to fashion race-specific remedial measures to assist minority firms. Does this mean that black politicians acted in good faith only to have the Supreme Court thwart their efforts?

Drake and Holsworth concluded that the phrase "integrate the money" was only a shibboleth. Black leaders never intended to open up economic opportunities for the masses. Simply put, the program was designed to create a few black millionaires. They found that the set-aside program helped two minority contractors, but very little of the money from set-asides trickled down to the masses. Black politicians were more successful with the political uses of affirmative action. The program helped them to forge a working coalition with the white economic elite, the Main Street establishment. They concluded that "affirmative action policies in Richmond served political goals much more than they did the economic development of the black constituency" (p. 89). The Main Street establishment supported the set-aside program in exchange for black leaders' promotion of downtown development and preservation. Black leaders convinced their constituency that downtown regeneration was consistent with overall black interest. In other words, the whole program came to be a scheme that served the political interest of black politicians and economic interest of the white elites.

This type of goal displacement is remarkable, given the progressive reputation of the City of Richmond. Thanks to Drake and Holsworth, we now know that racial peace was bought with this extremely limited payoff scheme. One wonders if the U.S. Supreme Court knew this when the justices were ruminating about strict scrutiny and reverse discrimination. Set-asides were not diverting vast resources to the minority community, nor were they forcing white contractors to employ more minority workers. What may disappoint some readers is that black leaders participated in the hoax at the expense of their black constituency. Drake and Holsworth believe the latter acquiescence was due to the lack of neighborhood associations in Richmond. And if one reads carefully, one will discover that white contractors who opposed the program had little connection or influence with the Main Street establishment. They were apparently unaware of the real purpose of the program.

Drake and Holsworth's book is thoughtfully conceived, well informed, and admirably lucid. It is a welcome addition to the case study literature on American cities. It is also a much needed critique of the political dance of new black politicians and their partners, the white economic elite. Establishing a working relationship is a difficult learning process for both groups, made more arduous by the loss of set-asides.

WILBUR C. RICH
Wellesley College

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Counting the Latino Vote: Latinos as a New Electorate *by Louis DeSipio, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1996. 221 pp. $35.00.*

In their analyses of the 1996 general elections, pundits continually commented on the impact that Latinos were beginning to demonstrate. With new attention focused on Latinos, Louis DeSipio's book, *Counting the Latino Vote*, is a timely and needed investigation of the Latino electorate that suggests paths of political mobilization and potential impacts of a new Latino electorate.

This book includes an analysis of the Latino electorate utilizing two nationally representative surveys of Latinos—the National Latino Immigrant Survey (NLIS) and the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS). Attention is given to the impact of citizen Latino nonvoters. The strategy allows for an estimation of the potential electoral strength of Latinos. This analysis follows with estimates of the electoral impact of the naturalization-eligible noncitizen portion of the Latino population. Strategies for mobilizing the Latino electorate and speculation on the potential trajectories of the Latino electorate are also presented.

The analyses of the potential impact of citizen Latinos on elections in the states where Latinos comprise large portions of the population is thorough and compelling. Also interesting is the distinction between the nonvoting registered (Reticents) and nonregistered citizens (Reluctants). The treatment of separate nonvoters plus the discussion of different mobilizing techniques and political preferences is enlightening. Equally enlightening is the analysis of the noncitizen Latinos, especially the information that many noncitizen immigrants have a history of political activity. Furthermore, many noncitizens do not naturalize because of bureaucratic hassles, hindering the potential Latino electorate.

Louis DeSipio writes what the most likely trajectory Latinos will follow is one of mass voter registration. This strategy would increase the impact of the Latino electorate but would not be based on a set of Latino specific issues. The potential would then be there for Latinos to alter the political balance in some states. However, ethnicity would not be a driving force, thus hindering the development of a Latino electorate with the impact of the African American electorate. Democrats would benefit initially, but attachments to the Democrats are not strong enough to discount future Republican gains.

This book suffers from a problem plaguing Latino research that can not be attributed to Louis DeSipio. The weakness is from the data. Yes, this is great data for Latino politics, but many of the findings are drawn from reported votes and activity in the 1988 presidential election and hence may be time bound. Latino partisanship and beliefs may have been skewed by the weak showing of the Michael Dukakis campaign. Other points needing further mention include the book's speculation about making it easier to naturalize. One must ask if this is a viable method of increasing the Latino electorate, given today's anti-immigant mentality in certain political quarters.

The 1996 elections seem to indicate that Latinos may be developing a stronger attachment to the Democratic party and that immigration policy and English-only movements may be developing as issues capable of uniting Latinos as an electorate. These comments should be thought of as new directions instead of weaknesses. Nonetheless, data presentation could have been more thorough. For example, on p. 97 there is discussion of a new variable to the model presented in Table 4.5, but the findings are not presented. Also, on several of the tables the number of respondents is not reported (Table 4.6).

Louis DeSipio's effort is a solid contribution to political science. His work paves the way for increased attention to the Latino electorate. Political science needs to end the habit of ignoring the Latino electorate, and Louis DeSipio skillfully demonstrates this point.

JUAN CARLOS HUERTA
Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi

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The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections *by William G. Mayer. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996. 214 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $18.95.*

The author here seeks to answer questions that have much preoccupied students of presidential politics in recent years. In the quadrennial quest for the presidential nomination is there greater disunity among Democrats than Republicans? If so, does this disunity spring from changes the Democrats made after the 1968 election in the procedures used to select their presidential candidates? If Democratic disunity in recent presidential elections cannot be traced to these changes, how else can it be explained?

William G. Mayer answers the first of these questions in the affirmative. Democrats are indeed more commonly plagued by disunity than Republicans in their quest for the presidency. He uses several measures to compare the two major American political parties in this respect. Each shows the Democratic party as having less cohesion within its ranks in the nomination struggle. Democratic nominees win a lower percentage of first ballot votes at nominating conventions, they garner a lower percentage of the vote in the preceding primary elections, and they are involved in many more contested primaries than Republicans.

But Mayer disputes the contention that this disunity is caused by new rules governing the selection of convention delegates that were adopted by the party in the wake of its contentious 1968 conclave in Chicago. He describes this view as a "process" explanation of Democratic disunity, which commonly ties Democratic disunity to state rules requiring convention delegates to be allocated among candidates in accordance with their share of the primary vote. These rules, critics charge, reward losers in primary elections and encourage them to stay in the race, thus aggravating and prolonging divisions within the party.

Mayer proceeds to rerun all the contests for the Democratic presidential nomination from 1980 to 1992 under various delegate selection procedures. He shows that the same candidate would usually have been chosen no matter what delegate selection procedures were followed. Moreover, he contends, Democrats have suffered far less from their divisive primaries in the ensuing presidential race than has frequently been alleged.

In his concluding chapters Mayer offers his own explanation for divisions within the Democratic party. In his view, the Democratic party has a more divisive struggle for the presidential nomination every four years simply because it is a far more heterogeneous grouping than its Republican competitor. It embraces "a broader range of groups and interests and thus encompasses a much wider spectrum of opinions about significant policy issues. . . . Democrats fight more than Republicans because they have more to fight about" (p. 73).

Mayer reaches this conclusion after examining survey data on voters's responses to questions on policies and policy makers. These responses uniformly show Republican identifiers as having far more cohesion than their Democratic counterparts. "Across a wide battery of survey questions," Mayer contends, "the Democrats repeatedly emerge as less cohesive than the Republicans—on social and cultural issues, on foreign policy concerns, and even on most economic questions" (p. 89).

Of course, the characteristics of party organizations change over time in response to shifting pressures and opportunities. For example, Mayer's data reveal growing evidence of disunity within the ranks of Republicans, a change attributable to the party's recent success in drawing support from a broader range of constituencies in American society. For party organizations, disunity is apparently an inevitable product of successful growth. If written

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after rather than before the 1996 presidential election, this study might have given greater emphasis to this Republican trend in its comparison of the two parties.

As it stands, however, the book helps to fill a gap in our understanding of American political life. As the author points out, research in the past has focused on characteristics the two major political parties share and much less on differences that set them apart.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
Johns Hopkins University

Onward Christian Soldiers: The Religious Right in American Politics *by Clyde Wilcox. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996. 180 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $13.95.*

On the eve of the next millennium, interest in the Religious Right remains keen. For those attempting to sort out the conflicting assessments of the movement, the best place to start is this crisp and lucid overview by Clyde Wilcox. A prolific scholar, Wilcox shares how his personal roots in the fundamentalist world of rural West Virginia imparted a sympathy toward people drawn to the Religious Right, while his own 1960s socialization produced disagreement with its policy agenda. Not surprisingly, the result of his effort is an unusually balanced portrait.

This book was not written to make a scholarly argument. Instead, it serves as a brief text for students, a primer for journalists, and an accessible read for a broader literate audience. It succeeds by weaving scholarly literature, judicious survey analysis, and spicy interview quotes into an elegant narrative. As a teaching tool, the book contains discussion questions, a fine glossary of key names and terms (such as glossolalia and dispensationalism), and a bibliography of scholarly works and books by movement figures.

Wilcox nicely anchors the Religious Right in historical context, showing how the current movement is but the fourth (though most sophisticated) manifestation in this century of political mobilization by conservative religionists. His evidence suggests that the Religious Right is backed by a relatively stable 10–15 percent core constituency, whose political vigor waxes and wanes with changing circumstances, leadership, and opportunity structures. In criticizing how the movement has been oversimplified or caricatured, Wilcox traces its diverse theological factions, leadership rivalries, strategic disputes, and distinct constituencies. He shows how the movement overlaps with, but does not encompass, other movements (both pro-life and home school organizations have liberal members, he notes).

What emerges from this analysis is a complex portrayal. Yes, on the fringes are those who truck with militia or Aryan groups; on the other hand, Christian Right activists can be far warmer toward Jews and blacks than more traditional Republicans. Yes, movement members are more conservative than the broader public; but, as Wilcox shows, the majority of evangelicals support an equal role for women in the family and society, would allow abortion in some circumstances, and disagree among themselves about the proper response to homosexuality.

The one thing lacking in the analysis of the Religious Right agenda is some recognition of the deeper angst about cultural drift that animates religious conservatives—an angst that relates to, but transcends, specific policy remedies. There is scant attention to family breakdown, for example, a passionate concern of religious conservatives now vindicated by mounting empirical evidence that it really is a problem.

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To counter wildly gyrating assessments of the Religious Right, Wilcox catalogues well its assets and weaknesses. In spite of formidable resources, the movement has achieved limited success and is likely to enjoy only incremental victories in the future, he notes. The Madisonian structure of the American system, and the inevitable counter-mobilization produced by threatened opponents, will see to that. But the very nature of the movement's sweeping agenda also means it will collide with the powerful inertia of cultural patterns, court rulings, and bureaucratic edicts.

Does the Religious Right broaden pluralism by giving voice to decent but underrepresented citizens, or is it a threat to democratic values and civil liberties? Wilcox, always even-handed, concludes that there is evidence to support both views. He credits the movement for helping to spark a discussion of faith and values in public policy, but he sees it as captive of a narrow, often divisive ideological agenda. Whether or not it moves beyond that self-limiting cage, Wilcox argues, depends on who takes up the reins of leadership and how they interpret their missions, both divine and strategic.

ALLEN D. HERTZKE
University of Oklahoma

Diversity and Citizenship: Rediscovering American Nationhood *edited by Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn and Susan Dunn. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 156 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.95.*

The six essays comprising this volume were originally given as lectures marking the bicentennial of Williams College in 1993. Solid in themselves, they are more an assortment than variations on a clearcut theme.

Robert A Dahl's "Is Civic Virtue a Relevant Ideal in a Pluralist Democracy?" is the most abstractly theoretical. Rejecting both classical republicanism, which demands impossible levels of disinterestedness in individuals and consensus in society, and its polar opposite, hyperegoistic individualism, Dahl offers "robust civility" as a more realistic ideal. This position recognizes the human capacity for self-sacrifice as well as aggrandizement; accepts the importance of chance and circumstance of good institutions, of leadership, and of agreeing on *process* where consensus on goals is lacking. Hardly newsy, but sensible.

Sanford Levinson addresses the question of citizenship more concretely but in a relatively narrow context, namely, whether the practice of law should be restricted to persons who are citizens. After a somewhat rambling but quite interesting discussion, he concludes that such a restriction might be justifiable in a country whose national existence is precarious, but not in the United States where citizenship isn't taken very seriously—an ironic conclusion inasmuch as it would seem to validate the insubstantial nature of American citizenship.

The remaining four essays variously combine history with theory. Pauline Maier examines the role of the American Revolution in shaping the way citizenship would develop. She notes that despite its limitations and overall vagueness, the understanding that emerged from the Revolution was far more comprehensive than citizenship in classical republics, that it also differed from them in being antimilitaristic, and that it made possible the remodeling of the corporation into a device for harnessing private effort to public purposes.

Noah M. J. Pickus moves the focus ahead to the Federalist Papers, but his approach is theoretical rather than historical. By-passing the "split personality" question, he argues that

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"Publius" can be shown to offer "a coherent (if unfinished) approach" according to which "American citizenship meant attachment to a common [national] identity" but did not foreclose deliberation over the nature of that identity or the possibility of its being changed (pp. 81, 64). The argument is dense but highly relevant to the contemporary multiculturalist debate; whether it can be legitimately attributed to Publius is a question for specialists in the Founding.

Nathan Glazer brings the themes of the volume together most directly in his "Reflections of Citizenship and Diversity." Although primarily concerned with the present, he shows that the debate over multiculturalism involves sharply opposed readings of American history—one that sees progressively greater racial and cultural inclusiveness; another that sees only perduring racism and oppression. In the past quarter-century, a devaluation of citizenship accompanied the erosion of the former view. Proposition 187 may, however, mark a turning point and has certainly made citizenship status more eagerly sought. Glazer's final reflections on these matters are inconclusive, except in confirming his adherence to a liberal assimilationist reading of American history.

The collection closes with an impressive historical analysis of the citizenship status of free blacks in the antebellum era. In "*Dred Scott* and African American Citizenship" Randall Kennedy shows that Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's denial that African Americans ever qualified as citizens overlooked earlier evidence to the contrary and was cogently refuted in Justice Benjamin Curtis's opinion in the same case. Kennedy rightly observes that while it does not excuse the "sordid tradition of proslavery constitutionalism" (p. 115), we should not forget that a more humane countertradition also existed upon which we can still draw—more easily thanks to this essay.

PHILIP GLEASON
University of Notre Dame

The Nation of Islam: An American Millenarian Movement *by Martha Lee. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1996. 144 pp. Paper, $15.95.*

Martha Lee has written a very brief history of the political and religious movement founded by Wallace Fard in the 1930s and currently under the ministry of Louis Farrakhan. Given the continuing importance of this movement in contemporary society and politics (witness the controversial Million Man March of 1995 led by Farrakhan), an accessible history of the Nation of Islam is certainly called for. Lee provides us with a clear and concise overview of those personalities (and to a much lesser extent the events) that formed the Nation of Islam from Elijah Muhammad through Malcolm X, Wallace Muhammad, and Louis Farrakhan. For this she is to be commended.

The book, however, lacks any clear analysis of the movement's development or of the institutional and organizational dynamics of its variable successes, failures, and transformations. There is, for example, no statistical or ethnographic data at all on the movement's members, nor any analysis of the demographic, gender, class, professional, or status positions of its members. Similarly, the work lacks any analysis of the movement elite (aside from its most public and well known personalities), of the relations between elites and followers, and in general of the organizational dynamics involved in a movement whose role in articulating black identity in the United States has for the past sixty years been far from

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negligible. Crucial events of the movement's history, including the schism of Malcolm X's defection and the reorientation of the movement's principles and desiderata under the leadership of Wallace Muhammad (which provided the background for Farrakhan's own reorganization of the movement from below) are left more or less unexplained. They are simply presented as historical record with little comment and less analysis. To say that Wallace Muhammad's and Louis Farrakhan's movements felicitously divided up the membership of the original Nation of Islam is, for example, to elide analysis of what is for the author a critical development—the split of the movement into a mainstream and more fully institutionalized faction integrating into mainstream society through the acceptance of the more universalist message of orthodox Islam and the continuation of a more radical, particularist branch under Farrakhan, which also inherited the mantel of the movement. Analysis of these and similar moments in the history of the movement are, however, lacking, leaving the reader with a paucity of theoretical perspectives.

Finally, it must be noted that the book does not live up to its subtitle. The issue of millenarianism is never squarely dealt with except for the opening chapter, which presents the reader with a rather staid and conventional review of the literature. No comparison is attempted with other movements. Nor is it ever convincingly argued that the Nation of Islam is indeed a millenarian movement in any of the term's senses cited by the author. One feels that an analysis of the movement in terms of some other categories, such as charisma and its institutionalization, may have presented a far more helpful framework to understand the movements character and changing trajectory.

ADAM B. SELIGMAN
Boston University

American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword *by Seymour Martin Lipset. New York, Norton, 1996. 352 pp. $27.50.*

What makes the United States unique? In this volume of essays, Seymour Martin Lipset gives the old answers a provocative new twist. American exceptionalim is a double-edged sword. Those virtues celebrated by chest-thumping patriots are just the sunny side of the vices deplored by breast-beating Jeremiahs. On the up side, Americans share a creed: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, laissez faire. Yet precisely those values lead to packed jails, broken marriages, high crime, low voting, stingy welfare programs, and hordes of lawyers. Celebrate economic success, says Lipset, and folks will rob, cheat, and sue to get it.

Many details will be familiar to Lipset's fans, for he has touched these themes often in his twenty-plus books. But *American Exceptionalism* takes a fresh look at two great American narratives: national decline (are our "best years as a nation behind us?") and moral decay (are we "seriously off moral track?"). Americans answer "no" (vast majorities see good times ahead) and "yes" (three in four see a moral crisis). Lipset does not buy either fear. He deftly exposes the recurring moralizing impulse, now being served up with half baked data.

Lipset is ready for the standard critiques. Isn't it a mistake to focus on just one country? Lipset agrees; he writes with an eye to the comparative context and includes thoughtful essays on Canada and Japan. Doesn't the exceptionalism story slight the African American experience? *American Exceptionalism* explores "exceptions to the creed" in essays on Afri-

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can Americans, Jew, and intellectuals. Isn't the entire analytic tradition a bit too celebratory? Yes again. Vices flow from the American creed just as freely as the virtues.

Lipset is so agile in exploring the logic of his approach that I wish he had faced up to its recent challengers. *American Exceptionalism* ignores the many scholars who push aside creeds for political institutions. Their questions confront Lipset's approach at every historical turn.

For example, perhaps it was not American ideology but the hostile union-busting courts that turned nineteenth-century labor leaders into voluntarists skeptical of government. Perhaps the American creed cannot even explain the absence of national health insurance. After all, President Harry Truman won reelection promising national health insurance; if Americans had been playing by parliamentary rules, they might well have gotten it decades before those social-welfare mongers in Ottawa. Perhaps cries of socialism delayed Medicare till 1965, but what happened after that? Even the flintiest congressional Republican now tries to pass for a Medicare champion. Never mind the American creed, say authors like Theda Skocpol. The Medicare program itself organized a distinctly noncreedal politics among senior citizens.

And what about the liberal creed itself? How does it fit with the civic republicanism that so many scholars see flourishing alongside early American liberalism? Rogers Smith puts the challenge even more powerfully: republicanism, liberalism, and repressive anti-liberalism are all deep-rooted American ideologies. None has the primacy that *American Exceptionalism* claims for liberalism. Certainly, one can imagine many responses. But American exceptionalism—not just the book but the entire field—would profit if Lipset squarely met these critics. Call it my agenda for Lipset's next visit to the topic.

Finally, Lipset occasionally slips off his analytic perch and enters a policy brawl. He suggests, for example, that the recent "American emphasis on competitive individualism seems to have paid off" (57). Perhaps. But we could more fruitfully read the rush to free markets as still another instance of Lipset's double-edged sword. On the one side, we have steady economic growth; on the other, job insecurity, growing gaps in wealth, the erosion of workers' power, and the ascendance of what Robert Reich calls the "let them drown" school of labor relations.

If Lipset had stuck to his model, he might have added another answer to a question that hangs over the entire book. Why does the gloomy side of American exceptionalism seem so much sharper today? Lipset rounds up familiar suspects—Vietnam, Watergate, the media. My own answer would have made more of those great economic shifts. Which brings us directly back to the great force of Lipset's analysis. This is an ambitious project that will stimulate almost any reader—to argue, to agree, to think. *American Exceptionalism* synthesizes the American experience, from colonial politics to contemporary polls. Even those who disagree will find much to admire in Lipset's keen, wise book.

JAMES A. MORONE
Brown University

Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe *by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 479 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

Any book by Juan Linz or Alfred Stepan is eagerly anticipated, given both scholars' outstanding contributions to our understanding of contemporary authoritarianism, democratic

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breakdown, and democracy. Fortunately, this long book lives up to what one expects from two such distinguished comparativists.

The book focuses on the conditions and practices that make it possible to undergo democratic transitions and consolidate democratic regimes. Part 1 provides a theoretical overview of several key themes. The rest of the book analyzes democratic transitions and processes in fifteen countries of southern Europe, South America, and postcommunist Europe, with general discussions of each region in addition to the country-specific analyses. Linz and Stepan compare both across and within these three regions.

Linz and Stepan make four especially important contributions. First, they reconceptualize our typology of contemporary regime types. Ever since the publication in 1964 of Linz's seminal article, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain," the dominant typology has been tripartite—democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian. Linz and Stepan argue that this typology is no longer useful, and they advocate adding two new categories—post-totalitarian and sultanism. Post-totalitarian regimes are distinctive along all four of the dimensions that Linz previously used to characterize regime types: the degree of political and social pluralism, whether the regime mobilizes or demobilizes, whether the leaders have great personal latitude in the exercise of power, and whether the regime develops a highly distinctive ideology or relies on a more diffuse mentality. For example, in post-totalitarian regimes, the official totalitarian ideology remains in place (in contrast to authoritarian regimes, which usually lack a well elaborated ideology), but it is discredited (in contrast to totalitarian regimes). Sultanistic regimes are distinguished from authoritarian regimes by a low degree of institutionalization and a highly personalistic leadership style.

Second, Linz and Stepan build on this new typology of political regimes and analyze the distinctive challenges for democratic consolidation posed by the four types of nondemocratic predecessor regimes. They compare the challenges these four regime types create along each of five features discussed in Chapter 1 as necessary for democratic consolidation: a free and lively civil society, an autonomous and valued political society, the rule of law, a relatively efficacious state bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society. Given the personalism and arbitrary nature of sultanistic regimes, in subsequent efforts to consolidate a democratic regime, it will be difficult to establish the rule of law, to develop a universalistic legal culture, and to create an effective state bureaucracy. Similarly, consolidating democracy after a post-totalitarian regime poses distinctive challenges. In the aftermath of an authoritarian regime, no economic changes may be necessary for democratic consolidation, but after a post-totalitarian regime, democratic leaders must undertake economic reforms in order to allow for the minimal development of civil and political society needed for democracy. The arguments about the challenges different precursor regimes create for democratic consolidation are persuasive.

Third, Linz and Stepan integrate a sophisticated discussion of nationalism and statehood into contemporary analyses of democracy. In many of the European postcommunist regimes, a fundamental conflict revolves around who should have the right to citizenship; Linz and Stepan refer to this as a "stateness" problem. They argue that the stateness problem, which barely existed in most South American and southern European transitions (Spain was an exception), presents one of the great challenges to many contemporary democracies. They caution against efforts to resolve the stateness problem by obliterating national differences; democracy may be easier if a nation and state coincide, but multination democracies are possible. They develop their analysis of the stateness problem in interesting accounts of Spain, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union/Russia.

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Finally, Linz and Stepan evince a staggering comparative breadth that very few political scientists can even aspire to, and they effectively relate the analysis of each country to the themes introduced in Part 1. The broad comparisons of the three regions are among the most rewarding chapters in Parts 2 (Southern Europe), 3 (South America), and 4 (Postcommunist Europe). After noting differences between Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the chapters on those countries, Linz and Stepan note that, taking the entire range of democratic transitions and attempted consolidations in the contemporary world, all three enjoyed relatively favorable conditions. Yet they avoid the misleading temptation to retrospectively treat these cases as overdetermined consolidations.

Linz and Stepan's analysis of the postcommunist countries effectively builds on Part 1. The authors underscore the difficult problems created by the lengthy period of communist rule for democratic consolidation for each of the five features discussed in Chapter 1. Civil society was weaker in the post-totalitarian countries than in the southern European or South American cases. Whereas opposition parties in Spain, Uruguay, and Chile led the opposition in the later phases of the struggle against authoritarianism, in the communist countries, no such development was possible. The authoritarian dictatorships of South America and southern Europe bequeathed a more positive legacy for the legal system. The authoritarian regimes left a heritage for state building that was sharply less negative than that of the posttotalitarian regimes, where none of the ingredients of an effective economic society existed.

This book has an inevitable tension between treating the most interesting aspects of each case, which could lead to excessively idiosyncratic discussions, and using the general theoretical issues of Part 1 to analyze the cases. Linz and Stepan navigate this tension successfully, framing all of the cases within their general theoretical approach while simultaneously addressing the most interesting aspects of the cases. Theoretically, the authors are eclectic without being so diffuse that they offer no message.

Although there is much to admire about this important book, it might have been better to undertake fewer country cases or to organize more of the book around themes and less around countries. Some of the countries are inevitably treated in a perfunctory manner, and some specialists may find little that is surprising on their own countries. But these are minor quibbles that do not detract from a huge undertaking and a landmark accomplishment.

SCOTT MAINWARING
University of Notre Dame

The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945–1995 *by Michael Yahuda. London and New York, Routledge, 1996. 298 pp. Cloth, $69.95; paper, $19.95.*

Michael Yahuda, who teaches international relations at the London School of Economics, offers an up-to-date history of Asian-Pacific international relations since World War II. Using the unfamiliar term, "the Asia-Pacific," while at the same time covering the more familiar terrain of international politics, he examines in great detail how the major powers have defined their interrelationship in the region.

The first part of the book puts Asian-Pacific affairs in the context of the global cold war, and the second, larger section chronicles the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union (and Russia), China, and Japan. This is a rather odd way of organizing data, inevitably pro-

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ducing repetitiousness. For instance, Mikhael Gorbachev's historic trip to Beijing in 1989, just before the Tiananmen incident, is mentioned in three widely scattered places (pp. 95, 179, 211). There is little difference in the three descriptions of the same event. This is frustrating for anyone who wants to read the book from cover to cover. On the other hand, for those wishing to find a neatly summarized description of the policies and strategies of a single power, the chapter dealing with that power will prove quite useful.

Throughout, the author's examination of historical events is well balanced, and his discussion of more recent developments is judicious. Both the text and the footnotes indicate the author's awareness of the most recent English-language scholarship on the subjects he discusses. Factual inaccuracies (NSC 68 was drafted in 1950, not 1949; the name of the Japanese prime minister in the mid-1950s is Hatoyama Ichiro, not Hayatoma Ichero; North Korean Energy Development Organization should be abbreviated as KEDO, not NED) occur rather infrequently.

For a book that focuses on the geopolitical interplay of the major powers and contains conventional statements about the cold war "bipolarity," some of the more interesting observations concern the behavior of smaller countries. "The nationalist sentiments of the majority of the countries of the Asia-Pacific," Yahuda writes, "did not coincide with the Cold War cleavage .... [Many of them] sought to establish a separate and distinctive international identity" (p. 45). In view of recent developments such as the formation of APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), it may be said that it was these forces pushing for a distinctive regional identity, rather than superpower geopolitics, that contributed to the shaping of the Asia-Pacific. One wishes that the book devoted more space to these countries and to economic, cultural, and other forces not readily comprehensible within the geopolitical framework.

AKIRA IRIYE
Harvard University

The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic Transformation *by William K. Tabb. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 414 pp. Cloth $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

Since the late 1970s there has been a steady stream of books purporting to explain Japan and the Japanese high-growth political economy written by authors from a variety of backgrounds and perspectives. Many of these books have been trite and derivative, some have been of note chiefly because they have advanced provocative theses, and a very few have been truly path-breaking. The book under review, if not quite path-breaking, should still be judged among the best books purporting to explain the Japanese model of political economy, because it offers an interesting synthesis of and insightful commentary on main themes in the literature to date.

The question Tabb sets about addressing in this book is: Why have the Japanese been able to transform and upgrade the organization of economic production so rapidly without sacrificing social stability? This obviously is a big question, and many scholarly books written to contribute an answer to it offer detailed studies of political institutions and processes, or of economic data in an effort to explain how institutional factors did or did not contribute to a Japanese miracle. What sets the book under review apart is the broad and eclectic mode

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of analysis that the author brings to this question, even though he takes what might be called a qualified institutionalist position.

The author offers an analysis of postwar Japan that is sociological in the following way: the unit of analysis is society; temporally situated cultural and social facts supply the meanings and preferences of individuals even when they engage in economic and political decision-making; and implicit in the analysis of postwar Japanese political economy is the view that a national society maintains a stable social formation or pattern until crisis or new challenges force an historic social change or reconfiguration. Apart from this, what one finds interesting is the author's careful critique of key interpretations of Japanese political economy from the disciplines of politics and economics, even as he attempts to subsume them in a broader sociological framework. If there were nothing else in the book, this aspect would make it worth picking up.

But of further interest is the analysis of Japan in the 1990s. Tabb argues that the so-called bubble economy of the late 1980s and its rupture in 1991 marked the exhaustion of Japan's postwar mode of development. This mode of development was a social formation rooted in history, motivated by economic nationalism, organized by interlocked political and economic institutional structures. It measured progress primarily in terms of capital accumulation. The new challenge or circumstance that the postwar mode of development cannot adequately address is globalization, or the unprecedented integration of all national societies into one vast global system of exchange, norms, and institutions. Here the question that Japan faces is whether it can change and adapt a strongly parochial national system to the need to be internationalist and open. It is a matter of survival and continued success for Japanese business and the state. Tabb concludes that the answer is unclear, but if Japan does achieve an adaptive transformation, as it did after 1868 and 1945, it will still be one uniquely determined by the past.

The focus on the profound effects of transnational forces on the Japanese political economy and the implicit theory of dynamic change are of great utility in understanding the direction and scope of change that Japan may be currently undergoing. Tabb, who is not by training a Japan expert, develops insights into contemporary change in the Japanese political economy that compares favorably with the work of many specialists. This book may provide an antidote for and a reminder of the limitations of narrow methodologies that may have less utility in developing answers to big complex questions.

DAVID ARASE
Pomona College

Troubled Industries: Confronting Economic Change in Japan *by Robert M. Uriu. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996. 264 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $17.95.*

Into the fierce debate about whether Japanese politicians or bureaucrats are calling the shots in industrial policy matters, Uriu enters and claims: Neither! He argues that industry actors, that is, companies, were the driving force behind policies towards "troubled industries" in postwar Japan; that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is not an autonomous and dominant, but a "permeated" and responsive bureaucracy; and that politicians have remained uninvolved. Therefore, to fully understand the process of industrial policy in Japan, we need to carefully analyze industry interests.

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With this goal, Uriu suggests to differentiate industries by their degrees of concentration (the size of the companies in an industry) and the size of the labor force. This leads him to posit two primary hypotheses: large firms (operating in highly concentrated industries) have sufficient financial resources to diversify and are, therefore, less likely to lobby for protection; a small labor force makes it easier for a company to diversify or even exit from the industry. Therefore, the companies most likely to lobby for protection are small firms in fragmented industries with a relatively large labor force.

To test these hypotheses, Uriu leads us through four detailed case studies (cotton spinning, synthetic fibers, electric-furnace steel, and shipbuilding) and four cursory case studies (coal mining, integrated steel, aluminum, and paper). His general conclusion is that in no case did the bureaucracy force the industries into certain actions. As suggested by the initial model, large firms were usually least interested in protection and cartel arrangements, whereas small firms, facing bankruptcy as the sole alternative to government support, lobbied hard for protection in all cases. While a large labor force boosted the political clout, Uriu contends that the policies directed at such companies were not significantly different from policies for companies with a large labor force. This suggests that the size of the labor force is not a determinant of policies, whereas firm size is.

Finally, and most surprisingly, Uriu finds that MITI provided the strongest support to industries that were least strategic, such as cotton and textiles. He considers this the strongest evidence against a "strategic plan-rational" MITI, as it supports the notion that policies are shaped by the lobbying skills of the affected industries.

The book deserves praise for its refreshing approach. It is high time that Japan analysts bring the industry back into the industrial policy debate, and Uriu achieves exactly that. His argument is interesting and well stated, and the case studies are competent. By making industry the unit of analysis, Uriu can explain a number of events that have hitherto puzzled many an observer: Why were not all depressed industries subjected to the same set of policy measures, if MITI is the primary actor in all cases? Why were cartels effective in some industries, but undermined in others? Who implemented and enforced the policies? Such questions can indeed only be answered if we consider the industries' interests in the process of industrial policy.

One wonders, however, how the case studies were selected. More than fifty industries were subjected to recession and rationalization policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Uriu chose some that he himself admits are special cases. How far can we generalize from his sample? Also, Uriu includes both maturing industries (where demand is in permanent decline) and industries that are temporarily distressed because of external demand shocks or misguided corporate strategies. These two categories demand different sets of policies, and it may be illuminating to differentiate these more carefully.

Most readers will probably be happy to agree with Uriu that recession and other "indicative"(government-administered) cartels had to be in the interest of, and based upon an agreement in the industry concerned in order to be effective; if not, the cartels would have been undermined by dissenters. Likewise, given the image of decision making in Japan as a process of negotiations among a host of characters in smoke-filled private restaurant rooms, no one will be surprised to see that Uriu has a hard time proving that all cartels were initiated by the companies in the industry. Yet, there is a fundamental difference between an industry desiring, and an industry initiating a policy single-handedly. Was it the bureaucrats who talked industry into certain strategies? Was it the politicians telling the bureaucrats to do just that, or was it industry telling both what to do?

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These questions touch the core of the industrial policy debate, and Uriu carries us a long way toward a better understanding of industrial policies toward declining and depressed industries in Japan. Uriu's arguments are very important and ought to be considered by everyone interested in the ongoing industrial policy debate.

ULRIKE SCHAEDE
University of California, San Diego

Japan's Foreign Aid to Thailand and to the Philippines *by David M. Potter. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 206 pp. $45.00.*

Japan's rise to the position of number one donor of foreign aid to the developing world has made Japan's aid policies the subject of a growing number of studies. David Potter's analysis of Japanese aid to the Philippines and Thailand adds to this body of literature an in-depth analysis of aid disbursements to two of the top ten recipients of Japanese aid. Much of the writing on Japanese aid stresses how bureaucratic fragmentation hinders the formulation of effective aid policies or criticizes the objectives and quality of that aid. Potter takes a different cut on the question of Japanese aid. He asks whether or not recipients get what they want from Japanese aid disbursements.

Potter draws attention to the interests of the recipient governments and their implementing agencies, Japanese companies, and the Japanese aid bureaucracy. He argues that a basic dilemma facing aid planners is that they have to balance their own preferences with the interests of Japan, the donor. Because of the power relationship that exists between them, recipient negotiators have learned over time to make their proposals fit the preferences of Japan. Recipient implementing ministries, in turn, have learned that it is important to work closely with Japanese companies in project formulation, because these companies tend to know the Japanese government's aid criteria. In other words, the Thai and Philippine governments have learned to anticipate donor aid preferences. This is what Potter calls a process of "anticipatory bargaining."

While anticipatory bargaining influences aid requests, Potter argues that Japan also has responded to the different development priorities of the Philippine and Thai governments. This can be seen by looking at the differences in their aid programs. Thailand has adopted a restrictive borrowing strategy that limits concessional borrowing to specific projects and relending schemes. In contrast, the Philippines has used concessional borrowing for balance of payments recovery and projects. Furthermore, aid to Thailand concentrates on project aid and two-step loans, while aid to the Philippines is more diverse.

Much of this volume focuses on trend data of Japanese aid to Thailand and the Philippines. Potter details changes in grant-based and loan-based aid from the late 1960s to 1993 and the sectoral and regional distribution of that aid. He then considers the match between Japanese aid disbursements and what the Thai and Philippine governments presented as their development priorities in their multiyear development plans. From this, the reader gets a broad overview of the development goals of the Philippine and Thai governments and how these have changed over time. Thus, we learn for example, that the Second National Social and Economic Development Plan in Thailand (1967 to 1971) emphasized heavy infrastructure development, and this was mirrored in the plan's calculations of foreign aid funding.

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Japan became a donor to Thailand during this time, and its initial aid disbursements generally followed the sectoral distribution of projects outlined in the plan. This volume will be primarily of interest to specialists on Japanese aid. The presentation is broad, covering a quarter-century of Thai and Philippine development plans and Japanese aid disbursement. In this short volume, the reader is not given much of a feel for the politics behind plan development in recipient countries or aid formulation in Japan. There is one chapter that presents a few brief case studies of aid disbursements. The volume would be stronger if the overview of aid programs made in the first five chapters of the book had been supplemented with a more developed treatment of the substate and interstate politics behind the formulation of aid requests in the Philippines and Thailand.

MIRANDA A. SCHREURS
University of Maryland at College Park

Thailand: Economy and Politics *by Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker. New York, Oxford University Press. 468 pp. $59.00.*

In their preface, Pasuk and Baker state that they have set out to write a book that is useful to students as well as challenging to specialists. On both counts they have succeeded admirably. Their work makes two important contributions to Thai studies. On a general level, they have produced the first comprehensive survey of Thai political and economic history since the nineteenth century to reach publication in over a decade. On a more specific level, they have provided the first extended analysis of the history of Thailand's land frontier and the implications of its recent closure.

A brief summary of the book's contents will give a sense of its impressive breadth. The authors divide their work into three parts: "village,""city," and "politics." The village section covers the expanding trade in agricultural products in the nineteenth century, the expansion of the rice frontier, the freeing of the peasantry, the growth of commercial agriculture in the twentieth century, the closing of the frontier, and the increasing conflict between the village on the one side and capital and the state on the other.

The section on city discusses the rise of capital under the nineteenth-century monarchy, the shifting dynamic between the Chinese-dominated capitalist class and the post-1932 military-bureaucratic elite, the transition from import substitution to export-led industrialization, and the growth of urban labor.

The politics section takes the early Bangkok monarchy as its starting point. It moves on to the establishment of the absolutist state; the rise of the military after the 1932 revolution; the challenge mounted by students, workers, farmers, and the Communist party of Thailand in the 1970s; the growing political power of provincial businessmen in the 1980s; the 1991–1992 crisis; and the emergence of civil society. The one institution that escapes extended critique is the monarchy, but given the sensitivity of the subject, this is understandable.

In covering all this ground, Pasuk and Baker consistently take a political economy approach. They briefly venture into the realm of culture in short discussions of the rise of mass-market music, television, and novels, reform Buddhist movements, and movements to defend the village as a way of life. But it is their clear focus on the relationship between economic structure and change on the one hand, and political dynamics and outcomes on the other, that gives their work its sharp analytic edge.

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Pasuk and Baker's discussion of the land frontier is their most notable specific contribution to Thai studies. To say that Thailand had a land frontier until recent decades is not a novel argument. What Pasuk and Baker have done that is both new and significant is to provide among the most detailed histories of the changing contours and character of that frontier and analyze its location within Thailand's broader political economy. Their work is the first to fully grasp the political and economic consequences of the fact that Thailand had been a frontier society from feudal times up until the 1960s, when the state began closing off the forests to further expansion. The connection they draw between upland frontier areas and support for the communist insurgency is plausible and provocative. Although the authors do not explore this possibility, it could be argued that the existence of a land frontier provided part of the material underpinning for the loosely structured nature of Thai society noted by earlier scholars.

In short, this is a most compelling work, representing the most important study of Thai political and economic history to appear in many years.

JIM LOGERFO
Columbia University

The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits *by Tse-Kang Leng. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996. 157 pp. Cloth, $59.00; paper, $16.95.*

Taiwan is a work in progress. In a decade it has evolved from hard authoritarianism to free-wheeling democracy. Implacable anticommunism and rigid adherence to a one-China policy have given way to pragmatic diplomacy, as the internationally isolated regime tries to find ways to engage in substantive relations with all countries, including its mortal enemy, the communist-controlled China mainland. In this concise but meaty book, Tse-Kang Leng weaves together an analysis of the process of Taiwan's democratization with a case study of the making of economic policy toward the mainland. His larger objective is to demonstrate the fundamental change in state-society relations and how this has impacted the process of formulating and implementing policy.

The author presents a multicausal explanation for Taiwan's unlikely and generally peaceful democratization. He examines the interrelations between the rise of a dissident movement and splits in the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist) party. Using Samuel Huntington's terminology, Tse-Kang Leng argues that Taiwan was mainly a case of elite-led transformation, but he does not downplay the impetus from society. Taiwan now has a strong civil society and numerous alliances between elements in society and in the state.

A coherent and dedicated party-state was behind Taiwan's economic miracle, yet the last decade has seen this solidarity and autonomy from society largely evaporate. Since the end of martial law in 1987, elements in society have challenged the state's advocacy of a one-China policy and have supported independence for the island. Thousands of Taiwan businesses circumvented rigid prohibitions to engage in trade and investment with China, attracted by its inexhaustible labor supply and gargantuan market.

The state's response has been to create several official and unofficial organizations to manage cross-strait ties. The book lays these out and traces their ties to political patrons. The author then shows ways in which the business community attempts to influence both these bodies as well as the increasingly powerful legislative yuan (parliament), many of

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whose members unabashedly represent business interests, often their own. The result is a fascinating study of the creation of institutions to deal with a rapidly changing situation. The author concludes that the state has ended up chasing rather than governing economic ties with the mainland. Businesses ignore its rules and warnings that the communists may use them as hostages to further their goal of reunification. (Some analysis of the position of Taiwan's powerful military establishment on all of this should have been included). The state cannot even compile reliable data on these ties. There is a glaring gap in the figures for trade and investment put forward by the Taiwan and mainland authorities. Not mentioned in the book are the Taiwan state's recent moves to try to get the upper hand by promoting the island as the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center, to coordinate business in Southeast Asia as well as mainland China for local and foreign companies.

This is a work of synthesis supplemented by interviews, policy pronouncements, and journalism. Its origins as a dissertation are visible in the frequent, not always useful, references to theories and paradigms that are not critically evaluated. The reasons for selecting one over another are not well argued. The author quite rightly argues that the state-centered approach for explaining Taiwan's economic miracle is no longer valid, but then he proceeds to use it anyway, then concludes tautologically that it doesn't work, as the state has lost its coherence, bureaucratic efficiency, and autonomy from society.

Nonetheless, this is a solid and helpful piece of work.

THOMAS B. GOLD
University of California, Berkeley

Islam and Democracy *by John L. Esposito and John O. Voll. Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1996. 232 pp. Cloth $45.00; paper $17.95.*

Muslim Politics *by Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 235 pp. Cloth, $39.00; paper, $13.95.*

These two books ultimately are unsatisfying. They are written about a topic that is much on the public's mind—the phenomenon of Muslims taking an active part in politics *qua* Muslims. Both sets of authors, however, manage to avoid coming to grips with the problem they have set for themselves.

Esposito and Voll in the main are writing about Islam and democracy; that is, are Muslims ready for democracy? Can societies that are primarily Muslim accommodate democratic practice? The authors take the position that, whereas there are aspects of Islam that do not dispose its adherents toward democracy, as long as the societies are functional, there is nothing so wrong with that. Muslim societies tend to be patriarchal, and patriarchy is not democratic on the face of it.

Having said that, the authors give several case studies of recent developments in a number of Islamically oriented countries. Their accounts of Egypt, Iran, and Algeria are particularly good, because they are accurate; things did develop as they say they did. Where the accounts section falls down is that the authors do not go deeply into the events they cover. An example—they say that most of the antiregime activity in Algeria started within the so-called private mosque network. This is true. There sprang up in Algeria in the late 1980s numerous private mosques, which set up to dispense aid to needy Algerian Muslims. What one wants to know is, where did these private mosques come from? Why did the government

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let them set up in the first place, especially since they were so obviously competing with the official mosques subsidized by the state?

Eickelman and Piscatori fall short in another area. They have written a book titled *Muslim Politics*. How can one do that and leave out—by-and-large—any discussion of Hamas and Hizbollah? The two groups are key to understanding the rise of political Islam. One may have a theory as to why one thinks they are outside the discussion, but one really should share it with the reader.

In the end, what is most troubling is the virtual disregard by both sets of authors of the violence being perpetrated in the name of Islam by the groups. The level of violence in Algeria—to cite the worst case—is approaching surreal proportions. Is there something about the religion that predisposes its adherents toward this kind of extremism? I believe—along with the authors—that there is not. I was reassured to see the authors state this emphatically. However, that still leaves the problem of where the violence is coming from? If Islam is not behind it, what is?

If one wants to be enlightened about religious practice among Muslims and get accurate brief descriptions of various Muslim movements the world over, these books are useful. But learning about a religious phenomenon specifically tied to present day politics, is not on offer here.

STEPHEN PELLETIERE
U.S. Army War College

Development Strategies in Africa: Current Economic, Socio-Political, and Institutional Trends and Issues *edited by Aguibou Y. Yansane. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 292 pp. $55.00.*

This volume is the product of a symposium organized by the editor at San Francisco State University in 1990 aimed at evaluating development strategies in Africa. It brings together contributions from a number of prominent analysts of the African scene, some academics, others working as development practitioners and consultants. Aguibou Yansane should be congratulated on having managed to get original contributions from such busy persons as Ismail Serageldin of the World Bank, Ali Mazrui, Elliott Skinner, and Reginald Green.

The book begins with the editor's solid but somewhat lengthy review of development thinking in Africa since the early 1960s. The remainder of the book is divided into four sections, each devoted to a particular theme. Serageldin, Skinner, and Mazrui provide a global perspective on the African situation. The first two emphasize the importance of cultural variables and the role that traditional institutions play in national development, while Mazrui provides a scattered and speculative review of the issues associated with economic reform—"deplanning the economy," as he labels it. The remaining three parts of the book are much less substantive but deal in turn with the social dimensions of structural adjustment, participation and pluralism (written, interestingly, by economist Green), and development in a changing world. Each of the contributions in these parts is followed by questions and answers. Although it is rare to have such comments published at such length, they do add a flavor to the book that otherwise would be missing.

This volume suffers from the same shortcomings associated with edited pieces. It is very uneven in quality. It does not look as if the editor has been strong enough to extract revised

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versions of papers that would meet a common minimum standard. The chapters also vary considerably in length. Some are forty pages long, others less than ten. The chapters by the academics are particularly disappointing. Although both Ali Mazrui and Sam Nolutshungu (writing on African political development beyond the cold war) are raising a number of important points in their usually controversial manner, their analysis is quite superficial and does not do justice to the subjects they tackle. Reginald Green's piece does not lack length, but his maverick style of presenting his arguments leaves the reader often confused as to what really counts in African development. The volume also suffers from appearing six years after the symposium took place. A lot of water managed to flow under Africa's development bridges during that time.

In an overall assessment of the contributions to this volume, it is in the end the editor's own introduction that saves the product. Even though the author could have said what he wants in fewer words than is the case and there is an exaggerated reliance on political declarations issued by heads of state in Africa that have little or no significance in the contemporary context, his chapter is well researched. The overview of the evolution of development thinking in Africa is thorough and multifaceted and constitutes useful reading for both the newcomer and the more seasoned observer of the African scene. Without Aguibou Yansane's own thoughtful chapter, this volume would have added up to very little.

GORAN HYDEN
University of Florida

Israel in Comparative Perspective *edited by Michael N. Barnett. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996. 296 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Is Israel unique? That is ostensibly the question that guides the essays in this book, although most of them address the central theme only tangentially, if at all. Nonetheless, as the contributors include a number of leading scholars on Israel, the essays are of a uniformly high quality. Of particular interest are those that deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially Shibley Telhami's analysis ("Israeli Foreign Policy: A Realist Ideal-Type or a Breed of Its Own?") demonstrating the extent to which ideologically-driven territorial expansionism has characterized Israeli foreign policy singe 1948, and Ian Lustick's similar demonstration ("The Fetish of Jerusalem") of the importance of ideology in Israel's posture toward Jerusalem, the most intractable of the various issues that still divide Israel from the Palestinians and its other Arab neighbors.

The central theme of whether Israel should be regarded as normal or unique is addressed most directly by Michael Barnett and Yehezkel Dror. In his introductory essay, "The Politics of Uniqueness," Barnett points out that Zionism in the past and in Israel today has long been ambivalent about whether a Jewish state should aim at normalcy—that is, at being just a state, for better or worse, like any other—or on the contrary should be an especially moral or civilized state, an example for others to emulate, "a light unto the nations," in the language of the Old Testament.

This continuing ambivalence is particularly evident in the explicit or implicit demands Israel makes on other states—especially the United States—for support of its policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As Barnett writes, "For every statement by an Israeli leader that held Israel to higher standards and claimed that Israel must be different, another demanded that

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the international community judge Israel by the same criteria and categories used to judge most states" (p. 17). When Israel wishes to emphasize the moral obligation of the international community to provide political, economic, or even military support in its unresolved conflict with the Arab world, it emphasizes its moral uniqueness: the only democratic, Western—that is, *civilized*—state in the Middle East. On the other hand, whenever the West grows uneasy with Israel's policies in the conflict, especially toward the Palestinians, or reacts against the extensive violence that often accompanies Israeli policies, Israel demands to be treated as a state like any other state—that is, presumably one that has the right to be just as violent, ideologically rigid, careless of human rights, or unenlightened about its own national interests as any other.

Indeed, sometimes Israelis appear to insist that they be judged not by the highest but by the lowest common denominator, as when they complain that they are being held to different standards from their Arab adversaries. Well, of course they are: to the extent that Israel's behavior resembles that of, say, Syria, the sense of moral obligation and identification that has always been the foundation of Western support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict is called into question.

The book concludes with an essay by Yezehkel Dror, one of Israel's most renowned political scientists, "On the Uniqueness of Israel: Multiple Readings." In a largely theoretical analysis of the major Israeli belief systems, Judaism and secular Zionism, Dror argues that while religious Judaism clearly emphasizes the uniqueness of the Jewish people, modern Zionism, the more influential belief system in Israel today, can be reasonably interpreted in support of either Israeli normalcy or uniqueness. However, in a concluding personal note, Dror makes it plain where he stands: "My own normative stance is that the justification of Zionism and, indeed, of the perpetuation of the Jewish people as a separate and unique entity, lies in their potential for . . . creative contributions to humankind. . . . My reading of Israeli history is . . . one of an erosion of its radical uniqueness, which in my view undermines its raison d'etre and requires radically innovative policies" (p. 257).

JEROME SLATER
SUNY/Buffalo

On the Brink: The Dramatic Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War *by Jay Winik. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 672 pp. $30.00.*

In this rambling and gossipy book, Jay Winik offers a neoconservative view of how the Reagan administration won the cold war. He makes no effort to disguise his sympathies, and the result is a one-sided account that makes a strong but not fully convincing case.

His focus is on four former Democrats who became key players on the Reagan foreign policy team—Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and Max Kampelman. These four neoconservatives reflected one of the three dominant strands in the foreign policy debate of the 1970s. In contrast to what Winik refers to as the McGovernite position of liberal Democrats, soft on the Soviet Union and strong on economic aid to Third World countries, and the Nixon-Kissinger championing of détente to avert a nuclear showdown, these four cold warriors, followers of Senator Henry Jackson, believed that the Soviet Union was an evil regime that the United States had to confront and defeat.

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Winik focuses on two primary issues—the quest for meaningful arms control and the effort to contain the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. He makes a much more persuasive case on the nuclear issue than he does on the flawed policy of aiding the contras.

Two developments made the nuclear arms race especially dangerous in the 1980s. The first was the Soviet deployment in the late 1970s of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) aimed at NATO allies and the American decision to respond by basing over 500 cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe. Winik credits Perle with devising the zero-option proposal that President Ronald Reagan announced in late 1981, which called for eliminating all of the Soviet SS-20s as the price for the United States not to deploy its own INF beginning in 1983. In an exaggerated comparison, the author likens this situation to the Berlin blockade of 1948, with Reagan playing Harry Truman's role in standing firm in the face of the Soviet challenge. The Soviets retaliated by breaking off arms control talks; but the second development, Reagan's embrace of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, forced them back to the bargaining table. Winik sees the climax coming later in the decade when Reagan stood firm at Reykjavik, refusing to trade SDI for Soviet promises of large-scale cuts in offensive missiles, and then succeeded in gaining the INF agreement in 1987 that largely embodied Perle's zero-option proposal. Although he overstates the issues, Winik does offer a plausible case for Reagan's role in reining in the deadly arms race and contributing to the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union.

The author's argument on Nicaragua is much less effective. Adopting the position of Jeane Kirkpatrick and Elliott Abrams, Winik sees the Sandinistas as part of a Soviet plot to gain control of Central America and even Mexico and thereby endanger American security in the Western Hemisphere. He fails to offer any evidence of such a far-fetched plan and portrays the contras as a heroic band of freedom fighters. Winik views congressional efforts to limit American aid, notably the Boland amendment, as a highly partisan attempt to cripple the Reagan administration. Rather than condemn the extralegal methods used to assist the contras, which finally culminated in the Iran-contra fiasco, he blames the Boland amendment for forcing the Reagan administration into "a desperate search for dramatic actions in the contra effort" (p. 262).

Despite its evidence bias, Winik's book does offer a reasoned argument for the Reagan administration's role in bringing about victory in the cold war. Although he focuses on the lower-level bureaucratic struggle, Winik gives Reagan full credit for the crucial decisions that enabled the embattled former Democrats in his administration to prevail in forging policies that helped topple the Soviet empire. Unfortunately, like the revisionist diplomatic historians who blamed the United States for starting the cold war, Winik suffers from an ethnocentric obsession that ignores developments inside the Soviet Union that contributed to the end of the cold war. It is just as misleading to give the United States full credit for ending the cold war as it is to blame it for beginning the conflict in the first place. The collapse of the cold war was an international development that cannot be attributed solely to the actions of the United States.

ROBERT A. DIVINE
University of Texas at Austin

The Domestic Presidency: Policy Making in the White House *by Shirley Anne Warshaw. Needham Heights, MA, Allyn & Bacon, 1997. 229 pp. Paper, $22.00.*

Shirley Anne Warshaw assesses the evolution of a presidential staff for domestic policy making from the Nixon presidency through the congressional elections midway through Bill

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Clinton's first term. Individual chapters, which draw on archives, interviews, secondary sources, and government documents, are devoted to each of the domestic staffs of the six presidencies under consideration. These are sandwiched between introductory and concluding chapters that focus and summarize the book's central argument.

That argument has two parts. The first is that domestic policy making has become an institutionalized part of the White House staff organization. The second is that the effectiveness of any particular staff depends primarily on the clarity and intensity of the president's interest in the particulars of domestic policy.

By institutionalized, Warshaw means that a domestic staff recurs "from administration to administration, had continual presence within White House decision making, involved a staff with certain hierarchical qualities and bureaucratic functions, and whose primary responsibility was consistently focused on domestic policy" (p. 5). Although the domestic staff entities typically operate under different labels—the Domestic Council, the Domestic Policy staff, the Office of Policy Development, etc.—these titles mask a continuity in staff procedures, functions, and structures in the domestic realm.

Most scholars, I venture, will not dispute Warshaw's claim regarding staff institutionalization; it mirrors findings regarding the White House staff more generally. The more interesting issue, however, is whether domestic staff institutionalization makes any difference in terms of policy outputs, staff effectiveness, or presidential influence on the policy process. Although Warshaw never explicitly focuses on specific criteria by which to evaluate staff effectiveness, she does present a number of potential indicators, including whether the domestic unit has preeminence in the policy-making process and how well the policy-making process is managed. Ultimately, however, it appears that by "effective," Warshaw means a staff that serves presidential purposes.

Using this criteria, she argues that the domestic staffs headed by John Ehrlichman (Richard Nixon), Stuart Eizenstat (Jimmy Carter), and Martin Anderson (Ronald Reagan) were more effective than those directed by James Cannon (Gerald Ford), Roger Porter (George Bush), or Carol Rasco (Clinton). Evidently this had less to do with the strengths and weaknesses of the senior domestic aides, however, or the structural attributes of the staff arrangements, than with the particular president's interest in the details of domestic policy. Presidents with clearly defined policy goals tend to build larger domestic staffs and grant them more access to the Oval Office and greater influence.

This book's strength are the six substantive chapters; these provide a useful summary of the evolution of the domestic staff, although presidency scholars familiar with the staffing literature will find little that is descriptively new here. Each chapter numbers about 30-40 pages, and typically proceeds chronologically, beginning with the presidential campaign and/or transition to office and focusing on policies, staff structures, and personalities. Undergraduates interested in a descriptive summary will particularly benefit from Warshaw's avoidance of social science jargon and excessive theorizing. (There are some minor factual and editing errors; in footnote 61, p. 142, McFarlane's first name should be Robert, not William; Alexander George, not Roger Porter, probably deserves the credit for coining the phrase "multiple advocacy" [p. 168]; and the chart on p. 199 is incorrectly labeled on the y axis).

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and returns to the question of staff effectiveness. Here presidency scholars might find themselves wishing that Warshaw had spent a bit more time assessing the impact of staff institutionalization. As she notes, in the final analysis the effectiveness of the domestic unit depends heavily on the president. There is little evidence that staff structural or procedural features matter that much, since they

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largely reflect the president's interest in domestic policy. This raises the obvious question: how much have presidents benefited from the institutionalization of a White House-centered domestic policy staff? After reading Warshaw's account, and thinking back to presidents like FDR and LBJ, who lacked comparable domestic staff support but who are generally viewed as successful domestic policy leaders, one is tempted to answer: "Not much." Indeed, Warshaw's narrative provides evidence that the pitfalls of staff institutionalization, on balance, seem to outweigh the promise. Rather than develop a coherent set of politically feasible, fiscally responsible policy proposals, domestic staffs seem to spend most of their time firefighting—reacting to daily events in a catch-as-can manner. Those staffs that do try to "manage" policy development—the Bush domestic unit is a case in point—find themselves embroiled in a cumbersome, time-consuming process of meetings and memos, often with little to show. And, increasingly, budget and fiscal policy, which are usually outside the purview of the domestic staff, dominate the policy agenda.

Judging by Warshaw's account, the institutionalization of domestic staff support may have inadvertently raised expectations that presidents will develop a comprehensive set of legislative proposals without doing much in practice to achieve this goal. And when expectations outstrip capabilities, presidential reputations suffer, as Bush and now Clinton have learned. One wishes Warshaw had tackled this larger issue. In her defense, however, in so doing she might have gone too far afield from her primary objective: presenting a succinct summary of the evolution of the domestic policy staff since 1968. For the most part, she succeeds in this task. It is for other scholars to decide what to make of it.

MATTHEW J. DICKINSON
Harvard University

A Lost Cause: Bill Clinton's Campaign for National Health Insurance *by Nicholas Laham. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1996. 272 pp., $59.95.*

With this book, Nicholas Laham joins a growing body of analysts who have attempted to understand why President Clinton's health care reform effort failed. Unlike many other observers of health care reform debate, Laham notes that Clinton's efforts represented some degree of success in that Clinton succeeded "in moving national health insurance legislation further down the legislative process more than any other president." Despite this success, the "Clinton health care reform initiative ended the same way all previous such campaigns have—in failure" (p. 204). Laham attributes this failure to several causes: the opposition of the medical care industry and its substantial influence on Congress; business opposition to the plan; the lack of public support for the reform initiative; and policy disagreement within the Democratic party.

Significant segments of the medical care industry, including many providers of care and health insurance companies, opposed the reform effort because they feared that the cost-containment provisions of Clinton's proposal would be financially disadvantageous to them. They expressed their opposition to Congress, particularly the members on the committees concerned with health care legislation, and ensured a sympathetic audience by increasing campaign contributions to new levels. "During January 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994, contributions to congressional candidates from the [health care] industry increased 52 percent over the same period during the 1991-1992 congressional election cycle" (p. 58). Laham argues

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that members of Congress are thus "financially beholden" to the industry and cannot pass a national health insurance bill.

The business community also opposed the reform, even though it could have relieved some of the burden of cost-shifting of health care costs for the uninsured that large businesses encounter under the current system. Small business was opposed to any reform that would require them to pay for health insurance for their workers. Clinton lost the support of big business when they became convinced that the cost of new benefit package requirements would outweigh any savings from the elimination of cost-shifting.

Laham also notes that deep division within the Democratic party over the best policy course led to the ultimate failure of Clinton's effort. A significant and intransigent segment of the Democratic party insisted on a single-payer health insurance system. Without the support of this faction of the party, the president's plan did not have the congressional support it would need to pass.

The principal cause of the failure of Clinton's health care reform effort, though, was the loss of public support for the plan. Opponents of Clinton's proposal were quick to point out that the cost-containment provisions of the proposal would require the rationing of health care services for everyone. Under the current system, the 85 percent of the public with insurance enjoys more or less unlimited access to health care services, while the uninsured have severely limited access to care. The insured public became convinced that it had more to lose through the rationing of health care services than it had to gain from the security of guaranteed health insurance. Laham sees this as the most important lesson of the failure of Clinton's health care reform: "national health insurance will only be possible once the insured public fears the risk of becoming uninsured more than they do the certainty of health care rationing" (p. 219).

ANNE LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the Legislative Veto
by Jessica Korn. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 178 pp. $29.95.

In 1983, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto, which Congress had relied on for five decades to control executive agencies. By means short of a public law, the legislative veto required federal agencies to seek the approval or disapproval of Congress (one House, both Houses, or committees) before implementing policy. In *INS v. Chadha*, the Court told Congress to adhere to the full legislative process: bicameralism and presentment of a bill to the president. The decision convinced many that Congress had lost a vital means of controlling executive officials.

As Jessica Korn makes clear in this book, Congress had plenty of other arrows in its quiver. The invalidation of the legislative veto did not upset the balance of power between Congress and the president as many scholars and public officials believed. Korn correctly points out that "the legislative veto shortcut was inconsequential to congressional control of the policymaking process because of the extensive set of powers in the Constitution already available to members of Congress" (p. 13).

Korn documents her thesis by examining three areas covered by the legislative veto: the Federal Trade Commission, the Office of Education, and the Trade Act of 1974. Loss of

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the legislative veto did not prevent Congress from using the regular legislative process to control public policy. These chapters are close and perceptive studies of the interactions between Congress and federal agencies.

What makes the book less convincing is the theoretical framework. Korn uses Woodrow Wilson as a foil, faulting his analysis of American government. That is not difficult to do, but the connection between Wilson and the legislative veto is never clear. She claims that the legislative veto "was one of the most highly touted of the many proposals to reform constitutional structure that emerged out of the Wilsonian critique of the Constitution. Once it was actually enacted into law, it captivated the attention of those intent on countering the alleged flaws of the separation of powers system" (p. 4).

Wilson had no love for separation of powers, but he had no love for the legislative veto either. In 1920, he vetoed the Budget and Accounting Act because it provided for removal of the comptroller general and the assistant comptroller general by concurrent resolution (which is not submitted to the president for his signature). He vetoed another bill that year because it provided that no governmental publication could be printed, issued, or discontinued unless authorized under regulations prescribed by the Joint Committee on Printing. He said Congress had no right to endow a joint committee or any other committee "with power to prescribe 'regulations' under which executive departments may operate."

The concept of the legislative veto, as applied in the twentieth century, owes its origin to President Herbert Hoover, who wanted to make changes in executive structures without going through the regular legislative process. He proposed that the president be given authority to reorganize the executive branch, subject to the approval of a joint committee of Congress. The proposal that became law in 1932 allowed the president to reorganize subject to a one-House legislative veto. It would be quite a stretch to call Hoover a Wilsonian.

In the years since 1983, Congress has enacted about five-hundred new legislative vetoes. For the most part, they require agencies to seek approval from the Appropriations Committees before taking certain actions. Korn does not regard these legislative vetoes as very significant, because appropriations bills "do not become permanent law" (p. 40). That is, they cover one year. True, but the Court condemned *all* forms of legislative vetoes: short-term and long-term. If the one-House veto in the immigration statute was constitutionally offensive, surely committee vetoes are more objectionable. Korn also discounts the legislative vetoes in appropriations bills, because the requirement to seek prior approval from committees is "usually in report language" (p. 40). The five hundred legislative vetoes after *Chadha* are all in public law.

LOUIS FISHER
Congressional Research Service

In Contempt of Congress: Postwar Press Coverage on Capitol Hill *by Mark Rozell. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1996. 160 pp. $49.95.*

The fundamental thesis of Mark Rozell seems to be that Congress deserves a better press than it gets. No doubt, just about every public figure from President Bill Clinton down through Newt Gingrich, Saddam Hussein, the newly lionized Larry Flynt, and even jailed John Gotti can fault the press for undeserved ill-treatment. Pointing out the miscues, misdeeds, and character flaws in public figures is basic press practice.

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The fundamental question about Mark Rozell's thesis is whether he proves it. In this reviewer's opinion, he does not. Unquestionably, he offers ample evidence of the increasing negativity of the press toward Congress since the end of World War II. In the early postwar years, the news media were focused on the presidency. Later, the Congress got some attention through the investigations into crime with the Kefauver hearings and into Senator Joe McCarthy's escapades. Generally, the ratings were not bad. They became good—even glowing—as President Lyndon Johnson led the nation into the Great Society, and Congress liberally and vigorously supported the great adventure. The role of Congress—or the lack of one—in the great misadventure in Vietnam was quietly overlooked.

Then came Watergate, an original press production, which Congress picked up and carried responsibly to its necessary denouement. But after that, Rozell argues, it has been mostly downhill for members of the Congress, at least in the elite media. The nation's servants on Capitol Hill rarely have won praise for their work and, particularly in the 1990s, have been largely portrayed as self-serving politicians feathering their own nests and those of the special interests who help finance their reelections.

A fair portrait of the Congress? Not really, of course, but Rozell does not appear interested in presenting any material drawn from the press that portrays the performance of Congress in a favorable light. The book is one long drumbeat of negative statements taken from the news media's premier commentators over the past few decades. Only David Broder is cited as having defended Congress on occasions.

It should be noted that when Rozell refers to "the press," he is talking about an elite fraction of the print media world—the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the major newsweeklies, *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News and World Report*. The vast majority of the nation's newspapers, as well as the whole world of television journalism, are beyond the scope of his study. The justification for this narrow focus appears to be the belief that the elite media set the agenda and tone of reporting and commentary in the rest of the media world.

Using these specific sources, Rozell makes the case against the press in exhaustive detail and offers as proof of the low esteem in which Congress is held public opinion polls. That said, the real question becomes: Has the press made a good case against Congress, and is the low esteem in which our lawmakers are held fully justified?

Implicitly, Rozell is suggesting that it is not, but he offers scant evidence of Capitol Hill's positive contributions over the past two decades. Indeed, his conclusion is that the American public expects too much from its legislators, because "The press's image of what Congress should be is clearly incompatible with the traditional role of the legislative branch . . . the Constitution's framers designed Congress to frustrate the popular will as necessary, to *not* act in an efficient, innovative fashion" (p. 132).

Rozell's own prescription for improving the public perception of Congress is for the press to spend more of its time and space explaining legislative process and policy to a largely ignorant public and for Congress to create a public information office that would present a positive picture of its actions and contributions to the public welfare.

Lots of luck with the latter suggestion. In reporting what the fledgling public information office had to say on almost any subject, the press story would begin: "Congressional spin doctors today claimed. . . ." And Rozell could claim vindication of his thesis.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham Univeristy

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John Marshall: Definer of a Nation *by Jean Edward Smith. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1996. 736 pp. $35.00.*

As his subtitle warns us in advance, Jean Edward Smith has written a comfortably old-fashioned biography of John Marshall. For Smith, the chief justice is a great man, and great men make history; cast in the heroic mold, Marshall emerges from this study as eminently worthy of his high place in the American pantheon. To be sure, Smith is willing to admit that Marshall may have slipped once or twice—comingling clients' funds with his own, a practice modern legal ethics frowns on, perhaps even committing adultery with the Marquise de Villette during the XYZ Affair. But in this version Marshall never falters when it comes to the things that matter: he carries forward the nation-building project of the Founders; he defies both Thomas Jefferson and the rather more formidable Spencer Roane (incidentally, Jefferson comes off as a bit of a paper tiger in this telling); and he leaves his country better than he found it. In short, Smith has produced a biography that is probably best suited to a general audience without previous knowledge of the subject.

The story Smith tells is a very familiar tale, in its essence hardly differing from the one so memorably enshrined (entombed?) in Albert J. Beveridge's classic four-volume Marshall biography of 1916–1919. To say this is not to fault Smith; every modern Marshall biographer stands in the shadow of Beveridge's narrative. Smith is aware of the problem, of course, and he does his best to distinguish his version of the story from Beveridge's—but in vain, for at heart his is the same triumphalist rendering.

Readers who already know the broad outlines of Marshall's life and achievements will wonder what Smith's account has to offer them. These readers may be in for something of a disappointment. Thus—to take one rather prominent example—Smith makes no real effort to reconstruct the totality of Marshall's career at the bar in the 1780s and 1790s, nor does he attempt to tell us what, if anything, links the years of practice to the years on the bench. Instead, he focuses on such dramatic (and hackneyed) episodes as Marshall's defense of Richard Randolph in 1793. In any case, he overestimates Marshall's role in devising the winning strategy in that sordid bit of business. In contrast, the story of Marshall's appearance in *Ware v. Hylton* (1796), the only case he argued before the Supreme Court, is reduced to less than a paragraph.

Given the importance of Marshall's thirty-five years on the court—and after all it is only Marshall's tenure as chief justice that justifies a biography of this length—it will come as a surprise to learn that Smith devotes less than half his text to this crucial period. Even then, Smith spends over a hundred pages on Marshall's first decade as chief justice, leaving only some hundred and twenty to cover the next quarter-century, the years that produced many of Marshall's most important consitutional decisions. As for Marshall's nonconstitutional decisions—the bulk of his work on the court—by and large readers will have to go elsewhere if they want to know more about them; as far as Smith is concerned, only the constitutional opinions deserve examination.

Still, if Smith has relatively little to tell the informed student of Marshall, those who are new to the subject are likely to be well served by Smith's strategy of sticking to the tried and the true. They will find this a lively and well written biography, none too challenging intellectually, but at the same time intriguing enough, I hope, to whet their appetites for more.

HERBERT SLOAN
Barnard College, Columbia University

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Party Conflict and Community Development: Postwar Development in Ann Arbor *by Samuel J. Eldersveld. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 271 pp. Cloth, $52.50; paper, $19.95.*

Eldersveld uses the example of Ann Arbor, Michigan to argue that politics matter in local development. He maintains that there are certain prerequisites that must be in place for a community to develop to its full potential. These include official governmental organizations, political parties, interest groups, political leadership, the managerial resources of a city's elite class, and an interested, involved public. The book is written from the perspective of a student of local government and political elites, as well as that of a former mayor of Ann Arbor with long political ties and activities. Eldersveld uses forty-five years of data on the political and financial aspects of Ann Arbor to highlight what he suggests is an exemplar U.S. city.

The book begins with a description of the nature of development in the city from 1945 to 1990. Building off the premise that politics matter in local development, four chapters of the book focus on the city's political institutions (the government itself, political parties, interest groups) and their relative roles in its development. This discussion is augmented with a consideration of the political involvement of the city's top elite and the general public. Another four chapters are devoted to leadership styles and issues, as well as the nature and extent of public involvement in the city's politics. After laying out the various political considerations, Eldersveld turns his attention to a few budgetary decisions based on party politics and conflict. The book ends with an attempt to set the experiences of Ann Arbor in a broader context. As part of his treatment of the subject, Eldersveld includes local election results (1946–1993), highlights of key referenda, and an overview of general fund budget allocations (1945–1991).

Eldersveld artfully crafts the chapters to build and support his argument that party conflict is a key, if not the most essential, explanatory variable in the city's development. He also argues that Ann Arbor has become a model progressive city because of its leaders' ability to manage and bridge the inherent conflict between economic and redistributive development. It is this mixture of postwar political activity that is of interest to Eldersveld, who essentially argues that city development is a function of the interaction between political institutions and leadership, resources and public support. Eldersveld ultimately maintains that the experiences of Ann Arbor provide insights to a key question facing cities in the 1990s: "how do urban elites deal with their problems, their conflicts, and their needs, and manage effectively what resources they have not only to survive, but also prosper?" (p. 9). It is important to note that Ann Arbor is a unique city; as such, the author's findings may have limited generalizability.

As an accounting and explanation of Ann Arbor's postwar development, this book is an ambitious undertaking. It is rich in detail and comprehensive in treatment. However, the main points are sometimes lost in a barrage of details and sidebars on concepts and points of fact. This makes the book difficult to read at times; but if one perseveres, it is well worth the attention and effort. It is quite possible to develop a love-hate relationship with the book. The basic argument made is interesting, and the points to be gleaned are worthwhile, if the reader is willing to wade through voluminous detail on a range of issues from a model of party conflict in the city to an explication of budget decisions. The book is of value to students of local government and governance processes, with a word of caution. It is a slow read, but patience and a good underlying argument do prevail.

CYNTHIA Y. JACKSON
Michigan State University

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Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development *by Alberta M. Sbragia. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996. 296 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $22.95.*

The community power debate raised the question of who governs: is it plural interest groups, a power elite, or a capitalist ruling class? Alberta Sbragia's brilliant synthesis of the literature on local public investment argues that we have ignored an obvious alternative—public officials themselves. The politics that takes place between governments, as public officials seek to maximize their institutional autonomy, is as important as the politics that takes place within governments.

Debt Wish is organized historically, with each chapter demonstrating a different phase in the dialectical struggle as governments attempt to assert their power vis-à-vis other governments. Sbragia demolishes the myth of laissez faire by showing how city governments were deeply involved in economic development in the nineteenth century, going deeply into debt to attract railroads. The panic of 1873 precipitated massive municipal bond defaults, and many cities repudiated their bonds. States responded by setting limits on local indebtedness.

In the twentieth century, cities devised two methods to circumvent state restrictions: the revenue bond and the public authority. These two inventions enabled cities to evade debt limitations. Sbragia shows how by the mid-1980s tax-exempt borrowing had shifted from infrastructure to economic development, subsidizing a long list of revenue-generating projects, all the way from K-Marts to convention centers. Ironically, the actions that governments took to maximize their autonomy came back to restrict them. Public authorities, for example, often frustrate the very city governments that created them. Finally, Sbragia demonstrates how Washington, facing massive leakage in federal tax revenues, took control, enacting the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which put stringent caps on private-activity bonds.

Sbragia's approach to the relationship between states and markets is insightful. From her viewpoint, to talk about "market pressures" is an abstraction, because governmental actions construct markets. *Debt Wish* can be viewed as an historical study of the political construction of the market for tax-exempt bonds, with each historical phase having characteristic biases. Her insight into the historical contingency of capitalist markets comes out especially clearly in her insightful comparisons to the British case.

Sbragia's adherence to a public-choice, rational-actor model, however, ultimately weakens her analysis. She begins with the assumption that local governments are "unitary actors" (p. 5), pursuing greater institutional autonomy. In order to achieve autonomy, public officials must adapt the city to economic imperatives, doing what is necessary to attract investors and middle class residents. Sound familiar? The reader's suspicion is confirmed by a Paul Peterson quote on the book jacket praising *Debt Wish* for demonstrating "that the country has long had and continues to have highly effective industrial policies—carried out by economically competitive state and local governments." Sbragia reinforces Peterson by stressing that each action was designed "to shore up the economic and tax base on which local government's financial health depends" (p. 171).

In fact, there is no unambiguous economic imperative. Moreover, local officials have to be as much concerned with distribution as with growth—because the distribution of rewards is how they buttress their political support. Robert A. Caro's detailed biography of Robert Moses makes this clear.

Sbragia wants to expand the definition of politics to include intergovernmental politics, but the way she theoretically constructs this politics makes it bloodless—anonymous offi-

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cials with green eyeshades maximizing their cities' interest. Given Sbragia's analysis, it makes no difference whether the public officials are white or black, from the upper class or the working class.

If Sbragia had tied intergovernmental politics and the biases of the rules to shifting interests in the economy and society, her analysis would have been complete. Notwithstanding its flawed rational-actor assumptions, Sbragia's *Debt Wish* is an impressive scholarly work demonstrating command of diverse literatures. It is a must read for everyone interested in local public finance.

TODD SWANSTROM
State Universtiy of New York at Albany

Kindred Strangers: The Uneasy Relationship between Politics and Business in America *by David Vogel. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 415 pp. $35.00.*

Political scientist David Vogel has been studying American business-government relations for more than two decades, and now with this book readers can sample key aspects of his scholarship. *Kindred Strangers* combines eleven of Vogel's previously published articles with a conference paper and ties the essays together with an introduction specifically written for this volume. Throughout this collection are three major themes: the importance of understanding context—historical and comparative as well as political and social—when studying the intersection of business and politics; the distinctiveness of American business and its relationship to government; and the fragmentary nature and fluctuating political power of the American business community.

The opening essays examine the American pattern of business-government relations in light of that same relationship in other capitalist nations. Under the scrutiny of a comparative framework, Vogel finds that American business is exceptional in a number of ways. Compared to their counterparts, American business elites maintain a greater suspicion and distrust of government. This distinctiveness is also evident in the areas of American regulation, which Vogel characterizes as confrontational and adversarial. Furthermore, Americans hold their corporations and business leaders to much higher standards of conduct than those in other capitalist nations.

Part two of the book explores the social and political environment in which American business operates. Vogel focuses on the development and impact of public interest activism. Beginning in the late 1960s, public interest advocates sought to curb the power of business. But unlike New Dealers, who looked to big government to regulate the private sector, these reformers relied on public participation and the federal courts to oppose corporate prerogative.

Beyond using the judiciary, advocates of corporate accountability have employed direct lobbying efforts including product boycotts, publishing exposes, or challenging company policy with shareholder resolutions at annual meetings. Such citizen challenges to business are significant, because they assisted government regulatory agencies and heightened public awareness. For Vogel, however, the very act of opposition to corporations is more important than the immediate impact. Businesses now must be aware of how their decisions will affect society and be prepared to defend their policies against public outcry.

This second section ends with an interesting article studying four cases where consumers fought against protective regulations intended to protect their health and safety. It describes

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the successful campaigns to eliminate automobile seat belt systems with ignition interlocks, to abolish a mandatory motorcycle helmet law, to overturn the ban on saccharin, and to speed up the time it took the Food and Drug Administration to approve new drugs for public use. While Vogel notes that this type of citizen opposition to health and safety regulations rarely occurs, he explains that all the above cases involved high visibility issues, the regulations interfered with consumers' freedom of choice, and consumers felt they better understood their own self-interest than did the government.

The final essays consider the topic of corporate power. Here Vogel attacks the idea that business holds a privileged position in American society and wields a constant and inordinate amount of political power. Instead, he argues, the business community is fragmented, its power fluctuates over time, and it is best understood within a model of interest-group politics. Furthermore, compared to corporate interests in other capitalists countries, American business has been less influential than its overseas peer group.

For scholars in the fields of business history, management, and public policy, *Kindred Strangers* will be familiar terrain, but for the uninitiated, this volume is a valuable and accessible introduction to the work of David Vogel and business-government relations.

WILLIAM B. FRIEDRICKS
Simpson College

Beyond the Broker State: Federal Policies Toward Small Business 1936–1961 *by Jonathan J. Bean. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 281 pp. Cloth $45.00; paper, $16.95.*

This book presents an historical analysis of federal policies toward small business over a thirty-five year period. These policies have been aimed at protecting small firms, primarily in the retail distribution sector, from competition from larger, presumably more efficient businesses, most notably chain stores.

Congress has sought to assure the survival of small businesses in America through a variety of devices, including the Robinson-Patman Act, which restricted the ability of manufacturers to offer "unfair" discounts to chain stores, legislation establishing a Smaller War Plants Division within the War Production Board to see that small firms received a fair share of defense contracts, and the establishment of Small Business Administration to provide financial support for smaller firms.

Throughout this period, small business found a number of vocal supporters in Congress, most notably Wright Patman, whose populist roots made them highly critical of "big business." Given the deep rooted sympathy for the small business owner within American political culture, these political entrepreneurs were able to exert more influence over public policy than was warranted by the actual influence of the lobbies representing small business. Indeed, Jonathan Bean notes that small business owners never became politically mobilized and that there is little evidence that they actually supported the policies carried out in their name. "Most small business owners lack any interest in politics and government" (p. 177).

Moreover, for all the rhetoric from politicians about the need to protect small business, it is by no means clear that they actually needed protection. Most of the laws enacted to benefit small firms were poorly enforced. Yet small firms have continued to prosper. For all the rhetoric from politicians about "the issue of big versus small business" the two have continued to coexist throughout the twentieth century history of corporate capitalism.

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This is an informative, well-researched book that does an excellent job of situating federal policies toward small business in the context of the broader history of business-government relations. However, because the book's scope is confined to federal policies—which, as the author convincingly demonstrates, have generally been both modest and ineffective—the narrative lacks historical drama. For example, we learn nothing about the distinctive political role or beliefs of small business owners in shaping the history of business-government relations.

Thus, what role if any did they play in opposing particular policies of the New Deal, such as the Wagner Act? Have there been important policy differences between large and small firms within umbrella organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce of the United States or the National Association of Manufacturers? And, if so, over what issues? What about among trade associations? Certainly, small firms appeared to have played a particularly critical role in defeating Bill Clinton's health care initiatives. Is there any historical precedent for this? Or is this the first time small business owners have become interested in politics? By confining his analysis only to those policies affecting small firms, the author has missed much of the political significance of small business.

Finally, the historical scope of this study is puzzling. Why begin in 1936, the year after the National Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional? Certainly the NRA marked a particularly important federal initiative to stabilize the economy in order to protect small firms and their employees. And what, if anything, is distinctive about 1961?

I am sure this book was a fine dissertation. But before making it into a book, the author should have expanded its scope. The result would have been both a more important and interesting book.

DAVID VOGEL
University of California, Berkeley

Fetal Rights, Women's Rights: Gender Equality in the Workplace *by Suzanne Uttaro Samuels. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. 225 pp. Cloth, $32.50; paper, $12.95.*

This book joins several other recent volumes dealing with the subject of fetal protection policies and their impact on women' employment opportunities in the United States and in comparative perspective. The other volumes include Sally Kenney's *For Whose Protection?,* Cynthia Daniels's *At Women's Expense*, and Robert Blank's *Fetal Protection in the Workplace.* During the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of private employers adopted fetal protection policies such as barring fertile women from working in jobs that might expose fetuses to toxins unless the women were sterilized. The motives of employers were mixed in adopting such policies according to the authors who have investigated this issue: rather than deal with the problem of toxic exposure, simply create blanket prohibitions on women's employment; concern about tort liability; decreased insurance costs for maternity benefits. Women workers were denied the opportunity to make their own choice about employment. The effects on male and female workers may have been even more profound than the impact on those directly affected, including the failure to monitor male exposure to toxins, increased job segregation for women workers and exclusion from high paying jobs with benefits, and the reinforcement of gender stereotypes through the equating of women with their reproductive function. Virtually all the books dealing with women's rights and fetal protec-

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tion include discussion of the landmark *UAW v. Johnson Controls* case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1991. It challenged the exclusion of women from jobs based on their reproductive capacities. The court held that Johnson Controls violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by treating all women as potentially pregnant; it discriminated by classifying employees based on gender and child bearing capacity. What is the justification for yet another book on this topic and to what extent does Samuels bring either new data or a new perspective to bear on this important topic?

Samuels's treatment of the fetal protection issue is distinguished by her inclusion of material related to congressional and administrative policies in addition to judicial cases. This study lies squarely in the literature of political science and public policy, in contrast to the other treatments mentioned. Samuels's argument is that governmental decision makers in Congress and the executive branch throughout the 1980s and 1990s failed to respond effectively to the increased use of fetal protection policies by employers, necessitating action by the courts. She calls particular attention to the linkage between fetal protection and abortion politics, as well as the history of protective labor legislation for women, which preceded the new wave of fetal protection policies generated by employers. The book analyzes the relationship between fetal protection policy and other sex discrimination policies, including Title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) approach to it. Samuels finds that the EEOC did little to advance the cause of women's equality in the face of continued exclusion based on reproductive capacity. The role of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration is similarly scrutinized and found deficient.

Samuels's analysis of judicial policy making in *Johnson Controls* and other cases also suggests the limitations of court rulings. While the nine Supreme Court justices concurred in the Johnson case, they disagreed on the permissibility of exclusionary policies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Samuels is concerned that although the Court refused to acknowledge the concept of "independent fetal right" as lower courts had done, the door was left open to the subordination of women's right, for example, if companies could prove financial insolvency. Samuels argues convincingly that fetal protection issues were treated differently by the branches of government than they were on other sex discrimination issues. To fully justify that view, it would be necessary to provide a fuller review of other, related policies during the Reagan/Bush era.

The debate over fetal protection and women's rights has important theoretical consequences, as well as practical ones. The debate relates directly to ongoing controversies dealing with equality and difference between the sexes, as well as protection of pregnant women. These arguments could be fleshed out a bit more fully in the book. Samuels's emphasis on reliance on judicial policy making, often with uncertain results, because of the failure of Congress and administrative agencies to act to remedy discrimination, is not without precedent. Is it the close connection with abortion that led to inaction in the executive and legislative branches? More explanation of the failure to act legislatively and administratively would be in order. Finally, Samuels's pessimism regarding the legacy of the courts in this policy area needs to be tested by analysis of recent developments in implementation under the purportedly more friendly Clinton administration. *Fetal Rights, Women's Rights* provides a useful policy study on which to build further investigation and analysis.

JOYCE GELB
City University of New York

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Women Politicians and the Media *by Maria Braden. Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky, 1996. 235 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

This book achieves three important goals. First of all, it is a brief, colorful history of the major political campaigns waged by women in this century for positions in both houses of Congress, for state governorships, and for the presidency and vice-presidency. Some of the book's characters make cameo appearances only; others are treated with a fair amount of detail. Among the latter are Jeanette Rankin of Montana, the opening character, who is typical of the independent spirit that characterizes many of the women who were willing to defy tradition and enter the public sphere. Others are Maine Senator Margaret Chase Smith and Representative Geraldine Ferraro (NY) who made unsuccessful runs for the presidency and vice-presidency, respectively. They are joined by Bella Abzug (NY) and Barbara Jordan (TX), who acquired nationwide notoriety in one case, and fame in the other, during their careers in the House of Representatives; and governors Ann Richards (TX) and Christine Todd Whitman (NJ), who were considered potential candidates for the vice-presidency, if not the presidency.

The book also chronicles the role of the press in the success and failure of women. That role has ranged from ignoring women candidates almost entirely, thereby denying them the chance to become known and attract support and money, to covering them primarily as stereotypes, defined in terms of their physical attributes including clothes and hairstyles and their housekeeping and child care skills. Even more damaging, reporters—women no less than men—have often vilified female candidates, suggesting that they lacked the qualities required for successful office holders. Women are depicted as weak, indecisive, and emotional. Unlike men, they are held accountable for misdeeds by their husbands and children.

Lastly, *Women Politicians and the Media* chronicles a major twentieth-century social revolution that has freed large numbers of American women from confinement to the private sphere of the home and hearth. While that as yet unfinished revolution has progressed without much bloodshed, this book illustrates how much untold suffering and psychological and economic damage it has inflicted on women politicians.

Given its rich detail, much of it based on interviews with the book's protagonists, the book is bound to appeal to general readers as well as to social scientists. The latter group will find it short on methodological detail. Braden, who teaches journalism at the University of Kentucky, does not tell us how she chose the women whose stories are chronicled here. Obviously, she cast her net broadly, but we do not know who was excluded and why and how the decision was made to treat some politicians extensively and others merely in passing. More problematic, we do not know how the author selected the news story examples that she quotes. There are dozens of interesting excerpts that show how women's capabilities and aspirations were treated with derision, but we do not know how representative and pervasive such examples were in the coverage of particular women and to what extent they damaged their campaigns.

The author excels in alerting readers to unfair coverage of women's political qualifications, but she underemphasizes the fact that women often bring unique talents to public office. These talents should be judged in terms of the duties of the particular office, rather than by standards that take typical male behavior as the preferred norm. For the sake of a balanced presentation, it should also be noted that briefer coverage of women, compared to men, is often due to political circumstances rather than reporters' gender biases. Most women still have less seniority in office than men and therefore do not occupy the leadership positions that have traditionally attracted the heaviest media coverage.

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In sum, *Women Politicians and the Media* is a fascinating account of the types of obstacles that have plagued the campaigns of prominent female candidates for Congress, the presidency, and governorships. But it lacks the detachment and perspective that one expects from a scholarly monograph. For the average reader, that is probably a blessing rather than a flaw, because monographs, unlike this sprightly written volume, rarely are much fun to read.

DORIS A. GRABER
University of Illinois at Chicago

Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union *by Michael Newman. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 236 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

Michael Newman poses an important and all-too-often neglected question: What are the implications of European integration for democracy? As Newman recognizes, the answer to this question depends largely on one's definition of democracy. For many opponents of integration, such as the Euroskeptic wing of the British Conservative party, democracy is intimately linked to the nation-state; integration, or the transfer of national governmental powers to supranational institutions, therefore, represents a profound threat to democracy. Newman defines democracy somewhat differently, however, to include not only formal rights of political participation and the accountability of government to the people, but also the achievement of economic and social justice. The realization of this latter idea of democracy, he argues, rather than the consequences for national sovereignty, should be the goal by which the European Union (EU) is judged. Assessing the extent to which integration has promoted this goal of democratization is the fundamental purpose of this book.

To determine this Newman examines, in separate chapters, developments in the realms of EU economic and social policy, the impact of integration on regionalization, the idea of EU citizenship, and the "democratic deficit" in EU institutions and decision making. Of these chapters the most interesting is the one on regionalization, in which Newman offers a somewhat skeptical view of the fashionable idea of a "Europe of the regions." The gains from regionalization of enhanced democratic control, he argues, must be weighed against increased economic imbalance and the loss of policy effectiveness due to political fragmentation. A Europe of the regions, in other words, may be detrimental to realizing the democratic goals of equality and social justice. In the chapter on citizenship, Newman argues against a form of EU citizenship that would be as exclusionary as most national variants.

In the book's conclusion, Newman argues that the institutional form of the EU, whether a supranational federal state or a confederal "Europe of nation-states," is not as important as its effectiveness in realizing the goals of democracy and social justice. It is also not so important for Newman whether the EU in the future follows a "multispeed" path, as seems increasingly likely, or adheres to its original design of one-speed uniformity. For all its potential problems, he argues, a multispeed EU would be preferable to the current immobilism if it would allow progress, even if initially among only a smaller group of countries, toward the goal of democratization.

To the question of whether the EU has been a good thing for democracy, Newman gives a generally positive answer, although this is stated largely implicitly. That Newman could reach such a conclusion, despite his recognition that integration has thus far been a fairly

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elitist process, is attributable to his particular conception of democracy with its emphasis on social and economic outcomes. As he states in the conclusion, the political institutions of decision making "cannot be detached from the goals of empowerment, equality, liberty, human rights and solidarity" (p. 204). This positive answer is not wholly substantiated by the evidence presented in the previous chapters, however, which paints a very mixed picture at best of the EU's consequences for Newman's ideal of democracy. In the end, the book reflects the author's basically idealistic and optimistic views of what the EU is all about and what it can become. It is for this reason, however, a useful rebuttal to excessively statist views of the EU and narrow-minded, nationalistic Euroskepticism.

Not all readers will agree with the underlying assumptions of this book that democratization is the fundamental goal of the EU and therefore the criteria by which integration should be judged. Nor will they necessarily agree with Newman's particular idea of democracy. Nonetheless, this is a highly stimulating and refreshing book that looks at the EU from a perspective that is different from the usual arid theoretical debates between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists. It is thus a valuable addition to the theoretical literature on the EU, which focuses on issues of direct relevance and importance to average citizens.

MICHAEL J. BAUN
Valdosta State University

International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods *by Harold James. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 768 pp. $45.00.*

The Debate on Money in Europe *by Alberto Giovannini. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995. 373 pp. Cloth $42.00.*

Harold James has written an admirably clear and thorough history of monetary relations in the postwar era, focusing on the evolution of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the context of a changing world political economy. His stated goal is to demystify the workings of the international monetary system and to make cooperation in international organizations such as the IMF more widely acceptable to the broader public. The book was commissioned by the IMF to mark its fiftieth anniversary, yet it was independently researched and subsequently reviewed by an outside editorial committee. The author had full access to the IMF archives and interviewed an astonishing number of the most pivotal actors in the monetary history, sources that no doubt contributed much to the crafting of this even-handed and excellent book.

Although the book is very much a work of economic history, and thus does not employ the theoretic and analytic conventions of political science, students of the latter discipline should find it an invaluable source of information and ideas. James begins the book with an overview of the permanent problems faced by states in an open international economic system, namely the political and economic dynamics involved in the interplay of internal and external economic adjustment. Three themes are introduced and used to frame the discussions throughout the book: the relation of monetary developments to the international economy; the destabilizing potential of national policy responses to the demands of adjustment; and the role of international institutions such as the IMF to intermediate among states, and between states and markets, to promote prosperity in a globalized economy.

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The historical chapters form the core of the book, beginning with the debates leading up to the establishment of the Bretton Woods system at end of World War II, moving toward fuller convertibility of currencies for the developed nations of the Western world (but less so for the developing countries). James details how the postwar years saw significant changes in the role of the IMF away from a purely rule-based regime to one in which cooperation—consultation, negotiation, and information gathering and dissemination—became the crucial function. The historical survey then explores the reemergence of international capital markets and the crises that brought about the end of the formal Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. Highlights of the following chapters include the attempts at coordination within the G-7 Group, the debt crisis, the rise of regional economic agreements, financial crises in the developing world, and the transition of the former communist economies to market systems.

The concluding chapter may be the most thought provoking to politics students. James provides a useful summary and analysis of the postwar history and draws out some of the key issues faced by policy makers today. He examines the problem of surveillance and market reactions when capital is highly mobile, and the tendency of policy makers to seek narrow policy solutions to systemic problems of cooperation. James notes that the intellectual consensus in support of market-based solutions that emerged over the 1980s should make the realization of increased cooperation more likely, as shared learning can be a powerful tool for international economic stabilization. He argues that we are today in an "information standard," one in which institutions like the IMF will become ever more important if the political will exists to use them effectively, and concludes with a brief sketch of how the IMF might develop in conjunction with the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the G-7, and the Bank for International Settlements.

Giovannini's book is a collection of previously published writings on the subject of European monetary integration. For those familiar with the work of this economist and policy maker, it will offer only the convenience of having the articles in one place; but for the uninitiated, it is a terrific opportunity to discover an economist whose superb technical skills do not get in the way of clarity and policy relevance. Even political scientists with minimal economic training should be able to learn from Giovannini's conclusions, and those with more training will enjoy following his analyses.

The articles are grouped into serviceable thematic sections. The book begins with a consideration of the workings of fixed exchange rate regimes, of which political scientists are likely to find the historical analyses of past and present monetary systems most helpful. Following on topics such as the Delors Report and the transition to a Monetary Union, concluding with two articles on the implementation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). One article is particularly interesting for students of political economy, "Economic and Monetary Union: What Happened? Exploring the Political Dimension of Optimum Currency Areas." This piece, previously published in a conference report, analyzes the distributional gains and losses from monetary union. Giovannini's conclusions—that private sectoral interests are either not identifiable or unstable—flies directly in the face of recent work in political science on the role of sectoral interests in monetary union.

KATHLEEN R. MCNAMARA
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

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The New Untouchables: Immigration and the New World Worker *by Nigel Harris. London and New York, I.B. Tauris & Company, 1995. 254 pp. $35.00.*

As labor migration increases with the globalization of all elements of economic activity (the trade of goods, the flow of capital, and the circulation of information), hostility toward immigrants worsens. No matter which countries are on the sending or receiving ends, the dynamics and patterns appear to be the same. Nigel Harris (professor of Development Studies, London University) seeks to understand this phenomenon, to connect it with changes in the role and organization of the state in the global economy, and to offer an alternative vision, which contradicts popular opinion. He draws on data and historical experiences from all over the world.

He argues that from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, nation states grew in power and stature, in part by entering into social democratic compacts with their own populations. Typically, this rested on an enforced internal cultural homogeneity. All "citizens" could then expect certain perquisites and protections, granted in exchange for their economic productivity and their political loyalty. Immigration controls went hand-in-glove with this constructed homogeneity.

The new global economy has not only rent asunder this old social compact, but it is promoting a return to a "cosmopolitan capitalism" (p. 7), which antedated this nation state system. Calls for increased controls over immigration reflect a rearguard effort to return to a system that is no longer practical.

Harris argues that such a perspective is seriously misguided. Modern nation states cannot realistically expect to control the flows of people across their borders. Moreover, immigration itself, he argues, is beneficial rather than detrimental to the interests of working people in the developed countries. We would all benefit most, Harris concludes, if the economic liberalization already applied to trade, capital, and information were extended to the movement of people.

This is hardly a novel argument. Any number of treatises on economic theory, particularly those written from a free market perspective, make this case. Typically, they offer models which are accepted or rejected on ideological grounds.

The New Untouchables is more interesting, however. The author has attempted to place this laissez-faire argument on a different basis. He draws not only on economics, but also on history, political theory, and sociology. His new contributions seem to lie in two areas. In the first place, he argues that the "immigration problem" is not really about the movement of people from country to country, but is about "the state and the social foundations of its power" (p. 87). Second, he contends that developed societies and their workforces benefit from immigration, particularly the unskilled labor that takes jobs unwanted by longtime residents.

Immigration has become defined as a "problem," Harris argues, as the power of the nation state and the meaning of nationality have entered a new era. Economic globalization has weakened the state formations which were shaped by the dynamics of the late nineteenth century, formations that involved not merely the powers of the government but also the construction of citizenship and national identities. According to Harris, both these states and their correlative identities have been relegated to the dustbin of history, from which they cannot be resurrected, regardless of political willpower or ideology.

He also argues that developed states and their populations would be better off without trying to impose new limits. He marshals diverse evidence to suggest that immigrants by

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providing sources of cheap, unskilled labor provide profits, demand, and labor needs that enable other sectors of the domestic working class to climb to higher-paying, more desirable jobs. They also contribute to taxes, social security payments, and other resources from which the entire population benefits.

Despite the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments on a wide basis, there are "grounds for cautious optimism," Harris concludes, as "an antiquated national political system is being dragged along by a world economy" (p. 228). He is certainly right that this argument cuts against "conventional wisdom." Whether his argument is sound or not will depend more on what happens in the years ahead, rather than on either historical patterns or recent events.

PETER RACHLEFF
Macalester College

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Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. and NIS Perspective on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program *edited by John M. Shields and William C. Potter. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1997. Paper, 427 pp. $22.50.*

Documents on European Union *edited and translated by A. G. Harryvan and J. vande Harst. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997. 313 pp. $45.00.*

How to Access the Federal Government on the Internet 1997: Washington Online *by Bruce Maxwell. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. 455 pp. Paper, $28.95.*

Index to International Public Opinion, 1995–1996 *prepared by Survey Research Consultants International, edited by Elizabeth Hann Hastings and Philip K. Hastings. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 800 pp. $295.00.*

Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection *edited by David M. Barrett. College Station, TX, Texas A & M University Press, 1997. 906 pp. $94.00.*

Political Commentators in the United States in the 20th Century: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook *by Dan Nimmo and Chevelle Newsome. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 448 pp. $95.00.*

Politics in America 1998: The 105th Congress *by Philip D. Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence with CQ's Political Staff. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997. 1648 pp. Cloth, $96.95; paper, $55.95.*

Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century *edited by Zalmay Khalilzad and David A. Ochmanek. Santa Monica, CA, Rand, 1997. 377 pp. Paper, $20.00.*

Strategic Survey 1996/97 *by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. New York, Oxford University Press, 1997. 268 pp. Paper, $35.00.*

Vital Signs 1997: The Environmental Trends that are Shaping Our Future *by Lester R. Brown, Michael Renner, and Christopher Flavin. New York, W. W. Norton, 1997. 165 pp. Paper, $12.00.*

The Wisconsin State Constitution: A Reference Guide *by Jack Stark. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 296 pp. $79.50.*

Notice to Members of the Academy

In accordance with the bylaws, the annual corporate meeting of the Academy of Political Science will be held on Monday, January 26, 1998 at 1:00 P.M. in the Academy's conference room at 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, New York, for the purpose of electing directors, presentation of the president's annual report, and the transaction of such other business as shall come before the meeting.

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Everett Carll Ladd's article, "1996 Vote: The 'No Majority' Realignment Continues," PSQ 112 (Spring 1997), reproduces uncritically some of the conventional wisdom of the day, such as that the 1996 elections reflect a move to the right of the American electorate and that Bill Clinton won because he responded to that move.

As proof that Americans moved to the right, Ladd presents a few polls in which people were asked how they feel about government, showing that the number of people who were favorable to more government intervention declined during the last fifty years. He compares 1941 and 1954 with 1994 and 1996. The rest of the article tries to explain the reasons for that supposed change and its political consequences.

Trying to elicit people's feelings toward government by asking them about government is not convincing enough evidence of people's actual responses to government. Government is a heavily loaded term that is too generic a word to have much meaning in people's lives. More relevant questions would have inquired about people's feelings toward social security, Medicare, or other highly popular government programs. There is no evidence on that front to support that there has been much change in people's attitudes. Not even during the Republican revolution.

As to Clinton's victory in 1996 due to its conservatism, one should first explain why Clinton was less popular than Robert Dole until November 1995, when Clinton appeared as the defender of Medicare and Social Security in the face of the Republican conservative avalanche. Newt Gingrich made Clinton popular. This alternative should have at least been considered and explained why it was rejected. To assume that Clinton was elected president because people were more conservative does not hold up in view of the polls.

Vicente Navarro
Johns Hopkins University

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

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

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

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

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

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